THE PLACE AND FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
ROBERT KRAMER*

Administrative Process is an experiment with 'human nature'. In the sheer
scope and the nobility of its effort, it has reason to expect more patience and
tolerance, and more careful study, than it has received in some quarters.'
INTRODUCTION

Today we are witnessing a period of intensive criticism and reappraisal
of the entire administrative process. The immediate cause no doubt of

the furor of study, writing, and speech-making in this area is the now
famous 1955 Reports of the Second Hoover Commission and its Task

Force.2 These Reports, with modifications, have become the basis for a
legislative program sponsored by the American Bar Association, which,

if enacted substantially in its present form, will, if the aims of its
sponsors are fulfilled, have effects perhaps as drastic and far reaching
*
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on federal administrative law as did the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946.
I. THE ADVENT OF BIG GOVERNMENT
There are perhaps more fundamental factors which give rise to this
vigorous contemporary debate over the administrative process. Most
Americans have an almost instinctive distrust and dislike of government,
especially big government. While grateful for the bounties it renders to
us, we resent the ever increasing governmental intrusions into so many
aspects of our private lives. Everywhere we look, everything we read
or hear, portends more, not less, government; bigger, not smaller,
bureaus, on every level-local, state, and federal.
There are those4 who counsel that democracy, as we know it, is wholly
incompatible with social and economic planning by the state, with big
government, and with a multitude of administrative agencies. They
would have us believe that unless we can somehow arrest this ominous
and seemingly inevitable trend toward greater government control, there
is no escape from complete destruction of many of the most cherished
ideals underlying our legal and political institutions. Their thesis is
that administrative agencies necessitate the delegation of wide discretionary powers to state officials, a delegation contrary to any rule of law,
for it means government at the unchecked whim of the individual exercising these powers. Such discretion makes it impossible to predict future
government decisions, since they depend solely upon the unbridled will
of the administrator. Others, more hopeful, despite disagreement among
themselves as to specific methods, believe that we may yet, though
time be short and the task difficult, control the many novel and explosive
forces confronting modern civilization without sacrificing the essentials
of our traditional personal freedoms.
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II.

THE ADVENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS:
ITS MERITS AND LIMITATIONS

At the very heart of these shattering dilemmas is the administrative
process. Through it the state has extended its controls into every aspect
of our individual and collective activities. The reasons why the administrative agency was the chosen instrument for the vast increase in government functions include: (1) The feeling that all relevant matters, not
merely those specially chosen by private adverse parties, should be considered in cases involving the public interest; (2) the need for continuous, consistent, integrated regulation and control; (3) the necessity
for intelligent coordination of policy making and law enforcement; (4)
the demand for the full-time services of experts, with large staffs of many
skills-skills enhanced by constant work in a specialized field; (5) the
patent inability of legislatures to do more than set forth broad standards
and policies; (6) the seeming failure of the judiciary, passive at best,
to come to grips with so many of these problems; (7) the tremendous
volume of cases involved; (8) the demand for an active, not passive
organ to carry out the will of Congress; (9) the need for swift, inexpensive action; and (10) the often imperative requirement for the wise
exercise of great amounts of flexibility and discretion. But today, perhaps,
we are more conscious than ever that the administrative process possesses
inherent defects and limitations. It does not solve all problems. Other
tools, both old and new, are also available to do certain jobs as well or
even better.5 Agencies, for example, may become so industry-oriented
as to neglect individual or public interests, or allow themselves to be used
by one group to dominate another. The regulator, especially when his
mission to eradicate an existent evil is accomplished, or when Congress
fails to give him specific statutory policy mandates, often is so influenced
by the potent economic, political, and social forces he regulates that
he becomes their champion and defender, rather than their controller.
On the other hand, a newly-created agency may be imbued with such
an overwhelming zeal to realize its purpose that it disregards or destroys
5. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 1.03, 1.05-.07 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Treatise]; Buttle, A Long Quest: The Search for Administrative Justice, A.B.A.J. 450
(1958); Carrow, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp. 1
(1958); Cole, Administrative Agencies and Judicial Powers, 44 A.B.A.J. 953 (1958); Jaffe,
The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Re-evaluation, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1105 (1954); Kramer, Values in Land Use Controls: Some Problems, 7 Am. U.L. Rev. 1,
26 (1958); Parker, Why Do Administrative Agencies Exist? A Reappraisal, 45 Geo. L.J.
331 (1957); B. Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390 (1955); L. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436, 473
(1954); Symposium-The Growth of the Administrative Process: A Reappraisal, 16 Fed.
B.J. 443 (1956); Jaffe, Book Review, 65 Yale L.J. 1068 (1958).
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anyone or anything which delays or obstructs it, regardless of the effect
upon individual rights and liberties. Thus, there may be a notable lack
of objectivity in an agency because of its industry orientation or its
crusading purpose. The short tenure of office and need for annual
appropriations plus a constant fear of legislative investigations make
administrators most receptive to political pressures. The executive, too,
can influence their actions greatly. Many policy changes are so subtle
that the appointment of sympathetic administrators, rather than statutory amendment, is the most effective way to achieve them.
Furthermore, administrators, as experts, have their limitations. Preoccupied with their narrow specialty, they tend to see only its problems
and to overlook its over-all place in a democratic state. They almost
unconsciously assume that the remedy for failures is more controls, more
restrictions, not more freedom for individuals and groups. In many
instances, also, administrators are called upon to make basic managerial
decisions regarding pricing, production, marketing, and capital expenditures, without having to bear the ultimate responsibility for the correctness of such decisions by facing angry stockholders or bankruptcy. Their
interference, then, is apt to be irresponsible, to discourage private initiative and private responsibility by the company management.
In many ways agencies are not as efficient, expeditious, or inexpensive,
as originally hoped. For one thing, it becomes increasingly difficult for
them to hire and retain capable personnel. Moreover, to insure due
process and fair play, administrators must follow certain basic procedural safeguards, all of which slow down and augment the cost of
administrative action. At the same time, business, society, and our
individual lives change at an ever swifter pace, demanding bold and
imaginative innovations. Yet, administrative rules must, of necessity,
often be based largely upon a static structure. The very formulation and
promulgation of rules and regulations for any activity requires a certain
minimum period of time, during which the assumption is made that no
drastic changes will occur in the problems to be solved.
Even if the administrative process lacks judicial objectivity and bears
other defects, its advantages cannot be lightly dismissed. One cannot
deny the need for its expertness and discretionary powers, its ability to
develop policies derived from an over-all experience and the impact of
continuous first-hand grappling with tough issues. This expertness of
the agency represents the combined total knowledge of all its staff members obtained from daily contact with various specialized problems. An
agency is often the most effective means of fact-gathering and can dispose
most efficiently of large numbers of controversies within the areas of its
special competence, pursuant to policies laid down by legislatures, the
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electorate, and the courts. It surely needs much freedom to carry out
these functions. Although we are beginning to grasp both the limitations
and virtues of the administrative process, we are yet far from the
development of rational standards-indeed, we often do not even appreciate the factors to be considered-in determining whether or not to
use this process to cope with a given social, economic, or political problem.
The truth is that not too much should be expected from our courts and
administrators. Too often, one believes that a complex problem can
be solved simply by passing a law delegating to an agency full power to
deal with it. This type of statute is manifestly unfair to the agency,
which has a right to expect some form of workable indications of legislative preferences on major policies. Yet, many enabling statutes have
a radical lack of any meaningful statutory policies regarding the area in
which the agency is to operate.; 6 others impart confusing and even conflicting policy standards; 7 and some contain policy criteria long made
obsolete by the rapid changes in the American economy.8 An agency
cannot make policy fairly, consistently, and vigorously, in accord with
the wishes of the people and their elected representatives, when there is
no congressional mandate or popular support or preference for any
particular policy in the agency's field of operation. Given a mandate to
act, to eradicate a specific evil or control it, an agency will fight and fight
hard to carry out its mission-perhaps so much so that it may even be
blind to resulting injuries upon the liberty and property of individuals.
But when a given mission is ended, the agency necessarily settles down,
views its handiwork as good, defends the status quo, for which it is
partly responsible, and is no longer creative. Policy making is political
and demands creative ability of the highest order when broad issues and
problems arise. If Congress, the People, and even the President are
muddled and at a loss to give any real statutory policy standards to the
agency, one can hardly blame the latter for failure to evolve a rational
and workable policy. Nor can a court be expected upon judicial review,
6. For example, the FCC has simply been directed to regulate "in the public interest"
a field with tremendous and complex problems with abundant competitors seeking a
limited number of valuable and highly prized government-awarded channels for TV
stations. See H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 62 (1959). See also the statutes
involved in FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524 (1952); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947).
7. For example, Congress has simultaneously favored a national policy in the antitrust
laws of competition and a policy of monopoly in many regulatory statutes, such as those
administered by the ICC, CAB, Maritime Board, etc.
8. For example, the ICC was ordered in the 1930's to apply a coordination policy to a
static depressed economy. apparently needing allocation of fixed resources. Today this policy
is obsolete in our rapidly growing and changing society.
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to determine if the agency has exercised its powers within the limits set
by Congress, when Congress has failed to specify any workable limits
or policies to be followed.
III.

THE

FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

The crux of any discussion of the administrative process is the question of judicial review, to which most of the tremendous business of
administrators is never subjected. At best, only an insignificant fraction
of all administrative acts will or can ever be reviewed by the courts, or
even be the subject of a request for judicial review.' Nor is judicial
review itself a wholly beneficial thing, for it, too, has grave shortcomings.
Courts may add greatly to the delays and costs of administrative action,
suspend essential activities, block programs desired by the overwhelming
majority of the voters, and obstruct both the legislative and executive
branches in carrying out most efficiently their duties. Judges may also
err in deciding cases or substitute an amateur's guess for an expert's
intuition. Why then this demand for judicial review? Perhaps it is
simply the howling of those who distrust and fear all government, who
object to the substantive programs of the agency rather than the administrative process, and who refuse to believe administrators can be objective
and reasonable. There seems, however, to be more at issue here.
Courts are relied upon to guarantee the constitutional and legislative
limits set upon executive power. Therefore, embedded in the emphasis
upon judicial review are some of the most basic principles of a democratic
society. To some, judicial review is a reflection of the American ideal
of a "government of laws rather than of men." But a government cannot
exist which does not function through and upon human beings. The
fundamental issue here perhaps is how to control the individual whims
and subjective factors present in men. We desire objectivity in government, to prevent arbitrary exercise of power, and yet preserve mercy
with justice. This is not an easy ideal to attain when vast powers are
given administrators to handle the complexities of contemporary civilization. To others, the real basis of judicial review is found in the doctrine
of separation of powers. The very checks and balances of the Constitution, however, negate any ideal, rigid allocation of powers. Adjudication is not purely judicial since judges can and frequently do make law
in deciding cases. Here, the basic factor may be the fear of unlimited,
unchecked power in any governmental branch. Power must be divided
and its exercise kept in restraint. Still others stress separation of func9.

See Gelihorn & Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and Comments, 61, 641-43, 660-66

(1954) ; 1 Davis, Treatise § 1.02.
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tions. No man should be legislator, prosecutor, jury, and judge. Yet an
administrative agency is not one man, but a group of men often faced
with rigid internal separation of functions imposed by design or necessity.
Again, the fear of too much unlimited power in the hands of one group
seems basic. The need to preserve due process of law in both procedure
and substance, and the desire to keep the judicial power inviolate from
alien encroachments, are other arguments often voiced.
We can perhaps best sum up the need for judicial review under the
ancient phrase, "rule of law." This phrase more accurately reflects the
real threat posed by the administrative process with which judicial review
seeks to cope: how to make certain that there are definite limits, effectively enforced, upon the tremendous powers exercised by the modern
state through the administrative process which affect the lives, properties,
and fortunes of its individual citizens.
By "rule of law"' 0 is meant the thesis (which is not necessarily either
what the actual law has been, is, or will be) that: (1) no government
official may or should possess or exercise arbitrary power (as opposed to
power to exercise discretion reasonably) over the person, interests or
liberties of an individual; (2) everyone, be he private citizen or government official, is so far as possible, equally responsible before the law and
may be sued for damages or compelled by a suitable tribunal to account
for his acts; and (3) although protection of individual rights against
state power may be given in many ways-by constitutional guarantees
in abstract form, by alert legislatures, by conscientious executivesexperience has shown that judicial remedies are often the most effective."
The executive seldom dissents from the administrative action; the legislature is often too busy to watch closely enough and too partisan. We
turn to our courts, therefore, to protect our individual liberties and to
insure our economic, political, and social rights, including our gratuities
and bounties, free of arbitrary restraints. The comparatively rigid
procedures in courts are actually designed to create as much objectivity
as possible and to restrain the individual wills of the judges by technical
10. See Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 143 (1958).
See also 1 Davis, Treatise §§ 1.08-.09.
11. See 1 Davis, Treatise § 1.08, at 55 (1958):
"[S]ome of the meanings of the rule of law or supremacy of law that are most common
include; (1) law and order, as distinguished from settlement of controversies by resort to
force; (2) a preference for fixed rules of law as compared with broad discretionary
power; (3) the elimination of all discretionary power from processes of government; (4)
the reverse of arbitrariness, of tyranny, of dictatorship, of totalitarianism; (5) due process
of law, or equality, or the law of the land, or a higher law against which statutes are
judged; (6) preference for judges of regular courts as compared with administrative officers; and (7) judicial review of all governmental action, or of all administrative action,
or of some administrative action, or of determination involving constitutional issues."
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rules, delays, and formalities. We recognize that power may be beneficial,
when wisely used, and absolutely essential. Even so, it is always capable
of abuse and of becoming dangerous, destructive, and terrifying. Initial
exercise of power should always, therefore, if of any importance, be
subject to check by an independent authority which has no power of
de novo review. The legislature set limits on administrative power which
are enforced by the judiciary.
Minimal effective checks on administrative power require that: (1)
each individual whose interests are directly affected by government action
shall, if he wishes, have a meaningful day in court (not necessarily a
court of law), where he is allowed to present his case upon the assumption that someone with real authority will in good faith seriously consider
his statement before deciding the case; (2) the deciding officers shall be
independent and objective-inwardly free from influences of personal
gain or partisan or popular bias, and outwardly free from external direction by political or administrative superiors-in deciding individual cases
on their merits; and (3) decisions shall be reasoned, taking into account both general principles and the particular situation, and revealing, so far as possible, the relevant factors and theories upon which the
decisions are based, thus avoiding either arbitrary departures from
general rules or unfair application of general rules to particular facts
contrary to their true spirit and intent.
To provide effective power checks within the administrative process
itself is difficult. In some cases, there may be adequate administrative
check on the initial action, but this is rarely true. Private persons, moreover, will not usually have confidence in administrative checks and
reviewers. They want judicial inquiry regarding questions of law, fair
procedure, and the substantiality of the evidence. Moreover, for an
agency, the most vital question usually concerns finding a positive solution for the problems entrusted by the legislature, rather than preoccupation about the legitimacy or legality of agency actions. If judicial
review is limited in scope to illegality and arbitrariness, there is then a
proper functional division between judge and administrator. The administrator gains in public confidence because his is not the final say on
legality, or on questions arising in the large area of legitimate doubt and
dispute over the limits of his discretionary powers.
There is another important factor in the administrative process which
shows the need for judicial review. Administrative orders and decisions
are obeyed and accepted in part because they are supported and enforced
by the power of the state. They are also accepted because regarded
as fair and just in their own right, and because viewed as the product of
a government or agency which is regarded as serving a common need and
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indispensable function in our society. There are certain attributes which
we usuallr look for in determining the fairness and justice of a decision
in its own right, so far as procedure is concerned. We ask if the judgment was arrived at (1) only on the basis of the evidence and arguments offered by the parties, (2) after all parties had a chance to present
their case fully, (3) in a real controversy, (4) where the decider lacked
any interest in the outcome of the case, (5) where he acted not on his
own initiative, but at the request of the parties, and (6) where he decided only the controversy before him. Administrative decisions often
depart widely from these standards for what are deemed compelling
reasons. Thereby they may forfeit public confidence in their fairness
and justice and rely for acceptance instead upon public respect for
government and the state, as well as fear of the possible invocation of
police force. For example, administrators may rely partly on evidence
and arguments not offered by the parties, without affording a full hearing. Administrators may act upon their own initiative frequently and
even have an interest in the outcome. Such factors greatly weaken the
moral force, so to speak, of their decisions. But the availability of judicial
review in those cases where these conditions are present may do much
to restore the moral force otherwise lacking and thus secure public acceptance of the fairness and justice of administrative actions.
The existence of judicial review is a constant reminder to the official
that excessive actions risk judicial inquiry and reversal. It is a constant
source of assurance and security to the individual citizen that he has this
method of vindicating his rights against the state before an independent
tribunal. Moreover, it is, if properly limited and exercised (so as not to
substitute judicial for administrative judgment on matters within the
agency's special competence), an actual source of strength to the administrative process. Public confidence in government is increased, and courts
are allowed to contribute their special talents to the administrative
process in such areas as constitutional issues, statutory interpretations,
establishment of procedural standards for fair play and due process, and
determinations that administrative findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
In addition, there are times when the expert may be blind to values
and factors beyond the purview of his particular competence or specialty
which merit consideration. There are broader p6licies found elsewhere
than in the agency's enabling statute. An agency must be brought by
judicial review into harmony with all law-its own enabling statute and
other statutes, the Constitution, and common law. For, example, the
peaceful settlement of labor disputes may prove too costly if free speech
is thus sacrificed; the fostering of a strong railroad or air carrier industry
:may clash with the maintenance of a truly competitive economy; the
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needs for a vigorous munitions industry may run counter to the values
of small business in our economy. The administrative expert immersed
in solving his own problem may not see how his apparently efficient solution impairs even more important values in our society. The judge is
often far better equipped to fit the specialized agency into its proper
place in the over-all pattern of our law and society.'
An administrative agency is neither fully representative in the sense
that a legislature is, nor free from all bias. It is created for specific
purposes and has a statutory command predisposing it towards certain
interests-labor, industry, etc. An agency finds it difficult to be, or
appear to be, as objective as a court, for policy-making involves a choice
of one interest over others, if the policy is to have force and stability.
Thus an agency must constantly prefer and choose, make enemies and
allies, and represent some interests more than others. There is no escape.
Courts are needed to protect those regulated by the agency or not fully
represented by the agency, and to protect minority groups in the regulated class from pressures the majority may exert upon the agency to
exploit or minimize minority interests. Judges are experts of synthesis.
Their perspective is wide, and they are usually cognizant of conflicting
societal goals. On the other hand, courts cannot provide a constant
check to bad administration or a positive spur to creative administration.
Hence the area of discretion and policy-making is not for them. Good
administration is basically achieved within the organization itself. We
look to the courts, not the agency, therefore, primarily for ultimate
protection against government abuse, because a guarantee of legality
by an organ independent of the executive is desirable.
If the administrative process is part and parcel of an imperative
delegation of power to government officials to enable them to handle
adequately the problems of modern society, then judicial review seems
essential to insure that this power be exercised conscientiously, within the
limits set by the legislature and the Constitution, and in accord with the
minimum demands of procedural fair play. The delegation of discretionary powers to individuals, is neither new nor foreign to a "rule of
law." Judges have long exercised wide discretion in deciding cases.
What is novel is the enormous amount of discretion entrusted to modern
administrators. Judicial review preserves the essentials of due process
inherent in a government of laws, and not of men, by restraining arbitrary and illegal exercises of administrative discretion. A delegation of
power implies some limit. Action beyond that limit is illegal. Judicial
12. Cf. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (seamen strikers on ship may
not be reinstated by NLRB); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.
1952) (retroactive change in NLRB policy on back pay not allowed).
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review constitutes an attempt to make administrative action legitimate,
just, and nondiscriminatory, both in procedure and substance.
So far as judicial review of administrative action is concerned, what
is perhaps the most difficult and least explored question of the rule of law
does not present itself in an acute form. This is the problem of determining which controversies are appropriate and amenable to solution through
the judicial process, and which are not. When the matter is originally
presented to the administrative agency, this is frequently the key issue,
and so too when the question is raised whether the matter shall be
handled at all through the use of an administrative body. If the administrative process is appropriate, the type of procedure and hearing, if any,
and the nature of the hearing the administrator shall use must be
determined. But assuming the administrator has acted or reached a
decision, as a rule there can be no question about the availability of
judicial review being appropriate save in extraordinary situations.
Whether the matter should ever have been referred at all to the administrator in the first place, and whether the administrator followed the
procedure best adapted to its fair solution, are quite different matters.
The enormously difficult problem today is how to extend judicial
review to new areas of state action employing administrative process
without crippling the administrator and negating his valuable qualities,
or placing demands upon our judicial system which cannot be met
without impairing the essential attributes of an independent judiciary.
This calls for many things: realistic procedural standards, meaningful statutory standards, and, above all, discriminating techniques for
judicial review. We cannot expect every administrative error to be
corrected by a court. We cannot rightly look to judges to reverse major
policies embodied in statutes by legislators, or to obviate all the effects of
poor agency appointments. Judicial review must be utilized with discrimination and confined to those areas where it will accomplish the most
good, where judges have the most to contribute, and where its merits
clearly outweigh its disadvantages.
IV.

THE RELATION OF AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW TO SCOPE OF REVIEW

There is no need here to embark upon a detailed study of all, or even
some, aspects of judicial review, since others have done so superbly, leaving little to add. 13 Yet, in this field, as in so many others, there is great
danger in abstractions and generalities divorced from concrete applications. Indeed, an examination of case law emphasizes the fact that
perhaps the gravest error committed in judicial review has been the
13. My debt to Professors Davis and Jaffe is tremendous. I have availed myself freely
of their research and conclusions in this field, as must anyone who now labors in it.
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attempt of judges and lawyers, in an understandable effort to insure
desirable predictability of future cases, to lay down hard and fast rules
admitting of no future exceptions or qualifications. Such attempts are
almost always doomed to failure. It is only a matter of time until these
rules are qualified, exceptions are created, and ways are found to circumvent their rigidity. Dogmas and absolutes are deceptive and dangerous
here. There is as much need to allow discretion to judges in fashioning
techniques of judicial review as to give discretion to administrators. We
must face up to the fact that pinpointing rules of judicial review with
mathematical precision is both unwise and impossible. If judicial review
is to be effective, we must be prepared to put our confidence in the
wisdom and restraint of both judges and administrators, and to give
them latitude to use their valuable experience, expertness, and qualities.
The first major problem is availability of judicial review. The general
statement that no rule, legislative or judge-made, should exclude all
judicial review in any given type of case at a times 4 is not likely to be
challenged. Only rarely has Congress attempted to enact sweeping bans
on all judicial review of administrative action in a case. Still more rarely
have courts either created a judge-made ban of this type or given their
complete assent-without leaving a possible loophole-to such a legislative ban.
As indicated, the problem has two aspects: legislative rules for availability of judicial review, and judicially created rules. Often the two
interblend, but so far as possible, it is helpful to consider them separately.
More important, the problem of availability of review becomes really
meaningful only if broken down into several different questions. In a
concrete case, the question raised is not apt to be whether any judicial
review at all is available for this administrative action. Instead, the
questions asked are: (1) may this party, (2) at this time, (3) in this
kind of proceeding, (4) in this particular court, obtain (5) any review of
these specific issues about this administrative proceeding, and if so,
(6) how much review on each issue will this court give? These questions
in turn give rise to further inquiries, such as: (1) what type of hearing,
(2) what type of record, and (3) what type of decision, have been
given by the agency in this case? The last three issues raise the critical
problem of what are the basic prerequisites for meaningful exercise of
judicial review.
14. See 4 Davis, Treatise §§ 28.05-.21; Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15
F.R.D. 411, 421, 451-52 (1954); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pts. 1-2), 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 401, 420, 769 (1958). See also Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1958); Parker, The Historic Basis of Administrative
Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 449, 476-81
(1958).
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In reality, the broad question of the availability of review may be
divided into two major phases. First, to what specific matters or issues,
if any, is review limited in this particular case: will there be review of
all or only some or none of the (1) constitutional issues, (2) jurisdictional issues, (3) issues of statutory interpretation, (4) issues of law,
and (5) issues of fact. Review may extend to every kind of issue of law
or fact. Review may be limited to certain specified factual or legal
matters, such as fraud, gross mistake, malice, citizenship, confiscation
of property, fairness of the procedure, etc. Review may be decreed on
all issues of a specified kind only, such as constitutional ones. These
problems are usually considered as aspects of the problem of availability
of review rather than scope: is review available on this specific issue of
law or fact? The second phase of availability of review-the one customarily discussed as scope-is how much review is to be given on a
particular issue or matter which is subject to judicial review. Review
may range from trial de novo, substitution of the court's judgment for
that of the administrator, to a far more limited test such as reasonableness or the presence of substantial evidence, warrant in the record, or a
basis in fact.
Our discussion will first focus upon availability of review in the sense
of whether review may be obtained of a/ or only some or none of the
concrete issues or matters of fact or law raised by the parties. Then we
shall briefly take up, in turn, who may obtain review, in what kind of
proceeding, and at what time. Subsequent attention will be given to
certain basic conditions for meaningful judicial review, such as an
adequate administrative hearing, record, and decision. Finally we shall
consider the usual problems of scope of review: how much review should
be given by a court of any specific issue of law or of fact which is subject
to its review.
Actually, the two aspects of what has been here termed availability of
review-availability and scope or amount-are interwoven. Whether or
not a court will grant any review at all of a specific issue or matter may
well be decisively influenced by the scope or amount of review that will
be given if review is made available. If a court makes review available
on a specific matter, such as fraud, it may restrict the review to only some
of the many issues raised by that matter, such as problems of constitutionality, jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and fair procedure. The
amount of review also on any issue or matter may be limited to reasonableness or substantial evidence. There seems no reason for judicial
hesitation to make available review of almost any agency action to a
limited extent, absent some powerful reason to the contrary. By limiting
the amount of review, when review is made available on a specific issue
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or matter, courts will not usurp the functions of agencies or unduly interfere with the administrative process.
Therefore, it is proper to begin with a very strong presumption that
there should always be some limited judicial review of any administrative
action, negative or affirmative, available to one who has an interest immediately and acutely affected by the administrative act, so that at some
point, he can test the validity of the act. The review may be limited in
two respects. First, only certain issues (constitutional, procedural, statutory interpretation) or certain matters (citizenship, fraud, malice) will
be reviewed by the court. Second, these issues or matters will be reviewed
only to a limited degree (reasonableness or substantial evidence). The
second type of limitation is usually warranted. The first type is exceptional and far less easy to defend. Limitations on review should usually
be those of the second type (how much), rather than those of the first
type (availability), if judicial review is to fulfill its legitimate role in
the administrative process. The second type of limitations adequately
prevents overextension of judicial review and resulting impairment of
the administrative process. Limitations of the first type prevent adequate
independent checks by the judiciary upon administrative power. Judicial
review, of course, is not an unmixed blessing. If unwisely exercised, it
can do great harm to vast numbers of persons. If not highly selective,
it can overwhelm our judicial system by its sheer bulk. Administrators
may be far better qualified than judges to perform certain governmental
tasks, and judicial review may add to delay and expense and be far from
the most efficient system which can be devised. In spite of all these
factors, judicial review, properly limited in amount or scope, is one of the
most effective methods yet devised to protect an individual's life, property, and liberty against arbitrary or harsh or unreasonable exercise of
government power.
Generally, therefore, some amount of judicial review should be the
rule for all administrative acts affecting legal rights absent special
reasons to the contrary, such as an express legislative mandate barring
it. Deferring consideration of the amount of review on any specific issue
or matter until later, our problem now is whether in some cases review
should be restricted to certain types of issues, such as procedural or constitutional ones, or certain matters as fraud, or altogether banned on all
issues and all matters. Here there are certain areas which, though unusually difficult, may cast more light on this problem if examined in
more detail.
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, MANDAMUS, AND RULE MAKING

One doctrine that often causes trouble is sovereign immunity.15 If a
sovereign may not be sued without its consent, how can an individual
petition a court to review at all any action taken by the government
through an administrative agency? If a statute expressly or by implication allows judicial review of the administrative action, there is no
problem because the government has thereby consented to the suit.
Suppose there is no statute of this type? Suit may still be allowed on
the artificial theory that acts of a government official, if illegal because
unconstitutional or beyond the scope of his statutory power or jurisdiction, are not those of the government. If an official exceeds his authority,
he has thereby lost sovereign immunity by ceasing to act as a government
representative. 6
A more forthright attitude is that in all cases the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which is based on historical tradition and not logic, should be
sharply and narrowly limited. To order an administrator to do what a
statute requires is to implement, not coerce, the will of the sovereign, the
People. Even a legal act of an official may be improper if done for an
improper or personal motive. Where judicial review of an administrative
action is requested by a private party, money damages are not usually
sought. There seems little reason, therefore, apart from an express
legislative prohibition against judicial action, to preserve the sovereign
immunity doctrine. This is true whether the administrator is acting unconstitutionally, 17 in excess of his authority," committing illegal acts
15. See 3 Davis, Treatise cbs. 25-27; Davis, Administrative Officer's Tort Liability, 55
Mich. L. Rev. 201 (1956); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Minn. L. Rev.
751 (1956); Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other Than
Damages, 40 Cornell L.Q. 3 (1954) ; Jaffe, Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the
United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827 (1957); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial
Review 1, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 432-37 (1958). Section 1009(c) of the A.B.A. Proposed
Code states: "Proceedings for review may be brought against (1) the agency by its official
title, (2) individuals who comprise the agency, or (3) any person representing the agency'
or acting on its behalf in the matter sought to be reviewed in the judicial district where
the defendant resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." This seems
a waiver of sovereign immunity.

16. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S.
605 (1912) (excess of statutory authority); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (Contitution). But cf. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945); Morrison
v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
17. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). The unconstitutionality need not relate to a statute. Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218
(1882).
18. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

while within his valid authority," or whether property, tort, or contract
is involved, or some affirmative or negative relief is being sought." There
should be no government infringement of an individual's legal rights
without judicial relief in such circumstances. Of course, the administrator's discretionary powers, especially if he be a high government
official or the head of state, may be so great as to enable him to reach
erroneous results with which a court may not properly interfere. Understandably, no court is likely to command the President to do an act.2 '
Even here, the test should be the character of the question and its suitability for judicial review. Many presidential acts are routine, or presidential action may be only ultimately possible, but not certain. Instead
of relying, however, upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity to deny
relief in a proper case, the court should frankly state that the real
rationale for its decision is that the official in question actually has
discretionary power great enough to allow him to reach erroneous as
well as correct statutory interpretations. 2 This is a different idea than
sovereign immunity, and rests, within proper limits, upon the availability
or amount of judicial review in such cases. The acts of a head of state
may often be so political in nature as to be totally unsuitable for any
judicial review.
There is more difficulty when the aim of the suit is to obtain something
from the government, such as land, coal, property, or money. Where
money damages are sought, the fifth amendment may well give relief
for property damage, a concept liberalized by recent decisions.23 A rule
allowing damages for every injurious government action is obviously
undesirable, since every statute to some degree injures some one, be it
only the taxpayers. Nor is mere invalidity of the law or action sufficient
when legislation for public welfare is involved, because some losses and
damages are the price one pays for living in modern society. Perhaps
19. But cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) ; International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904). Compare Land v. Dollar, 330
U.S. 731 (1947); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196 (1882).
20. Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) ; Roberts v. United States ex rel. Valentine,
176 U.S. 221 (1900); Clackmas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd
per curiam, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). Cf. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
21. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). But cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
See Gibson, The President's Inherent Emergency Powers, 12 Fed. B.J. 107 (1951).
22. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
23. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (fifth amendment applies to
temporary governmental seizure of coal mine because of strike or threat of one); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (owner of farm recovered damages caused to chickens
by low flying planes).
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monetary relief here should be limited to very exceptional losses, not
widely spread, which could well be anticipated in advance.
In any event, sovereign immunity has little justification as an abstract
doctrine today. Its abrogation will not force courts to assume the burden
of operating the government under current restrictions on the availability and amount of judicial review. To deny relief when a government official admittedly infringes another's legal rights is manifestly
unjust and unfair. Courts are certainly better suited to settle many of
these matters than mere naked force or political power and legislative
action.
A closely related idea is the reluctance of many courts to issue a writ
of mandamus or a mandatory affirmative order to a state official, unless
the act to be commanded by the court is purely ministerial, involving no
discretion on the part of the official.2 4 This is based partly upon the
sovereign immunity concept, partly upon the idea of separation of
powers. What is remarkable is the facility with which a court can find
a clear command allowing no discretion in a highly ambiguous statute. 25
More realistically, courts today do issue mandamus, even if the statutory
language is ambiguous or considerable discretion is 'given the government agency. The decisive factor is whether the court believes there has
been an arbitrary abuse of or refusal to exercise the discretion, or an
unwarranted interplretation of the statute.
Another troublesome question is the availability and amount of judicial
review in what is roughly termed rule-making by administrative agencies.
Judicial review to some extent should ordinarily be available here. The
problem really is: first, what specific issues are reviewable, and the
amount of review on the issues subject to review, in view of the delegations of broad discretionary powers which are usually involved; and
second, the nature of the procedure (its fairness, the extent to which it
will afford a firm basis for review by a court) to be followed by the
agency.
VI. AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
Traditionally, certain areas have been relatively immune from some
or even all judicial review. Review has been restricted sharply to only
24. Work yv. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925); Decatur v. Paulding,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); Kendall v. United States ex reL. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838). Cf. 3 Davis, Treatise §§ 23.09-.12; Davis, Mandatory Relief From Administrative Action in the Federal Courts, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 585 (1955); Jaffe,' The Right to
judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 426-28 (1958).
25. Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S.
167 (1936); Miquel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934); Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930); Roberts v. United States ex rel. Valentine, 176 U.S. 221

(1900).
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a very few, if any, specific issues or matters, and even on these, the
amount of review may be far less than normally expected. The critical
factor here is the increasing willingness of courts to grant at least some
review, but to concentrate upon the limited availability or amount of the
review.
A. Military Matters
Civilian courts have long been reluctant to interfere with the internal
discipline and control of the armed forces, which have their own unique
system of command and courts. There are certainly the strongest possible
reasons for civilian judges not to interfere with the raising, training,
deployment, discipline, and mustering out of military forces, especially
in times of national emergency. Yet, even grave threats to national
security may not always justify harsh measures conflicting with individual liberty and property. The large size of our armed forces is
apparently a permanent part of our society, not a temporary phenomenon.
So it is not too surprising to find the civil courts willing to exercise some
limited power of judicial review to make certain that even the armed
forces do not exceed their tremendous powers and jurisdiction.
The range of judicial review of a court martial is still uncertain.
That there is some review available on certain issues, as when a claim
of invasion of constitutional rights and due process is made, is clear.
The amount of review on these issues is not clear. It is disputed whether
the court ascertains if the military tribunal erroneously decided the constitutional issue or only checks to see if the military court gave fair
consideration to the matter. 6 The Supreme Court has recently held
reviewable to some extent the question of the army's power to give other
than an honorable discharge for conduct occurring prior to military
service; there was no question of the amount of review, or of the issues
subject to review, for government counsel conceded the illegality of the
discharge if any right at all to judicial review existed.27 So, too, the
Court has permitted limited review of draft board classification orders
26.

Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).

Cf.

Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569 (1957); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907) ; Carter v.

Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900). See Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. C1.
1947), for an especially outrageous court martial set aside by a civilian court. But cf.
Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Krivoski v. United States, 145 F. Supp.
239 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956). On the general supremacy of civilian
courts over military tribunals, see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 12 (1866);
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). Cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378

(1932) ; Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
27. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). Cf. Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37
(1951), reversing 183 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911) ;
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immediately prior to actual induction into the army.28 True, review
here was initially limited to determining only whether there was any
"basis in fact" for the classification,2 9 but later decisions, however, have
extended review to questions of law30 and fairness of procedure 3 ' and
approximated review of even fact questions to the substantial evidence
test customarily used in judicial review.3 2 Indeed, there has even been
review by habeas corpus of the army's power to refuse to commission a
dentist draftee in lieu of discharging him, but the extent of this review
is far from clear since the Court upheld the denial of the commission
upon the merits as warranted by evidence and the statute.3 3 No doubt,
assignments in the armed forces may often seem arbitrary from the
standpoint of individuals. Yet, there is need for judicial restraint here
lest national security be threatened by impairment of the efficiency of
the armed forces through unwise judicial meddling. On the whole, it is
salutary that even the powers of the armed forces, great though they
may be, should be subject to some limited measure of judicial review in
order to determine if they have been exercised with unnecessary harshness, arbitrarily, without fair procedure, or beyond the scope of the authority or jurisdiction conferred by Congress.
B.

Immigration 'and Treatment of Aliens

Another problem area is immigration and the treatment of aliens.
The Supreme Court has sometimes indicated that the powers of Congress
and the Executive over aliens are so plenary that judicial review here
may be entirely barred. Thus, the exclusion of aliens has at times been
Jones, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative Discharges, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 917 (1957); Note, Judicial Review of Discharge Classifications Determined in Military Administrative Proceedings, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 533
(1957). But cf. Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539 (1947); United States ex rel. French v.
Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); Gentila v. Pace, 193 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952).

28. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946); Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946) ; Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
29. Ibid.
30. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (19.55).
31. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955); Simmons v. United States, 348
U.S. 397 (1955); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953). Cf. Cox v. United States,

332 U.S. 442 (1947).
32. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United States, 346

U.S. 389 (1953).
33.

Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).

Cf. Nelson v. Peckham, 210 F.2d 574

(4th Cir. 1954); Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Levin v. Gillespie, 121 F.
Supp. 239 (N.D. Cal. 1954). But cf. Bland v. Hartman, 245 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1957).

34. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (citizenship issue); Lee Lung v.
Patterson, 186 U.S. 168 (1902); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 546-47
(1895)

(no review); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)

(deportation);
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said to be almost free of any judicial review or restraint so far as the
Constitution is concerned, even if the alien claimed to be an American
citizen. 5 On the other hand, the Court in a notable opinion denied that
the Executive or perhaps even Congress had the power under the Constitution to deport alleged resident aliens claiming citizenship without judicial trial or review of the matter of citizenship. 6 Recent opinions have
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889). Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). An alien entering
illegally may not be imprisoned without a judicial trial. Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896). An alien subject to exclusion may be detained in custody indefinitely
pending deportation when no country will accept him. Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). But cf. Barton v. Senter, 353 U.S. 963 (1957), affirming
145 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Mo. 1956) (an alien which no country will take cannot have
his actions restricted except to insure availability for deportation); United States v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957) (a deportable alien whom no country will take cannot
be made to tell the Attorney-General about possible communist activities except those
related to his availability for deportation).
35. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905). But cf. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v.
Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1932) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1920)
(dicta); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). Compare Carmichael v. Delaney,
170 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948) (former resident), with United States ex rel. Chu Leung v.
Shaughnessy, 176 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1949) and United States ex rel. Medeiros v. Watkins,
166 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1948).
36. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). But a resident alien is protected only
by procedural, not substantive, due process. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Jordan
v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950).
Cf. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). If lawfully ordered deported, a
resident alien is entitled to a hearing before an unbiased tribunal if he seeks, as an act of
statutory grace, suspension of deportation. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954). He is not entitled then to a trial-type hearing, and secret evidence
may be used to refuse suspension. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). If this hearing is
unbiased, there will be no further review, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi,
349 U.S. 280 (1955), except: (1) if there is an erroneous holding that the alien is not
eligible for suspension under the statute, United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy,
353 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1957); McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950) (eligibility); or
(2) suspension is denied because of an erroneous view of law; or (3) an arbitrary standard
has been imposed; or (4) there is error about the danger to the alien if he is deported
to the foreign country in question. See United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy,
234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955) (persecution); Miyagi v. Brownell, 227 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1955); United States ex rel. Watts v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd,
206 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1953) (persecution); United States ex rel. Partheniades v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (arbitrary standard); Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy,
142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (erroneous view of law). Cf. Dessalernos v. Savoretti,
356 U.S. 269 (1958); United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th Cir.
1955); United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1950). An order
denying an alien leave to depart voluntarily is similarly reviewable. United States ex rel.
Frangoulis v. Shaughnessy, 210 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Bartsch v.
Watkins, 175 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949). But cf. Anderson v. Holton, 242 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1957) ; United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.
1954); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 200
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adhered to this rather unsatisfactory distinction between deportation and
exclusion,3 7 in spite of its lack of justification where an alien has actually
reached this country or even lived here for many years before losing his
resident status by temporarily departing for a trip abroad. Actually,
in cases involving aliens seeking release by habeas corpus, the Court
has often reviewed, to the usual extent, questions of statutory interpretaF.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 928 (1953). Discretion to allow bail pending
a deportation hearing is judicially reviewable. Carlson v. Landon, 342 US. 524, 540
(1952); United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United
States ex rel. De Geronimi v. Shaughnessy, 187 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1951). An error of law
in either a deportation or exclusion hearing is reviewable to a limited extent. McGrath v.
Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950) (deportation); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (exclusion). The fairness of any administrative hearing is also subject to judicial review in an
exclusion case, as in deportation. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908). Cf.
United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958) (exclusion), noted
in 45 Va. L. Rev. 283 (1959). Under the Immigration Act of 1917, an exclusion or deportation order was reviewable only by habeas corpus. Tom We Shung v. Brownell, 207 F.2d
132 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 346 U.S. 906 (1953) (exclusion); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S.
229 (1953) (deportation).
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 either type of order is reviewable
in a declaratory judgment. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956) (exclusion);
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (deportation). On the other hand, a person
claiming admission as a citizen to this country under the Immigration Act of 1917 could
obtain a declaratory judgment as to his status even if not in this country,-or could obtain
admission, pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment to determine his status, after
having secured a certificate of identity from a consul, which certificate could not be refused
solely on the ground that he had lost his status. Under the Immigration Act of 1952,
review may usually be obtained by such a person only by habeas corpus after he is in
the United States and has secured the consul certificate, which may be denied solely because
of lost status and which only entities him to apply for admission in the same way as an
alien. Without the certificate he cannot seek a judicial determination of his status.
D'Argento v. Dulles, 113 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1953). Refusal of the certificate has been
held non-reviewable unless arbitrary or capricious. Ching Ming Mow v. Dulles, 117 F.
Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Wong Fon Haw v. Dulles, 114 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
Eng v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). So is refusal of a visa. United States
ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929). Cf.
authorities cited note 42 infra, regarding refusal of passports to foreign residents claiming
citizenship.
37. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (not true
of alien resident here twenty-five years who left for nineteen months to visit dying mother
abroad and wishes to reenter); Kwong Rai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (alien
seaman is resident, despite temporary absence from country, if on an American ship);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (not true of non-resident
alien-war bride-actually in this country) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945) ;
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1923); the Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (resident alien entitled to hearing prior to deportation).
Merely holding an alien at the door does not make him a resident. Thus, aliens temporarily
admitted under a claim of right or for other reasons are treated as non-residents. Rogers v.
Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958); Leng May Ma v. Barber,-347 U.S. 185 (1958). But cf. United
States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
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tion, of law, and of fact in both exclusion and deportation matters, as
well as the issue of procedural due process."8 There seems to be no
reason why friendly aliens should be denied such limited judicial review
as a protection against arbitrary, unduly harsh acts, unreasonable decisions, or the excessive exercise of administrative power, provided judicial
self-restraint is imposed. Certainly a claim of citizenship should be subject to judicial review, even if made by one who may not technically
be a resident in the legal sense. Even more difficult, perhaps, is the extent
of judicial review over action taken against so-called enemy aliens present
in this country in time of war. The leading case, 9 while upholding the
action taken, may be interpreted as giving some, though limited, judicial
review. The courts did pass upon the fairness of the procedure, the
substantiality of the evidence, the interpretation and constitutionality of
the statute, and the issue of whether petitioner was an alien enemy. The
Supreme Court, however, disapproved of the lower court's passing upon
the issues of procedure and evidence. It is hard to see why there should
not be limited judicial review on such key issues as a claim of American
citizenship or of citizenship in a non-enemy state, despite the emergencies
of war.
C. ForeignAffairs
Power over aliens leads to a consideration of the larger related issue
of judicial review in the realm of foreign affairs. Admittedly, judicial
review is restricted because of the broad constitutional authority granted
the President in this field. These are powers which courts should be
most reluctant to question or interfere with, because they involve factors
not appropriate to judicial review.4" Yet, one may question the wisdom
of a complete denial of all right of judicial review on all issues and all
matters when the cloak of executive power over foreign affairs is waved.
In one case,41 for example, granted the President's discretionary powers
38. See note 36 supra.
39. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). Cf. United States ex rel. Hack v. Clark,
159 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 158 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir. 1946) (both reviewing question whether petitioner was enemy alien).
40. Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Eastern States Petroleum & Chem.
Corp. v. Seaton, 163 F. Supp. 797, 165 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1958) (allow review of oil import
order). Even here there are dicta that when the plenary power of the President over
foreign affairs is involved, there will be judicial review for procedural due process. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
41. Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (no review of
an order granting one domestic airline and denying another a certificate to engage in certain overseas operations when order of CAB here is subject to review by President). See
H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1959). Cf. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line,
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to reject, modify, or approve the award of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
there could be limited judicial review at least of the procedure, and
perhaps the recommendations, of the CAB, even if not of the problem
as to whether the President exceeded his wide powers over foreign affairs
in acting as he did. So, too, the advent of limited judicial review over
the issuance and denial of passports, with the apparent recognition of a
right to travel abroad, is a welcome step.4" Of course, judicial review
here should not delve into questions of foreign policy or conditions existing abroad. It can, however, deal with factual and legal matters personal
to the applicant, such as his qualifications or any lack thereof, and the
threat his travel abroad poses. Passports involve not only executive
power over foreign affairs, but also the basic personal right of a citizen
to his freedom of movement.
D.

Political Issues

Closely related to foreign affairs is the category one may term, for
lack of a better phrase, political issues. These are matters where,
perhaps, the Court feels executive or legislative discretion is so complete
as to preclude any judicial review. Where the action is directly taken
by Congress or the President, policy considerations may well exclude
judicial review. If the action is in fact that of a subordinate to whom
power has been allegedly delegated, there seems far less reason for
disallowing some judicial review which could determine whether the
and fairly exercised within the confines of the
power has been clearly
43
delegated authority.
Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958) (Panama Canal tolls subject to review by President not
judicially reviewable until fixed by agency; may be judicially reviewable then); McGrath
v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1950); United States Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
222 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (deny judicial review for procedural violation). See Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial Check on the Executive, 42 Va. L. Rev. 175 (1956).
42. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Cf.
Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952); Jaffe, The Right to
Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Affairs 17 (1956). Refusal to grant a passport to
a foreign resident claiming citizenship may be reviewable. Yung Jin Toung v. Dulles, 229
F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1956); Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954).
Not so the refusal to grant a visa to enter this country. United States ex rel. Ulrich v.
Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929).
43. Cf. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276
(1950); Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
See Hart & Wechsler, infra note 71 at 192-210; Carrington, Political Questions: The Judicial
Check on the Executive, 42 Va. L. Rev. 175 (1956); Gibson, The President's Inherent
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E. Government Programs
Perhaps the most controversial area of judicial review today involves
the so-called gratuities allegedly bestowed by a generous government
upon its citizens. Formerly, government was a comparatively minor part
of men's lives, doing little more than preserving law and order and
safeguarding the national defense. Then it may have been wise to view
government jobs, government contracts, the disposal of government property, government pensions, government relief assistance, and government hospital and medical care, as mere privileges, mere emergency
measures, of little general importance, to which no one had any legally
protected rights. Today, it would be folly to take this approach. Many
industries depend upon government contracts for a major portion of
their business. Government is one of the largest employers, and denial
of government employment may well mean denial of the right to pursue
a chosen profession. Social security, pensions, medical, welfare, unemployment and relief benefits are regarded not as gifts or bounties, but
as something to which men are entitled as a matter of right. Many of
these programs, such as social security or the G.I. Bill of Rights, involve
obligations as well as benefits to the individuals involved. In addition,
many programs confer benefits on some, but at the expense of the rights
of others (employers are taxed by social security). Also, a distinction
is possible between rights given beneficiaries-low rates for consumers,
workmen's compensation for employees, certification for unions-and
the rights of those subjected to legal disadvantages because of these
programs-employers ordered to bargain with unions or to pay workmen's compensation, utilities subject to low rates, etc.
True, there are areas of vast executive discretion in hiring, promoting,
and firing employees, selling and buying properfy for the government,
determining eligibility for social security and veterans' benefits, with
which judicial review should not interfere. One may well distinguish
cases where the state grants a person something from those where the
state reaches out to damage some one, allowing more judicial review
in the latter. Yet, this does not mean that harsh or grossly unreasonable
exercise of this discretion, unfair procedural policies, or attempts to
exceed the wide limits of discretionary power should not be subject to
judicial check. Privileges and rights are often interwoven. Even if one
has no right to a bounty, he may have a right to fair treatment in the
distribution of it. Denial of a bounty may damage one's reputation if
done for certain reasons, as security. Indeed, one suspects that for most
people, these rights are among the most important ones today, perhaps
Emergency Powers, 12 Fed. B.J. 107 (1951); Wagner, Political Questions in the Federal
Judiciary-A Comparative Study, 32 Temp. L.Q. 135 (1959).
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far more significant to many in their daily lives than the older rights of

free speech and a free press. The problem here, as elsewhere, is two
fold: on what issues and matters, if any, is review available, and how

much review is to be allowed."
44. For example, postal orders barring use of the mails for fraud or obscenity are reviewable: United States ex rel. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921);
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). 'See Summerfield
v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955);
Stanfdrd v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1954); Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d
764 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Cf. Cates v,
Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951); Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Donaldson v. Read
Magazine, Inc., 233 U.S. 178 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
Denial of a passport may be reviewable. See note 42 supra. Cf. Perkins v. Elg, 307
U.S. 325, 349-50 (1939).
Suspension of deportation of an alien is reviewable. United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
Revocation of parole is reviewabIe to see if it is a total nullity. Compagna v. Hiatt,
82 E. Supp. 295 (N.D Ga. 1948), rev'd, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950). Cf. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935);
Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1951); But
cf. Dunbar v. Cranor, 202 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1953); Nave v. Bell, 180 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.
1950).
There may be review of disputed facts as to character, morals, or reputation where a
license to practice before an agency is revoked or denied. Goldsmith v. United States Bd.
of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252
(1957) ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). A land grant bounty is
reviewable. Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917).
The hiring and firing of government employees is reviewable, at least if unconstitutional
discrimination is alleged. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Cf. Ritter v. Strauss, 261 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 253 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 871 (1958) ; Taylor
v. McEiroy (D.DiC.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 918 (1958) (whether there may be judicial
review of revocation of security clearance by the Defense Department for an employee of
a government contractor resulting in the employee's discharge or transfer); Hargett v.
Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
See also Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277 (1951) ; Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948).
Review of orders involving pensions, grants, and bounties has been allowed. Dismuke v.
United States, 297 U.S. 167 (1936) (retirement benefit); Reynolds v. United States, 292
U.S. 443 (1934) (veteran's benefit); Hormel v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (government's counterclaim against veteran). Cf. RFC v. Bankers Trust Co., 318
U.S. 163 (1943) (review order fixing allowances for services in railroad reorganization);
Wilkinson v. United States, 242 F.2d 735 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 839 (1957).
Contra, United States v. Gudewicz, 45 F. Supp. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). Usually, however,
review is denied in these cases when a statute so provides, at least where a pure bounty
is involved. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Klein v. Lee, 254 F.2d 188
(7th Cir. 1958); American-& European Agencies, Inc. v. Gillilland, 247 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957); Magnus v. United States, 234 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1006 (1957); De Vegvar v. Gillilland, 228 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
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F. Negative Agency Orders
Another difficult problem is posed by the negative order. This involves
a refusal of an agency to act, to issue a complaint, or to exercise its
powers.4 5 Here, the feeling is that, like the public prosecutor, the agency
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956) ; 1 Davis, Treatise §§ 7.11-.20; Davis, The Requirement of
a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 222-80 (1956); note 46 infra. Cf. Hall v.
United States, 258 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Ford v. United States, 230 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1956); Longernecker v. Higley, 229 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Acker v. United States,
226 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1008 (1956); Cyrus v. United States,
226 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Houston, 216 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1954);
Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1954); Calderon v. Tobin, 187 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 935 (1951); Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Van Home v. Hines, 122 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 689 (1941) ; Barnett v.
Hines, 105 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 573 (1939). But cf. Hines v. United
States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Carlin v. United States, 100 F. Supp.
451 (Ct. Cl. 1951). This is also usually true of dismissal of government employees, apart
from unconstitutional discrimination. Cf. Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277 (1951) ; Hilton v.
Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948); Eberlein v. Woods, 257 U.S. 82 (1921). See Richardson,
Problems in the Removal of Federal Civil Servants, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1955); Note,
Review of Removal of Federal Civil Service Employees, 52 Coium. L. Rev. 787 (1952).
So, too, there is very limited, if any, review of the making of government contracts to
buy or sell property, often on the ground that a disappointed bidder has no standing to
sue since the statutory protections are solely for the government's benefit. Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). Defeated bidders for government contracts have been denied
review for procedural defects, following the Lukens case. This has been changed by 66
Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (Supp. V, 1958). Friend v. Lee, 211 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir.
1955) ; Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903
(1949). But cf. Capitol Coal Sales v. Mitchell, 164 F. Supp. 161 (D.D.C. 1958); Heyer
Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (1956). See also the Task Force Report,
Recommendation No. 50, at 206-12.
45. Both the ICC and the National Mediation Board may be ordered to take jurisdiction
if the refusal to do so is due to an error of law. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S.
638 (1918); Air Line Dispatcher Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). The power of the SEC to refuse jurisdiction may
not be reviewable. Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825
(1955). Dismissal of a complaint or petition by the NLRB is reviewable. Local 11, Office
Employees International Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Refusal of the general counsel of the NLRB to
issue a complaint may be reviewable to a limited extent only. Hourihan v. NLRB, 201
F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953). But cf. NLRB v. Local
1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S.
93 (1958); NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919
(1954); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 815 (1951). A labor union may not obtain review of a refusal by the Board to seek
enforcement of its order. Amalgamated Util. Workers, CIO v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261 (1940). Cf. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929). There is no statutory
review of a union's request for certification. NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940);
AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). But the union may obtain review in an equity action
in a district court. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). Cf. Inland Empire Dist. Council
v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945); International Union of Mine Mill & Smelter Workers v.
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should be given wide, if not total, discretion. The soundness of this view
is questionable. The public prosecutor is often an elected official, serving
a short term and directly responsible to the electorate for his performance
in office. The administrator works less in the forum of public opinion.
Discretion he must have. There should, however, be judicial scrutiny of
its arbitrary or excessive exercise. 6 Even absolute discretion may be
exercised in an arbitrary manner.
In discussing judicial review, the need for an intra-agency hierarchy
of review should not be overlooked. Review, also, should not be unlimited. Generally, review should focus upon arbitrary, harsh, or illegal
acts or procedure, letting administrators fix policy within the limits of
the discretion conferred by Congress. Administrators need latitude to be
creative and flexible, but not unlimited power. However, while judges
should be concerned with validity rather than policy, we should not
lightly dismiss the great creative abilities of our courts.
One may argue that in certain areas any judicial review at all may
create too much delay, expense, and administrative inefficiency, without
sufficiently compensating benefits of protection of individual lives, properties, and liberties. Thus, in the fields of work injuries, pensions or social
Farmer, 226 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 145 (1956); Farmer v. United Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954).
An employer obtains review if he refuses to bargain with the certified union. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). See Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor
Board Cases, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 720 (1946); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 527 (1958).
Negative orders as such are reviewable. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125 (1939); Shields v. Utah I.C.R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
46. A non-member producer can obtain review of an agency order giving a milk cooperative the right to part of the price of all the milk it handles, even for non-members.
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). Cf. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 433-35
(1949) (shipper obtains review of order denying reparations); Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947) (Board order removing national bank
director from office reviewed). But review of an order denying payment of a mere moral
claim against the government has been denied pursuant to a statutory ban. Work v.
United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925). Cf. Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v.
Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941); Adams v. Nagle, 303 U.S. 532 (1938); Butte, A. & P. Ry v.
United States, 290 U.S. 127 (1933). Congress itself may allow review if it is denied by the
Court. See United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950). The result of the decision in
United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), was changed by 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41
U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (Supp. V, 1958) which allow review of decisions on facts by government officers under clauses in government contracts covering disputes between the government and the contractor. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), which was
also overruled by 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1952), as amended, 66 Stat. 308
(1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (Supp. V, 1958), allowing any interested person to obtain
review of a legal question about wage determinations under government contracts. Cf.
United States v. Barnett, 230 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1956). See H.R. 272, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), providing for judicial review of determinations of the Administrator of Veterans
Affairs, now barred by 71 Stat. 92 (1957), 38 U.S.C. § 2211(a) (Supp. V, 1958).
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security, one may contend that the vast volume of claims, the requirements for quick payments and low costs, the usually undisputed nature
of the facts, the limited areas of discretion and policy making involved
when rules are often clear-cut and mechanically applied, the likelihood
that the agency will favor the applicants in all doubtful cases of any
possible merit, outweigh possible advantages of even very limited judicial
review. This is a powerful argument for limiting the availability and
amount of judicial review, and for using different techniques for review,
but not for completely eliminating it. There is still the possibility of an
occasional arbitrary or unreasonable decision to be reckoned with.
VII.

LEGISLATIvE ATTEMPTS To BAR JUDICIAL REvIEw

What is the role of Congress here? If the previous argument is sound
that there should be a strong presumption in favor of some review
of certain issues or matters, then Congress should be held to have
intended to bar all judicial review on all issues and matters or even all
review on specific issues or matters only when it has said so in clear and
unambiguous terms. There should be no exclusion of review by implication, or simply because wide discretion has been conferred upon the
administrator. Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act to make
this clear beyond all doubt, and to reject such cases as Switchmen's
Union v. NationalMediation Bd.4 7 seems desirable and necessary. 48 There
is still much uncertainty over the meaning and effect of the language of
the present Act on this point,4 9 although the Supreme Court has indicated
47. 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (review held precluded by implication though not barred by
express language of statute). Accord, Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Transp.
Serv. Employees, 320 U.S. 715 (1943). Cf. Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S.
239 (1950); General Comm'n of Adjustment v. Missouri K.T. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943).
But cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
48. Section 1009(a) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code, provides: "Every agency action
made reviewable by statute and every other final agency action which is not subject to
judicial review in an action brought by a person adversely affected or aggrieved shall, except as expressly precluded by Act of Congress hereafter enacted, be subject to judicial
review under this Act." A.B.A. Proposed Code 194-95. Also, Section 1001(a) omits the
provisions of Section 2(a) of the present Act exempting completely therefrom the Selective
Service Act of 1940, the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, and the Surplus Property Act of
1944, and adds: "No agency or function shall be exempt from any provision of this Act,
except by express statutory reference hereto." A.B.A. Proposed Code 184. The proposed
Code exempts fully the Tax Court and the Court of Military Appeals. A.B.A. Proposed
Code 184. In Section 1012 it expressly repeals the present exemptions from the present
Act now found in some fourteen statutes, to the extent they authorize special procedures.
A.B.A. Proposed Code 198.
49. The language of § 10 gives a right of review except "so far as (1) statutes preclude
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that this language usually creates a strong presumption in favor of
judicial review.50 Indeed, the Court has recently stated that if Congress
confers "a right," there is a strong inference that this indicates the right
shall be enforced and protected by judicial review where agency action
is taken in excess of delegated powers or contrary to a specific statutory
prohibition."' Unfortunately, at times, whether or not the right exists
seems to turn in large part upon whether there exists judicial review to
protect it. It is not clear if the "right" creates review, or review creates
the "right."
The courts have gone to great lengths-some would even say to
extreme lengths-to avoid legislative language which on its face apparently bars all judicial review on all issues and matters. A legislative
command that administrative action shall be deemed "final and conclusive" is interpreted to mean only that it shall be administratively final,
that is, subject to no further administrative modification or review, or
that judicial review is thereby limited but not barred.5" The availability
of review may be limited to questions of law or constitutionality. The
amount of review may be limited to reversal of acts clearly arbitrary or capricious, or entirely unsupported by evidence. This has oc53
curred in cases interpreting statutory commands involving pensions,
judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 60 Stat.
243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952). Arguably, this overrules the Switchmen's case, supra note 47.
Cf. Air Line Dispatcher's Ass'n. v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). But cf. Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 167 F.2d 529
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948). See also 4 Davis, Treatise § 28.08; Davis,
Unreviewable Admidistrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 427-33 (1954); note 53 infra.
50. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229,
232-33 (1953).
51. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1958). See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579,
581-82 (1958).
52. Cf. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480 (1957); Qrder of Ry. Conductors
of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520 (1947) (Railway Labor Act allows review when two
divisions of Board are deadlocked over which has jurisdiction of case); Elgin, J. & E. Ry.
v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946) (provision of Railway Labor Act that all awards "shall be final and binding" allows review of issue of whether
union is the authorized representative of an employee); Ellerd v. Southern Pac. R.R., 241
F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1957) (review for procedural defect). But cf. Washington Terminal Co.
v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 319 U.S. 732
(1943) (no review of adjustment proceeding except in enforcement proceeding).,
53. In United States v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1925), concerning a veteran's
claim for adjusted compensation, "final and conclusive" was construed as meaning final unless "wholly without evidential support or wholly dependent upon a question of law or
clearly arbitrary or capricious." Cf. Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924) ;
Gutnayer v. McGranery, 100 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1952), modified, 212 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.
1954). But cf. Adams v. Nagle, 303 U.S. 532 (1938); Butte A. & P. Ry. v. United States,
290 U.S. 127 (1933); Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U.S. 502 (1933) (hardship relief for
tax); First Moon 'v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243- (1926) (determination of heirs for land
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aliens,54 and draftees.5 5 Going further, a legislative mandate that administrative action "shall not be reviewed by any court" may still not preclude all review. By a magic feat of statutory interpretation the language
may be revised so as not to bar review of at least constitutional, and perhaps even jurisdictional, issues, since to bar this much review might violate
the Constitution. The concept of jurisdictional issues, broadly construed,
of course, may open all questions of law and fact to some review.
To date, the courts have largely sidestepped the difficult question of
whether the Constitution guarantees some judicial review of certain
issues or matters by interpreting statutes to allow any review that might
be demanded by the Constitution.5 6 For example, in cases involving
statutes requiring renegotiation of profits of government contractors,
despite the most express preclusion of judicial review by Congress, the
Court has allowed judicial review of a refusal to redetermine profits
because of an erroneous statutory interpretation which held the contract
not covered. This would seem to allow review of an erroneous interpretation allowing coverage,5 7 as well. Non-reviewability here is largely based
on the special competence of the agency regarding business and accounting practices. This is a factor not present perhaps when the issue is
whether the language of the Act covers the contract in question. The
Court may also be reluctant to allow the agency to determine the outer
limits of its jurisdictional powers. This is a task usually and properly
assumed by courts in order to serve as a check on agency power.
grant bounty not reviewable); United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919) (war loss
claim non-reviewable); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890) (valuation of import
claim non-reviewable); First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 225 F.2d 33
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (establishment of branch bank not reviewable); Lansden v. Hart, 180
F.2d 679 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950) (presidential proclamation dosing
area to hunting geese not reviewable); Sellas v. Kirk, 101 F. Supp. 237 (D. Nev. 1951),
aff'd, 200 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940 (1953) (grazing). Compare
George Kemp Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950), with Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1949)
and Stimson Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824
(1947).
54. Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48, 51 (1955) ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
55. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
56. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 586-87 (1934) ; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922). See Hart, The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 1362 (1953).
57. United States v. California E. Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 351 (1955).
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VIII. THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Does the Constitution preclude Congress from barring all judicial
review of issues involved in specific administrative acts? Certainly, there
are strong judicial expressions to this effect in Crowell v. Benson,"8
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 9 St. Joseph Stockyards
Co. v. United States, 60 and Ng Fung Ho v. White,61 so far as certain
issues, such as constitutional or jurisdictional facts, are concerned.
Indeed, these cases went further and required independent judicial judgment or even trial de novo on matters such as confiscation or citizenship.
The opinions leave unanswered such questions as what are jurisdictional
or constitutional facts, and how does one differentiate them from other
kinds of facts. Logically, there seems no standard. Yet, perhaps there
may be some facts which seem of the very essence of the agency's
power, which the statute stresses. There may be areas where the discretion of the administrator is unusually narrow and limited. There may
be administrative errors so grave in nature, and so drastic in consequences, as to call for unusual judicial intervention. There may simply
be no other way to obtain judicial review in a given case. Facts which
are relatively objective in nature, about which the answer is either yes
or no, black or white, as with citizenship, may require a different approach than such issues as reasonableness of rates, where hard and fast
lines cannot be drawn objectively. Certain areas, e.g., civil liberties,
may be deemed so crucial as to demand the closest judicial scrutiny and
the narrowest limits for administrative discretion.
We are in a shadowy area here, where judicial discretion is great.
Certainly it is hard to imagine a court lending itself, and its great powers
and prestige, to the enforcement of an administrative order or the
execution in any way of an administrative program, without some independent, albeit limited, inquiry into the validity of that order or
program. Courts, it may be predicted, despite an imposition of selfrestraint in deference to legislative commands, are not likely to allow
themselves to become mere rubber stamps automatically enforcing the
administrative process. The requirements of due process of law, the
preservation of the judicial power conferred by article III, the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus, and the respect for separation of
powers as a check on the potential dangers of unlimited power, all
operate to give some judicial review on certain issues and matters. Under
article III, the federal judicial power should include the power to review
58. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953 (1957).
59. 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
60. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
61. 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
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(perhaps even render an independent determination) vital facts relevant
to constitutional, and perhaps statutory, limitations on administrative
power and discretion.6 2 This category includes facts basic to the constitutional exercise of power. The use of courts, therefore, to enforce administrative orders, at least where such orders deprive men of liberty or
property, or involve criminal prosecutions,6 3 is surely always open to

the exercise of limited judicial scrutiny of the order involved. The
refusal or revocation of a license, where the license be a condition to
exercising a freedom otherwise legal, and its lack subjects one to
criminal penalties or fine or imprisonment, should fall within these
categories. Even if courts are not relied upon to enforce administrative
orders, if those orders result in imprisonment, the writ of habeas corpus"
will afford some judicial review. If the administrative order seizes an
individual's property, without compensation, the fifth amendment would
similarly demand judicial review.6 5 In some cases, of course, there may
be provisional seizure or even provisional imprisonment, with subsequent
judicial review by habeas corpus or other procedures.6 6
There should be review whenever the judicial process is employed to
enforce an obligation on a reluctant person, e.g., when a utility is ordered
to lower its rates or an employer to bargain with his employees or to pay
workmen's compensation. In addition, any substantial interference with
fundamental individual rights and liberties should be subject to constitutionally-guaranteed judicial review, although limited to a review of
certain issues and matters, and no doubt only to a limited extent of these.
Review should be required here at least to determine if the interference
violates constitutional guarantees and rights. Whether review should
62. See notes 56-61 supra.
63. Of course, Congress could impose reasonable restrictions here. A defendant who
failed, without good grounds, to attack the agency order in a specified court within a
specified reasonable time might be precluded from raising the issue otherwise. Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 446-47 (1944). Cf. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
64. Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946) (draftee). Cf. We
Shung v. Brownell, 346 U.S. 906 (1953); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (under
Immigration Act of 1917 review of deportation or exclusion of aliens may be had only by
habeas corpus); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103 (1927) (deportation); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (exclusion);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (detention). Compare Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), with Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). Cf. note 39 supra.
See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 368 (1951).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196 (1882).
66. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931) ; Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931) ; Brinkerhoff-Faris Co.
v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). Compare Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S.
594 (1950) and United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946), with Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288 (1944). See 1 Davis, Treatise §§ 7.08-.10.
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extend to other issues, such as other constitutional or statutory questions,
or perhaps all questions of law or even all questions of fact, is not so
clear. Nor is it plain how much review of those issues subject to review
should be required. The concepts of judicial power and habeas corpus
shade off into due process. The problems often involve unfair discrimination in the hiring or firing of government employees, and in the denying or granting of government bounties, pensions, and contracts. Whenever the administrative adjudication seriously affects property interests
or others of great
moment, perhaps due process should then require
67
judicial scrutiny.
IX.

STANDING AND

METHODS

Even if judicial review is available, it may be denied because sought
by the wrong person, or at the wrong time, or by the wrong method.
Judicial review is of little value when denied to those most likely to
undertake the cost and effort required to obtain it. As a general principle,
it might be wise to allow review to anyone able to show a sufficient
probability of a real and serious threat to or interference with his life,
liberty, -property, constitutional or statutory rights.6 True, sham cases
67. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
68. Usually a party may challenge the regulation affecting him. But problems often
arise here. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (organization
placed on list of "subversive organizations" by Attorney-General may challenge listing);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (denying review to government
employees affected by Hatch Act until they in fact acted contrary to challenged regulations); Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947) (tenants may obtain review of order
allowing landlords to proceed with eviction); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) (producer may challenge order deducting amounts from payments to him for milk); CBS v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) (network may challenge regulation denying licenses to
stations making certain contracts with networks); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113 (1940) (employer may not challenge order regulating wages paid his employees if he
obtains government contract); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (railroads can challenge 3-cent airmail because
of their investment in special mail equipment); Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 171 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 903 (1949) (disappointed bidder for government
contract cannot challenge government failure to sell to highest bidder) ; Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. United States Dep't. of Interior, 160 F. Supp. 417, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Compare
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick &-Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957) and American Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945), with Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S.
432 (1946). Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S.
103 (1958). But cf. Capitol Coal Sales v. Mitchell, 164 F. Supp. 161 (D.D.C. 1958).
Cases liberally giving standing include: National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) (certificate for gas pipe line construction may be challenged by coal association, coal miners' union, railway labor union); American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953) (competitors may challenge award of subsidies).
But cf. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958), petition for cert. filed,
27 U.S.L. Week 3168 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1958) (No. 536); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
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should be eliminated, since we want to be sure there are opposing parties
sufficiently interested in presenting forcefully their differing viewpoints.
If, however, one is actually adversely affected by government action,
he should have sufficient standing, if the action is judicially reviewable
to some extent (it may not be if it lies wholly within the discretionary
power of the administrator)9 There is no reason to shy away here
from declaratory judgments to remove real "clouds" not upon title to
property, but upon the exercise of one's legal rights or his business
activities. When asserting the rights of others, one should be able to do
so as a defense to government action."0 Even as a plaintiff, he should be
allowed to do so if he is also adversely affected by the administrative
action."' However, in any case, we may well require a far more immediate definite threat of harm where others, rather than the plaintiff,
are likely to seek review, if adequate grounds therefor exist, and be
more liberal in granting a plaintiff standing if there is no one having a
more direct stake in the controversy who is apt to request review.
Rigid rules lead to either inequitable or contradictory results. The
absolute federal ban on taxpayers' suits72 certainly needs thorough study
Cir. 1953) (consumer may challenge non-disclosure in oleomargarine label of use of synthetic vitamins); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 159 F. Supp. 884 (D.D.C.
1958). Cases denying standing include: Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 204
F.2d 64 (D.D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); American Lechithin Co. v.
McNutt, 155 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 763 (1946); United States Cane
Sugar Ref. Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943). Compare Singer & Sons v.
Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940), with Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15, 19
(1942). See 3 Davis, Treatise ch. 22.
69. One need not always have a "legal right." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470 (1940) (plaintiff lacked legal right to be free of competition but may challenge grant of license which in fact injures his existing business). Cf. Chicago v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FCC, 345 U.S.
153, 155 (1953). But cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) ; Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938).
70. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (white defendant may assert right of
Negro as defense to suit for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant). Cf. NAACP v.
Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958) ; Hanson v. DenckIa, 357 U.S. 235,
245 (1958); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264 (1956); NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951) (employer may assert lack of non-communist oath by
CIO officials as defense in suit by NLRB seeking to enforce its order against employer.)
71. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (non-resident motorist served personally
with process may assert rights of those not so served) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (private school may assert rights of parents and children). Contra, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (physician may not assert rights of patients to contraceptives) ; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540 (1912) (large business cannot
assert rights of small business). Cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477
(1940). See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 160-92 (1953);
Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 723, 726-27 (1959); Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 140 (1959).
72. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Cf. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
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and reappraisal in the light of the current heavy burden of federal taxes
on most people, especially where denial of a taxpayer's suit forecloses
for all practical purposes any judicial review at all of vast federal
spending projects. The concept of the individual "private attorney
general" seeking enforcement of the law 3 is one that could be shaped
by the courts to give needed relief when no one else is likely to challenge
the administrative action. The proposed substitutes 74 on the problem
7
of standing which will clarify the ambiguity of the present language 1 of
the Administrative Procedure Act seem highly desirable.
Similarly, there seems little justification for courts in the twentieth
century to return to the niceties of common law pleading to compel
plaintiff at his peril to stipulate the correct writ or method for judicial
review. An explicit legislative command as to the method of reviewin a special court, before three judges-should undoubtedly be adhered
to, for there are often valid reasons for centralizing review in one court
or requiring more than one judge. Absent an explicit legislative comU.S. 429 (1952); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445 (1939). State courts freely allow
such suits, even on nonfiscal matters. See 3 Davis, Treatise § 22.10; Davis, Standing to
Challenge Governmental Action, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 353, 391-96 (1955). It is not dear
when a case comes from the state courts whether the state or federal rule on standing,
especially in taxpayer's suits, controls. Compare Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
(1952) (federal rule; suit not allowed), with Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
(state rule; suit allowed). See also 3 Davis, Treatise § 22.17.
73. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943) (association of consumers may challenge order increasing minimum coal prices).
But cf. Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939), affirming 26 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C.) (contrary
result when suit brought in equity and not based upon statutory "person aggrieved"
provision). Cf. FCC v. NBC, 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316
U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Philco Corp. v.
FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959) (non-communications
competitor of parent corporation whose subsidiary operated station may challenge license),
noted in 72 Harv. L. Rev. 770 (1959). Cf. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1955) (newspaper may challenge license for station). But cf. Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (parent may not challenge license to subsidiary's competitor); Seaboard & W. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515, 518-19 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) (petitioner cannot challenge when another party
already represents same interests as petitioner).
74. Section 1009(b) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code reads: "Any person adversely affected
or aggrieved by any such reviewable agency action shall have standing to seek judicial
review thereof, except where expressly precluded by Act of Congress hereafter enacted."
A.B.A. Proposed Code 195.
75. Section 10(a) now provides: "Any person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of
any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5
U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1952). This was probably intended to let anyone adversely affected in
fact obtain review. See 3 Davis, Treatise § 22.02.
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mand, a general provision such as now proposed in substitutes 76 for
the Administrative Procedure Act, whose present language on this point
is not free from ambiguity,7 7 seems entirely proper. If the legislature

desires a special form of judicial review in any case of administrative
action, let it say so in unmistakable terms. Otherwise, there should be
one simple uniform method for obtaining judicial review for any agency
action.
X. TIMING OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Final Orders
If available, review may also be denied because sought either too soon
or too late. This problem as to when judicial review should be sought
is one that often calls for the most delicate balancing of individual hardship, agency power, legislative purpose, public interest, and judicial
experience and self-restraint. Here, situations, which in and of themselves reflected serious and legitimate concern over actual or potential
crippling or paralysis of a particular administrative process through
premature or excessive judicial intervention, gave rise to inflexible
dogmas and rules which have greatly hindered an intelligent approach
to these problems in subsequent cases. Rigid rules banning judicial intervention have obscured the crucial issues in the problem and led to
arbitrary, extreme, and even contradictory results.
The statement that judicial review should not be allowed until the
agency has issued a final order7" is undoubtedly sensible. This principle
obviates the delays and expense of countless direct appeals of interlocutory orders when review of the final order can give adequate relief
against an improper interlocutory order. There are situations, however, where an interlocutory order, unless immediately reviewed, can
76. Section 1009(c) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code states: "A person so adversely affected
or aggrieved may obtain judicial determination of the jurisdiction of the agency in a civil
or criminal case brought by the agency, or in its behalf, for judicial enforcement of such
agency action, regardless of the availability or pendency of administrative review proceedings with respect thereto, except where expressly precluded by Act of Congress. All other
cases for review of agency action shall be commenced by the filing of a petition for review
in the United States district court of appropriate jurisdiction, except where a statute provides for judicial review in a specified court." A.B.A. Proposed Code 195.
77. Section 10(b) provides that review may be obtained by any special statutory proceeding "or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or
habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction." 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1009(b) (1952). See Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1958) ; 3 Davis, Treatise ch. 23.
78. SEC v. Otis & Co., 338 U.S. 843 (1949); FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S.
375 (1938). See 3 Davis, Treatise § 20.05; Davis, Administrative Remedies Often Need Not
Be Exhausted, 19 F.R.D. 437, 460-70 (1957). See also Carrow, supra note 77.
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cause damage to a party far outweighing other factors. Sometimes this

damage can never be alleviated by later review. The decisive factor
should be whether the alleged harm to plaintiff is reparable or irreparable
unless immediate review is granted.7 9 Even if the injury is reparable,
there may remain the problem of which leads to more cost and delay:

immediate court review or court review only after an agency hearing.8 0
B. Exhaustion of Remedies
Similarly, few will doubt the general proposition that usually a party

should be required to exhaust his administrative remedies before a court
should attempt to handle the matter. This gives the agency a chance to
correct any error, render the right decision, or decide the case upon other
grounds. It allows the administrator to make the required investigation,
find the necessary facts, and determine the policy questions, as the legislature presumably intended him to do.8 ' Otherwise, a court will often
duplicate the work of the agency, covering exactly the same ground
as an agency hearing, adding to the expense and delay, and transferring
responsibility' from the agency to the court. Yet, there are instances
when all these factors may be counterbalanced by other considerations.
There may be a great. need for swift, definitive judicial decision upon the
constitutionality or validity of an entire program or for an authoritative
statutory interpretation. This is especially true where questions are
clear-cut, free of factual determinations, and involve vital problems as to
the constitutional or statutory limits of an agency's discretion, powers,
or jurisdiction.8 2 Absolute rules inhibit the prudent use of judicial discretion and conceal the real policy questions involved.
79. See, e.g., Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951) (agency decision about to be
made on record which included reports allegedly improperly admitted); SEC v. Otis & Co.,
338 U.S. 843 (1949) (agency decision about to be made on improperly included reports);
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939) (review threatened
'agency disclosure of confidential data); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) (review of temporary order allowing immediate effect to proposed dual rate system); Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 568
(4th Cir. 1953) (temporary rate order reviewed). Cf. United States ex rel. Kansas City So.
Ry. v. ICC, 252 U.S. 178 (1920); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918). But cf. Eastern
Util. Associates v. SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947) (no review of refusal to change place
of hearing until after hearing over).
80. Cf. Riss & Co. v. ICC, 179 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (no immediate review of
refusal to assign competent examiner to case; error judicially rectified by reversal on this
ground after agency hearing, Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951)).
81. Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953); Aircraft & Diesel Equip.
Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Macauley v. Waierman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540
(1946); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938). See 3
Davis, Treatise ch. 20; Davis, Administrative Remedies Often Need Not Be Exhausted, 19
F.R.D. 437 (1957).
82. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) (jurisdiction doubtful, de-
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The key factors should be: (1) the extent of the possible injury to
plaintiff if the administrative remedy must be pursued; (2) the degree
of doubt or clarity about the jurisdiction and power of the agency in the
instant case; and (3) the need for the specialized experience and knowledge of the agency in deciding the jurisdictional issues raised in the case.
Thus in some cases, the administrative hearing may involve abnormally
heavy costs or irreparable injury to the plaintiff; the jurisdiction of the
agency may be very doubtful or even clearly lacking; and the jurisdiction
may depend solely upon constitutional questions on which courts specialize and have the final say."3 In other cases, the administrative
remedy may be as fully adequate as the judicial one; the administrative
hearing may involve no unusual expense or great harm; and the jurisdictional issues may fall clearly within the specialized competence of the
agency. 4 Particularly where the constitutionality of the basic enabling
statute of the agency is involved, rather than the constitutionality of
the statute's application to a particular plaintiff (which may depend on
pended on statutory interpretation; company alleged irreparable injury to its bank credit;
seems contra to Franklin case, supra note 81); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329
U.S. 520 (1947) (stalemate between two divisions of board which were equally divided as
to which had jurisdiction of the case); Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317
U.S. 456 (1943) (agency hearing alleged to cost company $100,000; agency orders plainly
invalid on face; jurisdiction of agency depended on constitutional issues); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943) (federal court or ICC, not state agency,
should decide applicability of ICC order). Cf. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.
1955) (irreparable injury here-seamen barred by government as security risks were unable
to work at trade, had to travel to Washington for agency hearing; issue one of law and
constitutionality-legality of agency's procedure). But cf. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S.
579 (1958) ; Smith v. Duldner, 175 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1949). The final order-rule does not
seem to prevent review here either. Cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., supra.
State courts often do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies if a question of
constitutionality or jurisdiction is present. 3 Davis, Treatise § 20.09.
83. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958); Allen v. Grand
Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) (query whether any injury was caused by agency
hearing to bank credit as company asserted); Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
supra note 82. The problem differs if the administrative order is attacked by way of
defense in an enforcement action, for here the defendant does not control the timing of
court action. United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (lst Cir. 1952).
84. See, e.g., Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953) (no real injury
from agency hearing; jurisdictional question very confused); Arkansas Power & Light Co.
v. FPC, 156 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd per curiam, 330 U.S. 802 (1947) (state agency
had prescribed method of accounting: FPC issued show cause order to require changes
in these methods; no harm to plaintiff yet, since FPC might never issue order, or might
issue one in accord with state agency) ; Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
supra note 81 (no substantial injury from agency hearing); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (Court's earlier decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), settled issue of NLRB jurisdiction over manufacturing; only
issue here was factual nature of Bethlehem's business; alleged injury called for specialized
skill of NLRB).
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facts to be adduced at an agency hearing), will courts intervene immediately. 5 A court, however, may still refuse to act here because the
agency may decide the case for the' plaintiff on nonconstitutional
grounds." Inadequacy or improbability of obtaining appropriate relief
from the agency may be considered decisive. 87 The proposed substitutes
for the Administrative Procedure Act seem unsound since they would
preclude, or at least attempt to preclude, the exercise of judicial discretion on this problem."
C. Ripeness
The rather vague test of ripeness, which demands a mature case
before judicial review, has undoubtedly led to contradictory, confusing,
and unsound decisions. Yet, the basic rule is sound. It entrusts responsibility and discretion primarily to those who ought to have it, the judges.
This discretion is essential. Any standard must allow it. One that fails
to do so is deceptive, for it is an invitation to judges for evasions and
concealment of the real factors at play. Judges may err or act unwisely,
but it is doubtful if any legislative formulation of a standard would be
an improvement.
The fundamental principle, after all, is correct: courts should not
85. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958) (constitutionality
of state PUC order prohibiting carriers from carrying federal property at rates below those
fixed by PUC); Allen v. Grand .Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) (Court passed on
constitutionality of presidential creation of various wartime agencies, but not upon other
constitutional issues also raised by fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth amendments); Lichter
v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (constitutionality of Renegotiation Act; plaintiff
barred by lapse of time from seeking Tax Court ruling); United States v. Kissinger, 250
F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958). But cf. Miller v. United States, 242
F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957).
86. Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947) (constitutionality
of Renegotiation Act).
87. United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (FTC
remedy inadequate); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
88. Section 1009(g) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code reads: "Upon a showing of irreparable
injury, any federal court of competent jurisdiction may enjoin at any time the conduct
of any agency proceeding in which the proceeding itself or the action proposed to be taken
therein is clearly beyond the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction or authority of the
agency." A.B.A. Proposed Code 196. There is also a provision for (1) expediting the
decision of the court at the request of the Attorney General; and (2) assessing costs and
attorney's fees against petitioner in a suit that is frivolous or brought for the purpose of
delay. A.B.A. Proposed Code 196. Section 1005(a) provides for judicial review upon a
showing of irreparable harm, in the case of any investigation, where the agency action is
clearly beyond the constitutional jurisdiction or statutory authority of the agency, while
§ 1005(b) gives a court, in the proceedings to order enforcement of an agency subpoena,
power to quash it if it is unreasonable in terms, irrelevant in scope, beyond the jurisdiction
of the agency, not competently issued, or not in accordance with law. A.B.A. Proposed
Code 189-90.
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waste their time and energy on anything but actual problems, and should
avoid deciding remote, abstract, or hypothetical questions. There must
be clear-cut concrete issues for a court to decide. The danger, of course,
is that a court can thus evade its duty to decide a difficult or complicated
case.
Normally a court should not intervene if there is no substantial,
adverse effect upon the plaintiff now or in the immediate future.8 9 An
absolute requirement that no one may challenge a statute until it has
been concretely applied by an official ignores several facts. Many laws,
and particularly administrative rulings, are either self-enforcing (withholding of benefits, denial of licenses, passports, jobs, or mail delivery)
or enforced by private persons. Furthermore, an individual may be faced
with this Hobson's choice: on the one hand, compliance, with forfeiture
of his chance to challenge the administrative action, as well as loss of
his property or liberty; or on the other hand, defiance, with the risk
of a criminal prosecution or other severe penalties for violating the
statute or agency order."' Often, if one waits until men are ready to risk
89.

See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Public Serv. Comm'n v.
(relief denied against state agency where no proof agency
ever threatened or took action against interstate plaintiff, and since issues still general and
vague, no controversy existed between agency and plaintiff); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948) (relief denied against imposition of state tax beyond three mile limit on shrimp
where no indication tax would be so imposed on plaintiff); Employers Group of Motor
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Bd., 143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 735 (1944) (no review of NWLB "order" which consisted of advice to President
about terms for settlement of labor dispute even if President might possibly order seizure
of employer's business unless dispute thus settled). Accord, National War Labor Bd. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 145 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 856
(1945); National War Labor Bd. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944). But cf. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S.
541 (1948); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (hypothetical issue closely interwoven
with others). In FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954), all the parties
desired review of FCC regulations concerning "give away" programs; clear-cut issues were
well presented about an uncertain law. Although criminal sanctions were possible, none of
the plaintiffs had sought a license hearing until after which no such sanctions were possible.
See also Hart & Wechsler, op. cit. supra note 71, at 140-56; 3 Davis, Treatise ch. 21; Davis,
Ripeness of Governmental Action for judicial Review (pts. 1-2), 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1122,
1326 (1955).
90. See, e.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337
U.S. 86 (1949) ; Parker v .Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)-all involving risk of criminal prosecution. Cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958). But cf. Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S.
450 (1945) (Court refused to consider constitutional attack on state statute for vagueness
until state court construed statute in criminal prosecution of plaintiff) ; Douglas v. City
of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941). Cf.
Parker, The Execution of Administrative Acts, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 292 (1957).
Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952)
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their liberty, property, or employment to test an order, it never will
be tested.
A rigid principle that a declaratory order, as opposed to a coercive one,
may not be judicially challenged is unfortunate. The same is true in the
case of a rule or finding which merely fixes one's status, or the simple
announcement of an administrative policy. The crucial issue is whether
the agency action, regardless of its nature, inflicts or threatens to inflict,
.substantial and imminent injury on petitioner. Government action can
seriously affect private interests even before-it is specifically applied to
them by coercive ordersf 1 This may be true even of informal administrative action. 2 Nor is it accurate to argue that it is not part of the
judicial function to resolve debilitating uncertainties. Often, an authoritative clarification of legal doubts is essential for one immediately
confronted with a real and present dilemma. For example, should an
alien risk leaving this country for, a seasonal job if on his return he
91. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), FCC
regulations concerning the licensing of stations affiliated with networks were held subject to
review before being actually applied to any station or network since the networks had been
harmed by the refusal of stations to affiliate with networks. See also Shields v. Utah Idaho
Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) (ICC declaratory order reviewed). Cf. Frozen Food
Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Nukk v. Shaughnessy, 350 U.S. 869 (1955),
reversing per curiam 125 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (validity of parol regulations for
aliens prior to any actual violations); joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (listing of plaintiff as "subversive organization" reviewable where substantial injury sustained); La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 18 (1949) (state certification of labor union reviewable); Rochester Tel. Corp.
v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (declaratory order). But cf. Shannaban v. United
States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938); United States v. Atlanta B. & C.R.R., 282 U.S. 52i (1931)
(mere formal finding of fact not reviewable); United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273
U.S. 299 (1927) (review denied of ICC property valuation, held a-mere declaratory order,
despite injury to carrier's credit).
92. But cf. Local 37, Int'l L. & W. Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954) (review denied
of informal advice that resident aliens going to Alaska for temporary summer employment would be treated on return as aliens entering the United States for the first time, and
so subject to exclusion); Public Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 346 U.S. 402 (1953)
(agency "instruction" to airline held not reviewable even though violation thereof constituted
criminal offense and airline had immediate choice whether or not to comply) ; Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919) (agency "specifications" for scales not reviewable despite injury to plaintiff's business); Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225
(D.C. Cir. 1948) (no review of Blue Book stating FCC policy on program content in license
cases); Miles Laboratories, Inc, v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
752 (1944) (no review of. tentative agency finding that advertising was deceptive); Helco
'Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (advice that seed coloring was illegal
adulteration not reviewable despite necessity for criminal prosecution or confiscation of
seeds to test legality of advice) ; Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.
Tex. 1948) (no review of dicta in FCC decision about license renewals and censorship of
political speeches).
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may be treated as a nonresident alien and therefore denied readmittance.
A cloud on one's business, 93 or even commercial uncertainty, especially
in a regulated industry, may cause substantial harm and create a real
controversy. The mere fact that government action depends on other
events is not a fair test. The petitioner may simply have the choice of
obeying the agency order or risking a criminal prosecution; and obedience to the agency order may substantially injure him.
D. Primary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction merits attention, for it is sometimes too rigidly applied. The problem is whether court and agency shall
exercise concurrent original jurisdiction, or whether the initial exercise
of jurisdiction is exclusively the agency's right and duty. Primary jurisdiction determines only whether court or agency makes the initial
decision. Even if primary jurisdiction belongs to the agency, there still
may be judicial review of the agency's decision. The judicial decision
is merely postponed.9 4 There may be various reasons for postponement
of judicial action. In some instances, it is clear that the legislature meant
to exclude the courts until some prior resort has been had to the agency.
In other cases, prior resort to the agency is imperative to carry out the
agency's statutory functions, or to obtain an essential uniformity or
coherence of results or rates or a nationwide policy, or to make the best
use of the agency's expert staff Y5 Delay of judicial action until after
93. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (review of
FCC rules regulating multiple ownership of stations, which plaintiff asserted hampered
future plans for expansion, prior to actual application of rules in license proceeding);
Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956) (review of ICC declaratory
order refusing exemption as agricultural commodities of items carried by plaintiff, noncompliance carrying threat of criminal prosecution); Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners
Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953) (review granted of regulations affecting promotions, etc.,
of trial examiners, despite lack of showing of application to any specific examiners; a cloud
over professional status of all examiners) ; Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952)
(review allowed of New York statute threatening discharge of teachers for treasonable or
seditious words prior to administrative clarification of statutory language or threat
against teachers; statute's existing vagueness caused serious harm to academic freedom);
Amshoff v. United States, 228 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956).
But cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948) (no review of public cloud over bank's
status in Federal Reserve System due to violation of condition attached to bank's membership in the system); FPC v. Union Producing Co., 230 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 927 (1956); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
94. Cf. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958); United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 352 U.S. 77 (1956) (prior resort to
ICC necessary if construction of tariff's meaning involves inquiry into technical cost
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the decision of the agency gives the court the full benefit of the agency's
expertness. It also prevents imposing on the parties uncoordinated and
even conflicting requirements0 6 Here, primary jurisdiction eliminates
confusion, wastefulness, and contradiction. For example, frequently the
problem arises as to the relationship between anti-trust policy and a
regulatory policy which is semi-monopolistic. Until an agency has
formulated the specific regulatory policy in a given case, a court can
hardly determine the proper relationship between the regulatory and
anti-trust policies. Judicial review after the agency has set forth its
regulatory policy can more intelligently determine whether the agency
has inadequately considered the needs for competition. The agency can
first appraise the need for monopoly because of such factors as service,
safety, and costs. The court 'can then, upon review of the agency
decision, substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of

law and determine the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of discretion and policy, if the court believes more competition is needed (unless
a statute clearly deprives the court of this power) yT The mere fact that
the agency cannot grant the relief sought or that some, but not all, parts

of the problem are beyond administrative jurisdiction is not decisive.
allocation factors within special competence of ICC); United States v. Western Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 59 (1956) (prior resort to ICC needed if questions of reasonableness and meaning
of tariff complex and interwoven); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570
(1952) (government cannot, without prior resort to agency having power to immunize conference rates from anti-trust laws, bring anti-trust action against shipping conference and
its rate system); United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932) (prior
resort to Shipping Board required where anti-trust suit alleged conspiracy by conference
carriers); Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 240 U.S. 43 (1916) (need for uniformity in fixing
railroad rates precludes resort to courts before ICC has ruled on reasonableness of rates);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. American Tie & Lumber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914) (only ICC to decide
if oak railroad ties included under tariff category of "lumber." But cf. W. P. Brown &
Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 299 U.S. 393 (1937)); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951) (prior CAB determination needed over reasonableness of tariff rule that carrier assumed no liability for lost jewelry). Cf. Federal Maritime
Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) (shipping conference rates approved by Board
held invalid on merits as matter of statutory interpretation) ; Comment, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
1069 (1958). See Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations, 65
Yale L.J. 314 (1956); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws,
102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577 (1954); L. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954);
von Mehren, The Anti-Trust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1954); Note, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 192 (1957). See also
3 Davis, Treatise ch. 19.
96. Cf. Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947).
97. Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Federal Maritime
Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S.
86 (1953); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
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The agency may still be able to make a valuable contribution on those
parts of the case within its powers.1
In some instances, however, more is lost than gained by sending
plaintiff to the agency first. The legislature may have clearly meant
to preserve original judicial jurisdiction when it created the agency.
Judicial flexibility and discretion here are a prerequisite to an intelligent
formulation of rules. Blind automatic deference to so-called agency
expertness ignores the vital questions of: (1) the extent to which the
issues involved may not be as well, if not better, handled by a local court
than a distant or overburdened agency; (2) the extent to which the
question may involve factors not purely technical, which need the broader
viewpoint and experience of a judge, unwarped by specialization of
interest and responsibility; (3) how suitable is the question at issue for
the exercise of the discretionary powers of the agency; (4) will court
action seriously jeopardize the statute's purposes; and (5) will resort
to the agency for relief greatly inconvenience the parties by added delay
or expense. A court decision may often avoid later clashes between the
agency and the courts, especially if a question of law not dependent on
factual issues is involved. 9 Frequently, also, the fact that the agency
may have so identified itself with a particular group or policy or the
status quo as to prevent its giving adequate consideration to other factors
may influence a court. Primary jurisdiction should operate to give the
administrator the power needed for a rational, integrated execution of
the agency's enabling statute, including implied powers based upon its
special competence. More than this is neither required nor wise.
XI. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROBLEMS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of administrative action is so intimately related to
certain aspects of the internal administrative organization and procedure
that these questions require discussion at this point.
98. See, e.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Thompson v.
Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946); General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado
Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940).
99. See, e.g., United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945)
(no prior resort to FTC required in anti-trust action against export association whose acts
partly immunized under agreements when and if the agreements were ever approved by
FTC); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (state may file anti-trust suit
to enjoin conspiracy of carriers in fixing rates) ; Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,
259 U.S. 285 (1922) (judicial interpretation of agency regulation-a specific tariff-allowed
where special facts not needed). Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959); Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 916 (1953).

Order of R.
W.R.R., 339
nental & W.
Howard, 343

Compare Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941), with

Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946) and Slocum v. Delaware, L. &
U.S. 239 (1950). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); TranscontiAir, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
U.S. 768 (1952).
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Quite obviously, if there has been no hearing of any kind before the
agency, judicial review, to be at all meaningful, must be broad. The
same is true if there is no record for a' court to review other than
the bare announcement of the agency's final decision on the matter.
Similar problems arise if the agency has not issued a reasoned decision
setting forth its findings of fact and a rationale of its legal and policy
conclusions. In the first two situations, little less than a complete trial
de novo, at least on any factual issues subject to review, will enable the
court to determine whether the agency has acted arbitrarily or harshly,
denied procedural due process, or exceeded its powers or jurisdiction.'
On these questions of disputed fact, then, the court must and should
independently reach a decision based on the evidence adduced before it.
On questions of law, the absence of a hearing or record may not be so
fatal, unless facts, as often happens, are needed to decide the questions
of law. On some legal questions, the court may need only to consider the
statutory purpose to see if the agency's interpretation of law is within
the range of the choices made available by the legislature.
Even if there has been a hearing, it may have been too perfunctory or
limited to produce and develop the relevant issues and facts, or to afford
procedural due process to the parties. A formal record also may be of
little value if the decision was based mainly on facts not in the record.
A lengthy administrative decision may fail to disclose sufficiently the
rationale of the agency's conclusions and findings. The extent and nature
of judicial review dearly must be viewed in the light of how the agency
reached and made its decision.
It may be better in the interests of swift and inexpensive agency action,
particularly where the agency usually is favorably disposed toward claims
of individuals, to provide simply for a trial de novo upon judicial review
of issues subject to review rather than to attempt to formalize agency
procedures. An alternative, perhaps, would be to provide an agency
100. Section 1009(e) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code states that in a case where there is
judicial review of agency action which was taken without a formal trial type hearing,
"the record on review shall be made by trial in the reviewing court." A.B.A. Proposed Code
196. Section 1004(b) states that in cases of adjudication in which neither a statute nor the
Constitution requires a hearing, there may be provided an intra-agency system of appeals.
If requested, the reviewing agency body must furnish a copy of the reasons for its decisions,
which decisions (or thQse of the subordinate officer if there is no appellate body) are subject
to judicial review, with the record on appeal to be made by trial in the reviewing court.
This applies only to private rights, claims or privileges, including (but not limited to): (1)
proprietary functions such as use or disposal of public property; (2) public contracts;
(3) determinations based on inspections, tests, or examinations. A.B.A. Proposed Code
188-89. If the agency does actually grant a full hearing here, why should there be trial
de novo in judicial review? See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudicatory
Action Taken Without a Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 698 (1957).
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hearing only when requested by the claimant, or only if the claimant
protested the agency's initial decision. To require agency hearings with
a formal record and reasoned decision in the thousands of claims
processed for social security, veterans' pensions, or unemployment compensation, seems an expensive way to satisfy those relatively few cases
where a claim may be unreasonably or arbitrarily denied. Certainly, if
an agency hearing is required at some stage by the claimant, it need not
be a formal court-type hearing. Informal procedure should be allowed
so long as the record adequately contains the evidence and facts relied
on by the administrator in rejecting the claim. An informal decision
should suffice so long as it adequately reveals the rationale for the result
reached.
Another largely unresolved question is the extent to which judicial
review may be desirable and effective where the lack of a hearing and
judicial process before the agency resulted from the total unsuitability
of the matter for judicial trial. If this is true, the matter hardly becomes
more suitable for judicial trial-often trial de novo-upon review.
Review must be sharply restricted to a few issues and to a limited extent
even here if courts are not to be involved in inappropriate functions.
Review so limited, though, may not be effective where there is no agency
record. How do we decide what matters are not suited to a judicial
hearing?
There are agencies whose functions closely resemble those of courts
in adjudication. There are also agencies who, principally or in part,
exercise rule-making, rate-making, or other legislative powers. Here,
one feels the need for some type of hearing-not necessarily a courtroom type-to develop a record for review and to give all interested
persons a chance to present their case.
This problem concerning the type of hearing and procedure to be
followed by an agency-the extent to which it should or must conform to
court-like adversary methods-is one that continually causes trouble
and is closely related to judicial review. We cannot draw hard and fast
lines here, since we do not yet know enough about the types of controversies that are unsuited for judicial process. We must still recognize
that however compelling the need for departure in administrative hearings from judicial standards, such departures may involve a serious loss
in public confidence as to the fairness and justice of -the administrative
decisions. This loss may result in obedience to the administrative order
not because of its inherent moral force, but mainly because of fear of
the threat of police action for disobedience, or because of respect for
the government and the state, of which the administrator is but a part.
Men will distrust decisions rendered without a full hearing or based upon

19591

JUDICIAL REVIEW

evidence and arguments not offered by the parties, or those reached by
persons who have an interest in the outcome since it may enhance their
power and authority. We must weigh the need for any administrative
action in this manner against the resulting loss in public confidence and
acceptance. Broad judicial review may be desirable to regain public trust.
In legislative work and rule-making, advisory committees,'"" consultations, conferences, and written presentations are often more useful than
hearings (unless there are actual disputes over adjudicative facts). If
a hearing is held, it may often accomplish far more if it is of an argumenttype instead of the formal, trial-adversary type, so long as all interested
parties are given a chance to state their arguments, present their evidence,
and rebut opposing contentions. Credibility is seldom vital, so confrontation and cross-examination may serve no useful purpose. While trial
hearings are unsuitable for developing opinions about policy issues,
they may be proper at times for the presentation of disputed legislative
facts. On the other hand, in adjudicative hearings, a trial-type hearing
is essential. This is also true of legislative hearings which involve disputed adjudicative facts. Here there is, a need to develop facts bearing
on individual things, persons, and rights, especially about the past, and
to resolve such factual issues and disputes, rather than to consider policy
making, legal issues, and discretionary powers, which involve general
ideas and data. We need confrontation and cross-examination when facts
are in dispute which involve the credibility of witnesses, their memories,
and perceptions. The difficulty is not so much the right to a hearing,
but the problems relating to the evidence, the record, and the basis
relied upon by the agency in making its decision.
There is serious objection, therefore, to the advisability of substitutes' 01
for the Administrative Procedure Act which would impose courtroom
requirements for all agency adjudicative hearings and all rule-making
101. Cf. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
102. Section 1003(b) of the proposed Code provides: "Where rules are required under
the Constitution or by statute to be made on a record after opportunity for hearing, the
proceedings shall also be in conformity with sections 1006 and 1007 of this Act [hearings
in adjudications, decisions, and agency review] except that the provision in section
1005(c) requiring separation of functions shall not be applicable and that, in lieu of an
initial decision pursuant to section 1007, an intermediate decision may be issued which shall
be subject to exceptions before promulgation of the rule." A.B.A. Proposed Code 187. Cf.
2 Davis, Treatise § 13.08. However, § 1001(c), unlike § 2(c) of the present Administrative
Procedure Act, does not include in rule-making an agency statement of "particular applicability and future effect" or "the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting. . . . " 60 Stat. 237 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1952). Thus, under the proposed Code, rate-making and rule-making
of particular applicability would be adjudication and require a trial-type hearing. See
A.B.A. Proposed Code 184-85. Cf. 1 Davis, Treatise ch. 6.
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where there is a right to a hearing. All hearings required by statute in
rule-making should not be of the formal adversary type.
It also seems unsound to require the application of judicial rules for
pleading and evidence in formal agency hearings. 0 3 Agency records may
sometimes be too long because of failure to exclude irrelevant evidence.
Parties may sometimes be denied the right to introduce relevant evidence
or be unfairly restricted in the scope of cross-examination. Such errors
can be adequately corrected, when needed, upon judicial review, as at
present. The proposal seems to lose sight of the fact that there is no
uniform scientific way to evaluate evidence. There also is often no need
or justification to police, with the rules of evidence, fact findings of a
well-informed technical staff. Let the agency stress weight, not admissibility (except for privileges). Let it emphasize relevance and materiality. 0 4 The judge-made rules of evidence, even in non-jury civil
cases in the federal courts, are much too vague, and in many cases, far
too restrictive because of antiquated policies, to be forced upon administrative agencies. There is no need to inflict all the nuisances of the
judicial hearsay rules upon the administrative process.
Equally troublesome are recent proposals' 15 to restrict agency review
of findings of fact or evidentiary fact made by trial examiners or those
who initially preside at the agency hearings. Actually, the proposals
seem based largely upon the unwarranted belief that most hearings before
trial examiners involve oral testimony to a large extent, where credibility
103. Section 1006(d) of the proposed Code states that "the rules of evidence and requirements of proof shall conform, to the extent practicable, with those in civil non-jury
cases in the United States district courts." A.B.A. Proposed Code 192. This does not
apply to any "rule making" as defined in the Code (see note 102 supra) or to "approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures
or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services, or allowances thereof, or
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices" bearing upon these, where any "reliable and
probative evidence" may be received. A.B.A. Proposed Code 192. Section 1004(a) requires that "pleadings, including the initial notice, shall conform with the practice and
requirements of pleading in the United States district courts, except to the extent that the
agency finds conformity impracticable. . . . " A.B.A. Proposed Code 188. Cf. note 167
infra for similar provision in the Taft-Hartley Act.
104. See 2 Davis, Treatise ch. 14; Davis, Evidence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1309 (1955).
But cf. Pace, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp. 88
(1958).
105. Section 1007(c) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code provides: "The findings of evidentiary
fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, made by the presiding officer
shall not be set aside by the agency on review of the presiding officer's initial decisions
unless such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence."
A.B.A. Proposed Act 193-94. Cf. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and
Symbol, 40 Cornell L.Q. 281 (1955); Fuchs, Hearing Commissioners, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1342 (1955) ; Thomas, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals as They Affect
the Interstate Commerce Commission and its Practitioners, 24 ICC Prac. J. 1129 (1957).
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of witnesses is decisive. In fact, proponents of the change say it will not
apply at all to non-oral testimony. 10 6 Nor, apparently, will it apply to the
drawing of inferences of ultimate facts from basic facts, or to forward
fact finding in rate cases.10 7 Actually, credibility is a minor factor in
the hearings and work of many agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commission. Often it is
difficult to separate evidentiary facts from questions of law and of policy,
where the agency must continue to exercise full responsibility. Policy
and facts are often interwoven. If the issue involves credibility of
witnesses, the trial examiner's views are certainly entitled to great
weight. Even here credibility seldom stands alone and often is affected
by other nonoral evidence. At present, moreover, reviewing courts have
indicated in clear terms that the agency must give much weight to the
views of a trial examiner on credibility of oral testimony.", This seems
sufficient. True, Professor Cooper, in a recent study'019 of decisions of
four agencies, the NLRB, the FTC, the CAB, and the FPC, reaches
the conclusion that in few instances, if any, would the final decision of
the agency have changed if the findings of facts of the trial examiner had
been reversible by the agency only if clearly erroneous. Rarely was the
trial examiner reversed by the agency on closely balanced issues of fact
in these cases. Unfortunately, this study was made when the trial examiners were subject to reversal on factual findings by the agency. One
cannot be sure the examiner would have acted as wisely or reached the
same factual findings if he had known before his decision of his greater
degree of independence under the rule favored by Professor Cooper.
Moreover, everyone might not reach the same conclusions as to what
were factual findings and what were not.
XII.

SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, AND

JUDICIAL REvIEw

Separation of the internal functions of an agency poses further issues.
There are really two different problems here. One is the separation of
106. See Sellers, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal
Services and Procedures, 24 ICC Prac. J. 1115, 1156 (1957).
107. Fuchs, The American Bar Association and the Hoover Task Force Administrative
Code Proposals, 23 ICC Prac. J. 870, 874 (1956).
108. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955) (agency may overrule
examiner's findings even if latter not "cearly erroneous"). Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (examiner's findings on credibility bear upon substantiality of
evidence supporting agency's findings of fact). But cf. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), petition for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206
(1952) (examiner's findings unrelated to credibility given decisive weight by reviewing
court).
109. Cooper, Administrative Law: The Process of Decision, 44 A.B.AJ. 233 (1958).
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functions. Certainly, some internal separation of functions as under the
present Administrative Procedure Act is desirable and necessary, and this
should be extended to licensing and rate-making. Investigative and
prosecutory functions ought to be separated from adjudication. In fact,
prosecuting should be broadened to include advocacy in general, even if
no accusing is involved. Testifying, negotiating settlements, or instituting
proceedings, however, should not usually be separated from judging.
A second problem is not the improper combination of functions but
the institutional decision. This is the handling of cases by anonymous
persons, the agency staffs, which prepare and write opinions for the
deciders. Consultation between trial examiners and the agency staff
other than prosecutors and investigators, between such staff and agency
heads and members, may lead to a separation of decision-making from
opinion-writing and a denial of access by the parties to those who influence or decide the outcome of cases. This is true even if there is no
question of the introduction of factual materials not found in the formal
record. Such consultation, however, seems both desirable to utilize the
expertise of agency staffs, and necessary to obtain the prompt and
efficient handling of the tremendous number of cases requiring agency
action.
Proposals" ° to apply the present separation of functions of the Administrative Procedure Act to all formal rule-making on a record seem
unsound. Much formal rule-making is non-adversary in character, dealing largely with prognosis, political judgments, compromises of competing interests, and problems of feasibility. All of these demand expert
staff work, special knowledge, continuity of experience, and political
wisdom. We have here a legislative, rather than a judicial, function since
evaluation of the pros and cons of a wide variety of competitive interests
is involved.
On the other hand, it seems desirable, as pointed out previously, to
extend separation of internal functions"' to licensing and rate-making.
This is true despite the absence of an accusatory element and the
110. Task Force Report, Recommendation No. 35, at 164. The A.B.A. Proposed
Code modifies substantially these proposals of the Task Force. See note 102 supra. It
would not apply separation of functions to "rule-making," but defines rule-making far
more narrowly than the present Act-rule- or rate-making of particular applicability are
adjudication under the ABA Proposed Act.
111. Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1004 (1952), now exempts from separation of functions "applications for initial licenses"
or "proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of
public utilities or carriers." See 2 Davis, Treatise § 13.09 at 230. See also note 102 supra,
where the A.B.A. Proposed Code excludes formal rule-making and general rate and price
fixing, but has no exemption for licensing and rate-making of particular applicability which
are still included as adjudication and must have separation of functions.
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presence frequently of technical problems requiring staff expert knowledge. The need for independence of decision, especially in licensing,
seems to call for such separation of functions.
There are also: (1) proposals" 2 to isolate the trial examiners completely from the entire agency staff on all matters, rather than just the
investigatory and prosecutory personnel, as at present; 1 3 and (2) proposals" 4 to extend their isolation from the staff beyond disputed questions of fact, as at present," 5 to all matters of fact, law, and policy.
These are objectionable because they place an unfair burden on the trial
examiner, who needs the help of the expert agency staff. Other proposals" 6 would isolate the agency heads completely from the entire
112. Section 1005(c) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code stipulates that no "presiding or
deciding officer . . . shall be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any
officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigatory or prosecuting functions for any agency.... [N]o such presiding or deciding officer or agency . .. shall consult
with any person or party on any issue of fact or law in the proceeding, except that in
analyzing or appraising the record for decision, any agency member may (1) consult with
other members of the agency in cases in which the agency is making the decision, (2) have
the aid and advice of one or more personal assistants, (3) have the assistance of other
employees of the agency who have not participated in the proceeding in any manner, who
are not engaged for the agency in any investigative functions in the same or any currently
factually related case, and who are not engaged for the agency in any prosecutory functions." A.B.A. Proposed Code 190. See 2 Davis, Treatise §§ 11.08-.12, 13.03.
113. Section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1004(c) (1952), provides that no trial examiner shall "be responsible to or subject to the
supervision or direction of any officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency." See 2 Davis Treatise §§ 13.07,
13.10. This does not apply to the actual members of the agency. Section 5(c) further
provides that no trial examiner "shall consult any- person or party on any fact in issue
unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate." This also does not
apply to actual members of the agency. Different views have been expressed as to whether
it bars consultation with non-invesigating or non-prosecuting agency staff. Compare 2
Davis, Treatise § 11.17, with Fuchs, Hearing Commissioners, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1342, 136869 (1955).
114. See note 112 supra. Note that the ban extends to "any issue of fact," not "any fact
in issue," as under § 5(c) of the present Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c)
(1952). This would include all facts, even those not disputed. Unlike the present Act, the
ban aiso extends to questions of law. Moreover, § 1007(b) of the Code makes it mandatory for the trial examiner to make the initial decision, unless the agency presided at the
hearing, except when all parties waive this right, and except for rule-making required to be
made upon a record under § 1003(b). See A.B.A. Proposed Code 187, 193. For the definition of rule-making, see note 102 supra.
115. See note 113 supra.
116. At present, the separation of functions required by § 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply in any manner to the agency or any member or members of the
body comprising the agency. See note 113 supra. However, § 5(c) prohibits any officer,
employee, or agent engaged in performing investigative or prosecutory functions in any
case participating or advising in the decision of that or a factually related case, except as
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staff on all matters; or from investigatory and prosecutory staff members
only on all matters. This kind of isolation should be required as to the
investigatory and prosecutory staff only. The expert staff of the agency
is its chief reason for existence.
The concept of the agency as a one-man judge, prosecutor, investigator,
jury, and lawmaker is, of course, far from the truth. Agency heads, in
authorizing prosecution or investigation, may more fairly be likened
perhaps to a judge ruling upon a demurrer or a motion to dismiss before
all the evidence is in, or issuing a temporary restraining order, or the
Supreme Court ruling upon a request for certiorari. Nor do agency
members stand to gain or lose personally by their decisions. They are
more in the role of a head of personnel at a large corporation who, after
investigating, fires a worker for loafing on the job. The gain in public
confidence, however, if there is separation of functions here, may well
compensate for some resulting inefficiency to the agency.
There are also proposals for a rigid external division of agency functions."'T These seem to vary in purpose and method, some 1n 8 stressing
complete isolation of investigatory and prosecutor personnel in an
counsel or witness in a public hearing. Thus agency heads, even if engaged in investigations or prosecutory functions to some extent, may still decide cases. However, other
employees, agents or officers engaged in investigating or prosecutory functions in any case
or a factually related case may not participate or advise in the decision or recommended
decision or review of such cases. Cf. 2 Davis, Treatise § 13.06. The A.B.A. Proposed
Code would apply separation of functions to agency heads. See A.B.A. Proposed Code
§ 1005(c), at 185. Thus, unlike the present Act, any agency member in any way connected with prosecutory or investigatory functions in a case or a factually related one
could not sit or participate in any adjudicative aspect of that case. The Task Force Report
favored complete separation of all deciding officers, including agency heads and members,
from all the staff, except for special review assistants, along the lines of the present FCC
organization. Task Force Report, Recommendation No. 41, at 176-82.
117. There are no such requirements in the present Administrative Procedure Act. The
American Bar Association has drafted bills to (1) make the Tax Court an article III one;
(2) establish a Trade Court, also an article III one, with original jurisdiction over all
Clayton Act proceedings, and all unfair trade practice proceedings by the FTC and other
agencies; and (3) a Labor Court, an article III one, with original jurisdiction over all
unfair labor practices and labor representation cases of the NLRB. See Sellers, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal Services and Procedures, 24
ICC Prac. J. 1115 (1957). See H.R. 8751, S. 2292, and S. 3796, S. 3797, S. 3798, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The Task Force favored an administrative court with two sections,
one for taxes, one for trade regulation. Task Force Report, Recommendations Nos. 62-65,
at 242-56. Some of the Task Force also favored a labor section and an immigration section
in this court. Id. at 435-42. The Commission recommended labor, tax, and trade regulation
sections. Task Force Report, Recommendation No. 51, at 84-88.
118. See 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 154 (1952). Cf. 66 Stat. 712, 721
(1952), 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(f)(2), 155, 409 (1952). See 2 Davis, Treatise, §§ 11.13-.14,
13.04-.05. The FTC has a review staff which assists the agency members in adjudication
and may not engage in other functions. Trial examiners must render all initial decisions
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independent branch, as in the present NLRB, others' 9 emphasizing transfer of adjudicative agency functions to a special administrative court.
Logically, an agency should be divided into three independent parts:
(1) a court for adjudicatory functions, (2) an independent investigatory
and prosecution part, and (3) an independent rule-making part. Proposals for administrative courts seem to ignore any alleged harm from a
mixture of investigatory and rule-making functions. Many agencies
have power to handle a given problem either by rule-making or by
adjudication. Proposals for an independent prosecutor only ignore
alleged defects of mixing adjudicative and legislative functions. Yet,
the difference between the legislator and the judge is often deemed
fundamental. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that ultimately all

adjudicative functions should be given to regular courts. This should
occur when policies have been made sufficiently definite by the administrative agency and administrative court to have moved from the realm
of discretion to routine decision under definite rules of law. 20 If this
is true, then all investigation and prosecution would eventually go to the
Department of Justice, and all rule-making and legislative activity (of
which very little would ultimately be required when agency policies

had been fully worked out) could be returned to Congress itself.
Perhaps the answer is that logic will not prevail here over certain hard

facts. The continual rise of new problems caused by the rapid growth
and changes of the American economy promises little hope that the need

for wide discretion, expertness, flexibility, rule-making, and- policymaking, will ever disappear in the fields entrusted to administrative

control. The idea of even substantially eliminating administrative disand may consult with no one (except other examiners) in making decisions on any issue
of law or of fact-not even with the Commissioners. The Commissioners in making adjudicative decisions may not consult with (1) anyone who participated in any way with
the preparation or presentation of the case; (2) anyone in investigatory or prosecuting
work; (3) anyone in the Office of General Counsel, Chief Engineer, and Chief Accountant.
Each Commissioner also has legal and engineering assistants with whom he may consult.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1959), recommending an amendment to
allow consultation with the General Counsel.
119. These are to be article II courts of original jurisdiction. The agencies, such as
the NLRB and FTC, will continue to handle the investigation and prosecution of cases,
and the formulation of rules, but all hearings on these matters will be in these courts. It is
not clear whether the general counsel of the NLRB will continue to retain his independent
status.
120. Cf. B. Schwartz, Administrative justice and its Place in the Legal Order, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390 (1955); L. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436, 473 (1954);
Sellers, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal Services
and Procedures, 24 ICC Prac. J. 1115 (1957): But cf. Ginnane, The Future of Administrative Law, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 432 (1958).
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cretion is a chimera. Discretion has a continuous function. Limited
clear-cut delegations of power by Congress, or literal prescriptions by
the legislature, are usually impossible, even if desirable. Regulation
always requires much discretion. There is no way to reduce the large
and ever-increasing number of variables to precise statements which can
be mechanically applied. We must recognize the continuous need for
a sensitive response to the dynamism of American business and society.
Nor is it true that a rigid body of law should always be given to the
courts. It may still be impossible to carve out the agency's judicial functions without seriously impairing its work.121 The agency may need to
retain control over enforcement of even fully-developed rules to continue
development of its program. Adjudication frequently is closely tied up
with the entire regulatory scheme. This is particularly true when the
threat of adjudication may often lead to compromise and informal settlement, as in FTC and NLRB proceedings. Here informal settlements
are often made because of the agency's power to issue cease and desist
orders in contested cases and thus define unfair practices. 2 2 Each
adjudication has a twin aspect: (1) it fixes rights of the individual
parties; and (2) fills in statutory gaps, as when it defines what are
unfair trade or labor practices. Where prosecution and adjudication
are separated too much, the prosecution will often ignore or be unaware
of the policies of the deciders. Giving adjudication to courts or a separate
agency creates too much division of power and too many checks and
balances, which lead to paralysis, inefficiency, conflict, and confusion.
Proposals to create independent administrative courts appear to ignore
the legislative activities of the "independent agencies." They assume
that if the agency's judicial functions are severed, the remaining part of
the agency can be fully coordinated with and submerged in the executive
branch of the government. Indeed, the assumption seems to be that this
will greatly increase the operating efficiency of that part of the agency
not transferred to the administrative court. 2 These arguments seem121. See Carrow, Administrative Adjudication: Should its Role be Changed?, 27 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 279, 294-99 (1959); Farmer, An Administrative Labor Court: Some Observations on the Hoover Commission Report, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 656 (1956); Nutting,
The Administrative Court, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1384 (1955).
122. See H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79, 81-85; 2 Davis, Treatise

§ 13.05; Freer, The Case Against the Trade Regulation Section of the Proposed Administrative
Court, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 637, 646-48 (1956); Gatchell, The Impact of the Administrative Process on the Judicial Branch of the Government: A Defense of the Status Quo,
16 Fed. B.J. 482 (1956); Kinter, The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of Some
Possible Defects, 44 A.B.A.J. 441, 493-94 (1958) ; Minor, The Administrative Court: Variations on a Theme, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 380 (1958).
123. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1408-10 (1955). But cf. Schubert, Legislative Adjudication of Ad-
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ingly ignore the fact that Congress has deliberately chosen to make many
of these agencies independent of the executive branch. The reason for
so doing was that the agency was a delegate of legislative as well as
judicial power.124 It is unlikely that Congress, upon creation of an
administrative court, would then supinely allow complete executive
control of the remaining functions of an independent agency. This
would be particularly true when much of the agency's work consists of
the creation of rules, a subordinate kind of law-making requiring the
exercise of policy judgments. The current intense interest of Congress
in the functioning of these agencies indicates an unfavorable attitude
toward these proposals.
XIII.

ADMINISTRATIVE

-IEARING RECORDs AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

A.

Official Notice

The nature of judicial review depends not only on the type of hearing,
if any, previously allowed before the agency, but also upon the kind of
record transmitted from the agency to the reviewing court. If the record
is scant and fragmentary, failing to contain all the facts and evidence
relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision, it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for the court to determine whether there is an adequate
basis in fact for the agency's decision, without a trial de novo or at least
a reopening of the record to admit the missing data and evidence. Three
questions in particular have arisen here.
First is the matter of so-called judicial notice by the agency of facts
and matters not in the record or contained in evidence presented at the
agency hearing.1 2 5 On the one hand, there is a strong feeling of unfairness when the agency decision for the first time makes findings of fact
upon the basis of data not in the hearing record. This means that the
interested parties have had no chance, prior to the agency's final decision,
to meet this data, explain or refute it, or even to argue about its relevancy
and accuracy. On the other hand, to confine an agency, with its expert
staff having wide knowledge of the technical problems with which the
agency constantly deals, to judicial notice of indisputable facts may
ministrative Legislation, 7 J. Pub. L. 135 (1958); B. Schwartz, Legislative Oversight: Control of Administrative Agencies, 43 A.B.A.J. 19 (1957); B. Schwartz, The Administrative
Process and Congressional Control, 16 Fed. B.J. 519 (1956); B. Schwartz, Legislative
Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1031 (1955); B. Schwartz, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly
Dicta Comp. 8 (1958).
124. See 1 Davis, Treatise § 1.03; Arpaia, The Independent Agency: A Necessary Instrument of Democratic Government, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 483 (1956); Priest, The Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 24 ICC Prac. J. 796 (1957); Priest, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp. 11 (1958).
125. See 2 Davis, Treatise ch. 15; Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
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greatly delay and add to the expense of hearings. It may make unavailable much of the expert knowledge of the agency which is based
upon unconscious intuitive judgments, without any corresponding benefits
to private parties.
The agency cannot be confined to indisputable facts. Policy choices,
which must be based on all relevant factors, often are the result of data
too elusive to be captured in a record. They are based upon an understanding of general facts, prior experience with similar problems, logic,
guesswork, imagination, intuition, emotions-the whole cumulative experience of the administrator. One can hardly testify or be crossexamined on such matters in a satisfactory manner. The agency thus
needs its expert data to formulate policy, to create law, and to exercise
discretion wisely. It also may need this to infer facts from data, and
even perhaps to check credibility of witnesses. It needs often to use its
resources and knowledge, the material in its files, and the data in the
minds of its staff, after the hearing has ended. The access of the
agency to its accumulated experience and wisdom should not be unduly
blocked or hampered.
An agency, however, should permit anyone who desires to challenge
facts judicially noticed to do so at some time prior to final decision. All
parties should have a fair chance to apply their testing processes to any
facts that significantly influence or bear closely and critically upon the
findings or decision. They should have adequate and full opportunity to
meet in an appropriate fashion all these facts that influence the disposition of the case. What is an appropriate fashion depends on such factors
as: (1) whether the facts are at the heart or edge of the dispute;
(2) whether there is much or little doubt about them; and (3) whether
they relate to policy or other matters. Here, again, the attempt to
establish absolute rules is a mistake. Much must be left to the discretion and good sense of administrators and judges.
Some facts may be collateral ones, on the periphery of the decisive
issues in the case. If there is little possibility of doubt about them, and
if they are legislative and policy-making, there seems little need or
desirability of an absolute rule that no notice may be taken of them
without prior warning to the parties and without the calling of witnesses
to testify and be cross-examined about them. At the other extreme,
there are facts which are at the very heart of the controversy and the
subject of doubt and bitter dispute. If they are adjudicative and relate
to the immediate parties, not to give those parties full opportunity to
cross-examine and to rebut all evidence relied upon by the agency in
its findings on these facts is a manifest denial of justice. When legislative facts are disputed, a chance to know and meet, to explain or rebut,
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the data relied upon should be given all parties, but this does not often
require a trial with cross-examination. Evidence should not be substituted for argument here. For legislative facts, we usually need written
briefs or oral arguments and discussions, not sworn testimony at a trial.
On the whole, the present relevant provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act are satisfactory.-2 6 The agency should have discretion,
subject to judicial review for abuse or arbitrary or harsh exercise, (1) as
to when to notify parties before notice is taken of facts not in the hearing
record, and (2) as to when it will permit the parties to dispute or
challenge facts already noticed. The proposed substitutes 27 for the
Administrative Procedure Act provide that no material fact of any kind
may be judicially noticed by an agency without prior notice to the parties.
This seems unwise and perhaps unworkable.
There are proposals"" which would require inclusion in the record of
all memoranda prepared by the agency staff and used by the agency
126. Section 7(d) states: "Where any agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in" the record, any party shall on timely request be
afforded an opportunity to show the contrary." 60 Stat. 241 -(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(d)
(1952). See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); United States v. Pierce
Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515 (1946). In drawing inferences from proven facts, the
Board may rely upon its specialized knowledge so long as its inferences and conclusions
reasonably relate to these facts. In choosing between two equally possible inferences, the
Board may use its special experience. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954);
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945). Compare Erie R.R. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.
Ohio 1944), with Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,,598 (1907), and American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public .Util. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 63 (1935); United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); ICC v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
127. Section 1006(e) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code provides: "Agencies may take notice
of judicially cognizable facts and in addition may take official notice of general, technical,
or scientific facts within their spicialized knowledge. Such additional official notice of a
material fact beyond the evidence appearing in the record may be taken only if (1) the
fact so noticed is specified in the record or is brought to the attention of the parties before
final decision, and (2) every party adversely affected by the decision is afforded an opportunity to controvert the fact so noticed." A.B.A. Proposed Code 192.
128. Section 1007(b) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code provides that the record for decision
by the trial examiner shall include all the pleadings, "evidence received or considered, including testimony, exhibits, and matters officially noticed," offers of proof and rulings
thereon, and the findings proposed by the parties. A.B.A. Proposed Code 193. "No other
material shall be considered by the agency or by the presiding officer." A.B.A. Proposed
Code 193. Section 1007(c) provides that on review by the agency of the examiner's
decision the "record shall include the above items and the examiner's decision and the
exceptions and briefs filed. A.B.A. Proposed Code 193. "No other material shall be
considered by the agency upon review." A.B.A. Proposed Code 193. Sections 1007(a) and
(c) state that the grounds for decisions by the examiner and agency shall be within the
scope of the issues presented on the record. A.B.A. Proposed Code 193.
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in any way in making its decision. There seems no good reason why an
agency should be far more restricted here than a judge. It is one thing
to insist that all factual evidence relied upon be in the record. It is
very different to insist that both memoranda of law or policy, and summaries or analyses of arguments, briefs, and even evidence already in
the record, prepared by assistants, should also be incorporated into the
formal record. Judges rely on secretaries and law clerks to prepare
similar memoranda and summaries. No doubt, as Professor Cooper
points out,12 9 counsel often would be delighted and find it most helpful to
have copies of such documents (and the agency might well benefit from
briefs of counsel thereon, pointing out vital facts in the record overlooked, etc.). The same reasons, however, that operate to deny access to
them in the case of judges apply to administrators. The benefits to the
parties are outweighed by the added expense and delay, and the hampering of free interchange of views among the deciders.. Even courts have
been known to decide cases upon grounds not argued by counsel, and
though the wisdom of this is doubtful, a statutory mandate is not the
solution. As Professor Cooper admits, 130 prohibition of oral discussion
might also be necessary to enforce this rule. Enforcement then would
virtually necessitate invasion of every conference of agency staff members about a case. The real thrust, perhaps, of the critics here is at the
so called institutional decision, because of the feeling that an agency
decision is the product of many anonymous staff members rather than
of the agency heads.
B. Secret Evidence
A second serious problem is the deliberate publicly acknowledged
concealment from the parties, and even from the reviewing courts, of
crucial evidence on the ground that disclosure thereof would be detrimental to national security or the best interests of the government. 3 '
129. Cooper, Administrative Law: The Process of Decision, 44 A.B.A.J. 233 (1958).
But cf. Goff, Views on the American Bar Association Proposed Code of Administrative
Procedure, 25 ICC Prac. J. 1097 (1958).
130. Cooper, supra note 129, at 235-36.
131. See 1 Davis, Treatise § 8.15; Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166 (1958); Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1956); Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government
Information, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 687 (1957); Symposium-Executive Privilege: Public
Right to Know and Public Interest, 19 Fed. B.J. 1 (1959) ; Comment, The Use of Undisclosed Evidence by Government Officials in Administrative and Judicial Proceedings, 45
Calif. L. Rev. 524 (1957). Section 1002(f) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code exempts from
the requirements of publication for proposed rule-making, data required to be kept secret
for the protection of national security, data submitted in confidence to an agency relying
upon a statute or agency rule, or data whose secrecy is specifically authorized by statute
or disclosure of which is a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. A.B.A.

1959]

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Thus, the basic rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and rebuttal
are denied, often in cases involving the adjudication of disputed facts
about individuals. The problems usually are not those of policy-making,
issues of law, discretion, future prophecy, or of rates and profits. Instead
of legislative rule-making, involving general data and ideas, we deal with
facts about individuals, and their rights, liberties, and property. In
criminal trials, we have pretty well concluded that the government must
either disclose to the defense all relevant and crucial evidence in its
possession which is essential to its case, in spite of the effect upon
national security, or dismiss the prosecution. 32 A rule so absolute is
probably not suitable for all administrative hearings. Few would argue
that the government must be forced to disclose national defense secrets
in order to remove a suspected employee from highly secret work on
atomic energy or from an important policy-making post, even if the
government may not secure a conviction for espionage of the suspect
without this disclosure.
There are two different phases to this problem. First, there is the
government's claim of a special privilege to keep secret or withhold
certain documents or data in a proceeding, such as a criminal prosecu-.
tion, where undeniably a regular trial-type hearing is ordinarily required
Proposed Code 186. There is a similar exemption for national security under Section
1003(f) for such data so far as the rule-making requirements are concerned. A.B.A. Proposed Code 188. Section 1005(f) provides: "In the case of agency proceedings or actions
which involve the national security of the United States and for that reason must be kept
secret, the agency shall provide by rule for such procedures parallel to those provided
in this Act as will effectively safeguard and prevent disclosure of classified information to
unauthorized persons with minimum impairment of the procedural rights which would be
A.B.A. Proposed Code 190-91.
available if classified information were not involved."
Section 1006(d) gives in hearings, "except as otherwise provided by statute," a right to each
party "to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." A.B.A. Proposed Code 192.
132. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53 (1957); Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953); United States v. Coplon, 185
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States v. Andolschek,
142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944). In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), the Court
upheld a refusal to give access to an Air Force accident investigation report in a suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), it was
held that in a criminal prosecution for refusal to submit to induction, the defendant was
entitled to a fair resum6 of the FBI report upon which his draft classification was made, but
not the report itself. Perhaps Congress has modified the rule in providing that refusal to
disclose relevant statements of government witnesses in criminal cases shall cause the elimination of all testimony of the witnesses rather than dismissal of the case (unless the
court declares a mistrial in the interests of justice). See 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(d) (Supp. V, 1958). Cf. Palermo v. United States, 258 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 905 (1958) ; Lev v. United States, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
granted, 358 U.S. 903 (1958); Rosenberg v. United States, 257 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1958),
cert. granted, 358 U.S. 904 (1958).
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by statute or the Constitution. In the second situation, the government
withholds documents or data on the ground that there is no requirement
that a full trial-type hearing be provided. Instead, something less than
such a hearing is sufficient to meet any statutory and constitutional requirements for fair procedure and due process. The line between the two
types of situations is not always clearly drawn, and often they tend to
overlap and merge into each other. A criminal trial is a clear example
of the first kind. Perhaps an exclusion hearing for an alien, a classification hearing for a draftee, or a security hearing for a government employee, are examples of the second type.
Nondisclosure in a case where normally a trial-type hearing is required
is based: (1) in part upon a common law privilege for nondisclosure of
"state secrets"; (2) in part upon an executive privilege growing out of
134
separation of powers;"' and (3) in part upon statutory provisions.
The decisive factors are clearly the type of information withheld and the
nature of the interest affected, civil or criminal. In addition, the courts
differentiate among kinds of civil interests, such as government employment, admission of aliens, or the suspension of deportation of aliens,
on .the ground that some of these interests demand less procedural due
process than others. The type of information varies and includes secrets
of state; identity of and data obtained from informers; data secured by
government investigators; and so-called internal management data. Top
secrecy is usually given to the first category, which involves public
security, international relations, and military plans and organizations.'
The informer privilege has been sharply limited in criminal cases'3 6 and
133. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 Yale L.J. 477 (1957).
134. Cf. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragan, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). In both these cases subordinate officials were allowed to obey
orders of their superiors, based upon statutes, to withhold data. The Court did not rule
whether the superior officials could be compelled to reveal the secret data. See Appeal
of SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (both cases upholding non disclosure in civil suits between
private persons).
135. Cf. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (upholding in civil action secrecy
of espionage agreement made with spy by President). See Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936). All these cases involved the President himself. A
lower court has applied this privilege to the Secretary of State in passport cases. Dayton
v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 144 (1958);
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 574-75 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S.
116 (1958).
136. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (no privilege if informer is one who
took active part in the investigation itself). There is no privilege if the informer's identity
is once disclosed, nor does the privilege extend to the informant's disclosures if they do
not reveal his identity. And if the informer's identity is essential for a fair trial, it must
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also in civil actions brought by the government."' A privilege has been
denied government investigators in criminal actions 138 and also in civil
proceedings.' 39 The issue of secrecy for data transmitted by one official
to another in the course of his duty-the so-called internal management
category-is confused. This includes exchanges of advice, 40 a rather
sensitive category, and government files containing other pertinent data
which private litigants desire.' 4 '
Thus far, in these cases and also in situations of the second type
(where a trial-type hearing is not required) there has often been a failure
to work out alternative solutions between absolute disclosure and absolute
concealment of everything asserted to be vital for national security. It
seems questionable that all government employees, even those not
engaged in defense or secret work or in policy-making jobs, should be
subjected to this type of hearing. 142 Sometimes, instead of discharge,
the proper remedy may be a transfer to another government position
in some non-defense, non-critical area. If the object is to keep secret
the identity of spies or agents, perhaps adequate summaries of their
evidence or reports could be furnished. If the identity of actual government secret agents may be concealed, the same non-disclosure policy does
not seem applicable to names of former associates, neighbors, casual
informers, etc. Often the latter accusers are motivated by malice or
mistake, unknown to the investigator. The accused can quickly expose
the distortion or falsehood here, if given the chance. Where the secrecy
of FBI reports is at stake, full disclosure could be required except for
data whose secrecy is essential for security. If speed is deemed essential,
be disclosed or the case dismissed. But cf. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); Amaya v. United States, 247 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 916 (1958); United States v. Colletti, 245 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957).

137. Cf. Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).
138. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957). Congress has tried to modify the rule of the Jencks case by statute. See note
132 supra.
139. NLRB v. Adhesive Prod. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958); Communist Party
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Cf. Blair v. Oesterlein
Mach. Co., 275 U.S. 220 (1927).
140. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
141. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (sharply limiting this privilege). But cf. Petrowicz v. Holland, 142 F. Supp. 360
(E.D. Pa. 1956); Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
142. In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S, 536 (1956), it was held that a government employee
in a non-sensitive position could not, under present federal regulations and statutes, be discharged as a security risk. Congress, of course,-may amend the present laws to confer this
power.
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full disclosure of FBI reports in draftee cases could be required, even
if cross-examination is denied or curtailed in respect to adverse informants. 4 3 A vague claim of public security should not always be
allowed to override all personal rights and freedoms short of criminal
prosecutions, as it would eliminate any check on the otherwise unlimited
power of officials to conceal weak evidence, and permit them to hide the
real basis for their decisions behind the facade of security from the
private parties adversely affected and the reviewing courts. To avoid this
result, there should be, if possible, some objective independent appraisal
here-perhaps by a judge' 4 4-as to the validity of the pleas for secrecy
because of security. Private disclosure to a judge could be required
in most cases, at least to an extent sufficient for him to decide if the
plea of secrecy is warranted. Subsequent events and investigations 45
143. In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), the Court imposed the requirement
of a fair resum6 of all the adverse evidence in the investigator's report for conscientious
objectors under the Selective Service Act's provisions granting them a "hearing." Why
not require disclosure of all of the FBI report here except what must be concealed for
national security? How can the judge determine if the resum6 is fair unless he sees the
full FBI report? In Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 405 (1955), the Court ruled
the resum6 unfair, saying that it must allow the objector to defend against adverse
evidence by explaining, rebutting, or qualifying it. In Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S.
407 (1955), the objector was held entitled to see the recommendations of the Justice Department to his appeal board, if they contained factual data not otherwise available to
him, so that he could know and meet all the facts in the file sent by the Department to
the appeal board. Why not reveal to him all the facts except those whose concealment
is essential for national security? See notes 146 and 188 infra.
144. Apart from the President, it is not clear what showing must be made and how
much revealed to the judge and counsel, to uphold a claim of secrecy. Cf. United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1953); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953) (Attorney General's claim upheld); Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.
1958). The problem of requiring disclosure to the judge, and if so, also to all counsel
is an undecided one. See United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.RD. 719
(W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); Appeal of SEC,
226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955); Petrowicz v. Holland, 142 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 257 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 904
(1958).
145. Thus, Mrs. Knauff, after the decision in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), upholding the right of the Attorney General to exclude her as
an alien whose admission was prejudicial to the United States, without any hearing or disclosure (even to a court) of the evidence upon which this ruling was based, was in fact
given a hearing by the Attorney General before a special board, which board ruled against
her admission after the presentation of hearsay evidence charging her with sending confidential and secret government data to Czechoslovakian agents while employed by the
American Government in Germany. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals found
a lack of substantial evidence to support this charge. The Attorney General then approved
this finding and ordered her admission. See Knauff, The Ellen Knauff Story (1952).
Similarly, Mezei, after the decision in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953), upholding the right of the Government to keep him as an excludable alien
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indicate that it is all too easy for an official to cover up mistakes or the
weakness of a case by suppressing evidence on the pretext of security.
Moreover, in case of doubt, the official decision is almost always in favor
of secrecy.
Agreement is general that we should endeavor to give the individual
the maximum confrontation possible consistent with national security.
The difficulty comes when this principle is applied concretely. There
seems, however, no real justification for shielding most informers, at
least nonprofessional ones, and no need for concealment of any but the
most top secret data, whose revelation might cause grave harm to the
interest of the state as a whole. There are serious doubts that security
is imperiled if: (1) full disclosure is made to conscientious objectors in
draft classification hearings of FBI reports; 14 6 (2) in passport 14 7 or
licensing proceedings 148 the passport or license is granted unless full
indefinitely in custody until a country could be found willing to receive him, without a
hearing and upon the basis of confidential data (not even disclosed to the courts) that
his admission would be prejudicial to the United States [although he had already resided
in the United States for 25 years before returning to Europe for 19 months], was finally
paroled on the recommendation of a special board which upheld his exclusion on the basis
of revealed evidence of past membership in the communist party. See 1 Davis, Treatise
§ 7.15, at 482; Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 251
(1956).
146. In United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953), the Court ruled the statutory hearing did not require that the registrant be shown the FBI report or told the names of those
giving the FBI evidence. Nor did due process. Thus, no opportunity to cross-examine those
giving adverse evidence is given. For the extent of a party's rights to a fair resum6 of
adverse evidence, see note 143 supra and note 188 infra. But cf. Bouziden v. United States,
251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958); Blalock v. United States, 247
F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957).
147. In Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 235
F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the district court reversed a denial of a passport because it was
based solely upon confidential, undisclosed data and so was not supported by substantial
evidence. The district court ordered that all evidence relied upon for the agency decision
must appear in the record so that the applicant might meet it and the court review it. This
rule no doubt should be limited to facts concerning the applicant and not matter
dealing with foreign relations. In Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), a similar
situation, the Court reversed a passport denial on the ground that it had been made for
an improper reason, and thus avoided ruling upon the question of the use of the secret
evidence. Cf. Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court ordered
either the issuance of the passport or disclosure to the applicant and the court of the
particular reasons for the denial, or a statement of cause for not supplying the reasons.
The passport was issued. See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), reversing 248
F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Clark
v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C.
1952). See Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 47 (1956);
Comment, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1956); Comment, 61 Yale LJ. 171 (1952); Note,
43 Minn. L. Rev. 126 (1958).
148. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (procedural
due process required for bar examination applications); Minkoff v. Payne, 210 F.2d 689,
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disclosure is made of the evidence allegedly justifying a denial; (3) exclusion or deportation or non-suspension of deportation of aliens is denied
unless the evidence relied upon is disclosed; 1 49 (4) revocation of a
691 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (liquor license renewal; full opportunity to rebut evidence must be
given); In re Carter, 177 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949), on rehearing in banc, 192 F.2d 15, 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951) (revocation and
renewal of license for surety on bonds in criminal cases requires a hearing and full revelation of all data, including an FBI report, on which agency decision is based); Goldsmith
v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (dictum that accountant's
application for admission to practice before Board may not be denied on charges of unfitness without a hearing because of due process and a chance to rebut and explain adverse
evidence). Cf. Brooks v. Laws, 208 F.2d 18, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (denial of admission to
bar; dicta that confidential inquiry is allowed); Columbia Auto Loan, Inc. v. Jordan,
196 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (denial of renewal of insurance agent's license requires
trial-type hearing or trial de novo in court). Of course, a trial-type hearing is unsuitable
and should not be required if the question is related to an applicant's technical training and
competence, instead of his character or morals. Nor is a trial-type hearing always needed
or required if general legislative facts are in dispute. Cf. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), where the Court refused to review an award
for overseas air transportation to one applicant and its denial to another by the President,
who using confidential data, revised the CAB recommended decision. The complete refusal
of all review seems questionable.
149. In exclusion proceedings, when the alien is a nonresident seeking admission, there
may be, under recent decisions, no constitutional barrier to denying him a hearing or using
secret data to exclude him. This is true even if the alien is actually in the country,
"knocking at the door." The only protection given is what Congress provides by statute.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 (1889). In exclusion cases there may be no right to a judicial hearing even
if a claim of citizenship is made. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905). But Cf.
contrary holdings cited in note 34 supra. The fairness of an administrative hearing on this
point is, however, judicially reviewable. Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113 (1924), modified,
266 U.S. 547 (1925); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). Resident aliens are
entitled to procedural due process in deportation proceedings, The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), but not to substantive due process, Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954). The line between exclusion and deportation may be a very fine one. Compare
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), with Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (resident alien seaman out of country on American ship
held subject only to deportation, and not exclusion procedures, and so entitled to a hearing).
On the issue of alleged citizenship a resident alien is entitled by due process to a full
trial-type hearing. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939) ; Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276 (1922). If ordered deported, an alien is entitled by statute to a hearing before
an unbiased tribunal on the issue if, as an act of grace, his deportation will be suspended.
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). If the hearing is unbiased, he is not entitled to know and meet adverse evidence, for secret data may be relied
upon to deny suspension. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) ; Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955). Full hearings on a stay of deportation application
are not required. Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955); Chiu But Hao v.
Barber. 222 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot, 350 U.S.
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parole is suspended unless the grounds and evidence therefor are
0 and (5) except in a comparatively few instances of employees
revealed; 11
engaged in highly secret work, discharge for security (instead of transfer
or reassignment) is denied unless a reasonably full disclosure of the
evidence bearing upon fitness and loyalty is made. 5 ' Today, not only all
878 (1955). An order to an alien not to depart from this country has been held subject
to a trial type hearing. Han-Lee Mao v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See
Comment, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 547 (1953). See notes 34-37 supra, note 189 infra. Cf.
United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
150. It is very doubtful if there is any non-statutory right to a hearing on an application for parole, probation, or pardon. Cf. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937);
Loiseau v. Hunter, 193 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1951). There may be a statutory right to a
hearing before revocation of a parole on the factual issue of whether its conditions have
been violated. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). One court has found a due process
requirement for a hearing of some kind here. Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.
1941) (pardon). Cf. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (right to counsel
under a statute). But cf. Dunbar v. Cranor, 202 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1953). The statutory
hearing perhaps does not include the right to know and meet adverse evidence. Hiatt v.
Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S.
880 (1950). Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
309 (1951); note 44 supra.
151. In Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), the Court held a government employee had no right to a
hearing before discharge as a security risk, nor to judicial review thereof. On this point
the opinion seems no longer the law, since due process would require a hearing and limited
judicial review here. SIochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947)
(dictum). Cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955);
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (registration under Subversive Activities Control Act; use of secret data denied). The Bailey opinion also held
there was nothing improper in the reliance upon secret data. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 253
F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 871 (1958). Other courts have reached
a contrary conclusion when merchant seamen were declared security risks and, hence, ineligible for employment as seamen. Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal.), appeal
dismissed, 191 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1951) (entitled to resum6 of all evidence if identity of
informer must be kept secret; identity of informers not secret agents must be disclosed);
Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), modified, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.
1955) (entitled to know and rebut all evidence). Cf. United States v. Gray, 207 F.2d
237 (9th Cir. 1953). An injunction against interference with their employment was then
issued. Lester v. Parker, 141 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 235 F.2d 787 (9th Cir.
1956). In Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872
(1958), an office employee of a company engaged in work on a government defense contract was held to have no right to secret data causing the revocation of his security
clearance. The loss of clearance resulted in his transfer from an $18,000 a year job
(with access to classified data) to a $4,400 job (without such access). Cf. Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950); McTernan v.
Rogers, 113 F. Supp. 638, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1953). But cf. Bland v. Harman, 245 F.2d
311 (9th Cir. 1957). See O'Brien, National Security and Individual Freedom (1955);
Brown & Fassett, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process Under the Port

FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

government employees (including those in the armed forces), but also
several million employees in private industry working on government
contracts, as well as merchant seamen, 52 are subjected to government
security requirements. Perhaps the point has been reached where we
are taking away rights as essential as those at stake in criminal proceedings without requiring the same safeguards for individual property and
liberty. What job, profession, or calling will one be able to pursue without a state license and security clearance in these days of continual
mobilization to meet threats of war?
One with a real interest at stake should have a chance to know and to
meet by rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument all unfavorable evidence on disputed facts, except in the rare case where
national security overrides his rights. The labels, legislative and judicial,
are not helpful. Often a hearing involves both types of tasks. A court
may handle legislative facts. A legislative hearing may involve adjudicative facts.' 53 In licensing cases, the issue may be adjudicative (the fitness
of one applicant) or legislative (the general rule to be applied to all
applicants when facts about them are not disputed)."' If the issue is
Security Program, 62 Yale L.J. 1163 (1953); Garrison, Some Observations on the LoyaltySecurity Program, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
152. From 1939 to 1955, over 4,750,000 government employees or applicants for government jobs had been investigated for loyalty and security. N.Y.C.B.A., Report of the
Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program, 114 (1956). The program
covered 2,371,373 persons on June 30, 1955. Ibid. In 1955, almost 3,000,000 industrial employees of private companies were under the Defense Department's Industrial Security Program. Id. at 115. Over 800,000 seamen had been investigated in the government's Port
Security Program by 1955. Ibid. Thus there are about 6,000,000 persons now covered by
the federal civilian security programs, plus another 3,000,000 covered by the military personnel security program. Id. at 116. There are over 2,000,000 names in government files
of persons, probably not now employed by the government who have been investigated.
Id. at 115.
153. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), where the statute required
only a hearing, and the Court required a trial-type hearing, for the fixing of future rates for
stockyard services-a legislative function. Cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U.S. 38, 50 (1936); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U .S. 287, 289
(1920); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). See Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); Fuchs, Constitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case with Respect to Procedure and Judicial Review in
Administrative Rule-Making, 27 Wash. U.L.Q. 1 (1941).
154. Compare Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123
(1926) (dicta), with Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948) and Albert v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 209 Md. 27, 120 A.2d 346 (1956).
Under the OPA the Supreme Court indicated that a trial type hearing-a full oral hearing
-need not always be given as a matter of due process. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944). Lower courts then required such hearings for disputes over essential facts only.
United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952). But cf. Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944) (not clear if complaint attacked a statute and general regulation or a
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character or moral fitness, a full hearing is needed with cross-examination. If the issue is training or ability or competence in a profession,
an examination, not a hearing, is usually best suited to decide the issue.
C. Ex Parte Influences
Finally, there is the charge that many agency heads and staffs are
receptive to the off-the-record ex parte pressures and persuasions of
lobbyists, petitioners, five-per-centers, and others of similar ilk. 55 Here
is probably one of the strongest arguments for an administrative court.
Judges, so it is said, are seldom if ever exposed to such influences. No
congressman presumably would dream of calling a federal judge on behalf
of a litigant in a case pending before the judge (state politicians and state
judges may not always be so insulated), but the same congressman
would not hesitate to call an agency member about a pending matter.
The congressman feels that the agency is engaged, in part at least, in
performing the same type of work, and making the same policy decisions
and rules, as a legislator. It is well-recognized that there is nothing
improper-indeed, it is the accepted thing-for legislators to discuss
pending bills with interested persons. If the administrator performs
legislative as well as judicial functions, we can hardly expect him to be
treated solely as a judge and not at all as a legislator. Perhaps complete
divorce of functions may be the only remedy here, but other, less
drastic, approaches should first be tried.
Canons of ethics for administrators and the bar in these matters are
badly needed. The canons should lucidly cover these matters in outspoken, direct language. Congress itself can forcefully and clearly
expound its views as to the proper role of the administrator here.
specific order reducing rents; no trial-type hearing required). Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (assessment of amount of tax on individual property demands
trial-type hearing), with Bi-Metalic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915) (no trial-type hearing needed for order increasing valuation of all taxable property
in Denver). See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, supra note 153.
A hearing, not a trial-type one, may be required by due process for legislative-type facts.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). Usually a trial-type hearing is not suitable for such facts. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294 (1933). But cf. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949) (trial-type hearing required on issue of change in
SEC rules involving no question of fact); L. B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1948); Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
155.
See Sangamon Valley TV Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 49 (1958); WIRL
Television Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 51 (1958); WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 358 U.S. 55
(1958); Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958); WKAT,
Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958); H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1959); Newman, The Supreme Court, Congressional Investigations, and Influence
Peddling, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 796 (1958).
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Punishment both for the erring administrator and for the pressure
applier and influence peddler is needed. Perhaps when large favors to
be dispensed by agencies are at stake, there is little hope for any solution
except one which makes the award of the favor largely nondiscretionary,
based upon the objective application of fixed criteria to easily ascertainable facts. The hardships of such mechanical rules would be a necessary
price to pay for the elimination of influence and corruption. First,
however, other methods should be tried. In most areas, Congress
cannot eliminate administrative discretion and set definite mechanical
standards, short of adopting a lottery or drawing-of-straws technique.
An obvious approach is to improve the selection of personnel in administrative agencies, as well as fostering the development of professional
ethics and standards. Perhaps the use of external and internal checks
should be encouraged in many cases. Judicial review and legislative
investigations can perform useful functions. Full publicity of all actions,
with periodic public reports, rotation of personnel, insistence upon
written explanation of all actions, internal review within the agency and
definite allocations of responsibility-all these can help. There is also
needed a statutory requirement for mandatory disclosure by all agency
personnel of any off-the-record approaches, enforced by suspension or
dismissal of personnel for failure to disclose; and similar sanctions on
any counsel' 56 or parties involved (disbarment of counsel, disqualification of the party).
In the last analysis, the most difficult problems presented are in nonadjudicative matters, such as rule-making, loan and contract making.
Here, codes of ethics are needed, but of themselves they will avail little.
Integrity cannot be legislated or compelled. If Congress, however, is
really disturbed, as well it should be, it can assume the lead by enacting
strong measures which will elicit equally vigorous administrative measures to combat trafficking and compromise by appropriate acts of selfrestraint and discipline.

XIV.

REASONED AGENCY DECISIONS AND JUDICIAL REviEw

Another factor bearing upon the type of judicial review is the extent

to which the agency has explained the reasons for its decision. A judge
156. See the Proposed Practice Act, 43 A.B.A.J. 425 (1957). Section 403 of this Act
prohibits any attorney or representative of a party in an ageny hearing from communicating or having discussion, without reasonable notice to or in the absence of his
adversary, with any agency or employee, representative, official or presiding officer of an
agency about the results or disposition of a contested adjudicatory proceeding before the
agency. Section 408 provides for disciplinary proceedings against attorneys for violations
of this and other rules. See Nutting, Legislative Ethics, 45 A.B.A.J. 79 (1959), and the
recommendations in H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 12, 15, 85-91 (1959).
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or private person will have great difficulty in appraising the adequacy
and the reasonableness of an order if the agency fails to state clearly
the rationale for its action. Often there is no way for a court to decide
if the agency has followed an admissible theory of law or has acted
within its total delegation of power. The agency decision, therefore,
should show its logical connection with the legislative policy of the
statute. We want the administrator to rationalize and announce a general
rule or policy which provides a comprehensible basis capable of being
tested for its relevance to the enabling statute. Since a statute may allow
several theories for an order, the agency must show which theory it
followed to the exclusion of others. 15 7 This does not mean that all
decisions should be in the rigid mold of formal findings. Indeed, such
decisions, when phrased simply in terms of statutory language and
standards, are often the worst offenders so far as failure to reveal the
real grounds for the action taken. There is a real need for courts to
insist upon brief, precise articulation by the agency of decisive facts and
issues and the governing policies and reasons therefor.
Of course, there is a strong temptation to write agency opinions which
deliberately fail to articulate policy, because a lucid articulation of issues
and policy, with a frank statement of reasons in a particular case, leads
to two results. First, the opinion is far more vulnerable upon judicial
review since the judge can readily ascertain if the agency has exceeded its
powers, has considered irrelevant or improper factors or reasons, or has
failed to take into account crucial matters. Second, the agency's discretion in future cases will be narrowed, unless it is prepared openly to
change its policies. It is no wonder then that an agency either tries to
write an opinion in the statutory language, or one that is little more than
a statement of the result reached for the reason that it was "fair and
just," or goes to the other extreme. In lieu of brevity, another technique
to baffle real judicial scrutiny and review is to recite all the evidence
and arguments advanced by all parties, and then, without indicating any
157. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), 3332 U.S.
194 (1947) ; New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947) ; ICC v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567
(1947); North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 (1945); Colorado-Wyo. Gas Co. v.
FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515 (1945) ;
Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194 (1944); City of Yonkers
v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944) ; United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315
U.S. 475 (1942); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. United States, 295 U.S. 193 (1935); United
States v. Chicago M. St. P. & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499 (1935); Florida v. United States, 282
U.S. 194 (1931). Cf. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 161 F.2d 413 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 613 (1938).
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preference or choice, state that on the basis of all the evidence and all
the arguments pro and con and &I the policy factors present, the following decision is made. A reviewing court can hardly condemn an agency
for not considering any one factor, when all are referred to in the
opinion; nor can it say that an improper factor was responsible for the
decision, when so many other factors were also considered. Indeed, many
agency decisions deliberately recite huge masses of fact, mainly as
assertions of the parties and witnesses, and ignore reasoning, policy,
or any indication of the relative importance of the issues, facts, and
policies. Such decisions deliberately conceal value judgments which
may be the actual basis for the decision.
Thus, an effective check on the arbitrary, foolish or dishonest exercise
of power requires that every action taken be fully explained and its
relevance to the agency's statutory powers and policies elucidated in a
reasoned manner. On the other hand, nothing causes greater distrust of
agency policy than a belief that each case is decided by new rules
fashioned solely to rationalize a preconceived result in the particular case,
so that the decision does not state the real reasons, which may well
have been kept secret because improper. This encourages recourse to
off-the-record promises and influences. When litigants look in vain to
past decisions for clues as to how their similar case will be decided, or
when they discover conflicting and arbitrary results in prior judgments,
they conclude that personal influence rather than evidence and reasoning
will decide the controversy. If an agency in granting licenses for valuable
rights is found in the past to have sometimes ignored without explanation
factors at other times deemed decisive, few will believe that the past
decisions establish any relevant criteria or standards for agency awards.
Here is a possible objection to the institutional decision. If agency
heads do not decide cases but permit anonymous subordinates to do so,
the whims or individual views of the subordinates, if not fully coordinated and even eliminated by a strong hand and control, may result
in inconsistent and vacillating policies.
Stare decisis, of course, is virtually impossible without reasoned decisions which develop a system of principles and rules. The desirability
of some stare decisis in the administrative process is undeniable. We
want policy-making that is both fair and consistent. Trial examiners
are at a loss in reaching decisions if the agency's policies are unknown,
conflicting, or unpredictable. The agency itself, to be fair, must reexamine every argument in every case if it completely ignores stare
decisis. The effectiveness of the agency is further increased by stare
decisis because, through it, private persons can obtain standards and
guides to enable them voluntarily to conform their conduct to the norms
set by the administrator. These norms also give the agency a firm basis

19591

JUDICIAL REVIEW-

upon which to negotiate, reason, and informally settle many cases. On
the other hand, slavish adherence to the past can lead to decisions based
not upon right, but upon technical rules of law. Stare decisis is desirable,
but not to the point of making it absolutely mandatory.
Little more can be done by legislation than the present mandate'5 8
of the Administrative Procedure Act on this question. Here, again,
much must be left for the discretion of judges, who can insist upon
adequate rationalization of agency orders and judgments. Moreover,
the nature and extent of the rationalization will vary widely, depending
upon the statutory discretion given the agency by Congress (an explicit
narrow mandate requires explicit findings) and the nature of the issues.
Some decisions are largely a matter of informed expert judgment, based
upon long experience, the reasons for which cannot be expressed precisely. 159 To insist upon a clear rational explanation for a result where
impossible will often distort the result and conceal the real grounds
for it. Frequently, an agency is called upon to act as a legislature, to
compromise competing claims, or to predict future consequences on the
basis of past experience. Here we can insist only that the agency state
frankly its theory, even if exactness is impossible because of the breadth
of the order, so that criteria can only be partially formulated.
One final matter is whether an agency should always be required to
proceed according to previously established rules and to make new
policy by a rule prospective in operation only, or whether it should be
allowed to choose between announcing a new policy by a prospective rule
or making it by a case decision retroactive in operation. Generally,
where the agency has a choice, it should use the rule or announcement to
avoid the harsh results of retroactive operation. It may even announce
a new policy prospectively in a decision. But an inflexible mandatory
requirement to this effect, such as is proposed by some,'6 0 seems unwise.
158. Section 8(b) provides: All decisions shall "include a statement of (1) findings and
conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all material issues of fact, law
or discretion presented on the record; and (2) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief,
or denial thereof." 62 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) (1952). The same language is
found in § 1007(a) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code, which requires that the "grounds for any
decision shall be within the scope of the issues presented on the record." A.B.A. Proposed
Code 193. See also § 1007(c) of the proposed code. A.B.A. Proposed Code 193-94.
189. See H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, 41 (1959); 2 Davis, Treatise
ch. 16; Dobin, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp.
71 (1958); Jaffe, Administrative Findings of the Ameer in America, 34 Cornell L.Q. 473
(1949); Keenan, The Assertive Administrative Agency Report, 25 ICC Prac. J. 525 (1958).
160. Section 1002(e) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code states that no "rule, order, opinion,
or public record shall be relied upon or cited against any persons unless it has been duly
published or made available to the public in accordance with this section." A.B.A. Proposed
Code 186. Under § 1001(c), "rule" includes "every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy . . . ."
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Rule-making may even have disadvantages for those affected, since it
may give them far less chance than a case decision of a full hearing on
the merits of the agency's policy. 161 No agency, moreover, can always
foresee all the special problems of the future. Courts often announce
new policies in retroactive decisions. It seems unwarranted to prohibit
an agency from ever applying a legislative standard until it has enough
experience to formulate a regulation. 16 2 The policy announced in the

case, of course, may be too harsh or arbitrary, or not within the discretionary power of the agency. These are different matters. The injury
to private interests caused by retroactive application and the extent of
reasonable reliance on former policies must be weighed against the injury
to public interests caused if only a prospective rule is made.' 63
XV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Another factor important to judicial review is the right to counsel, both
in court and before the agency. All too often in the past, agencies have
looked upon lawyers as a costly delaying nuisance to be avoided so far
as possible.'" Yet, adequate records, full hearings, and reasoned decisions
are less probable if counsel is denied private parties. The proposed legislation to handle this problem seems a long step forward, although there
may be questions raised as to some of its details. 6 ' This legislation also
places a heavy responsibility on the bar. It is not enough to require
agencies to recognize the rights of private persons to counsel for agency
hearings. There remains the difficult problem of assuring that a person
A.B.A. Proposed Code 184. Sections 1007(a) and (c) require the grounds for any decision
to be within the scope of the issues presented on the record. A.B.A. Proposed Code 19394. It is not clear if this will overrule the principle enunciated in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
supra note 157.

The Task Force was quite specific.

See Task Force Report, Recommen-

dation No. 55, at 222-25.
161. Cf. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Logansport
Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
162. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223
(1946) ; Optical Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 963 (1956); NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954); Shawmut
Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1945). See 2 Davis, Treatise §§ 17.07-.08; Newman,

Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in
Administrative Law, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 374 (1953); Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1955);

62 Harv. L. Rev. 478 (1949).
163. Cf. SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1941).

164. Cf. Haas, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp.
53 (1958); vom Baur, Representation Before Administrative Agencies, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1297 (1955).

165. See the Proposed Practice Act, 43 A.B.A.J. 425 (1957); Deale, A Major Reform
Proposed: The Administrative Practice Reorganization Act, 44 A.B.A.J. 133 (1958). See
also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
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who needs and desires trained counsel may obtain this help. In certain
instances, litigants with unpopular causes have experienced real difficulty,
even if there are no financial obstacles, in securing the services of able
and experienced counsel. More frequently, a person lacks sufficient financial means to pay for legal assistance. An applicant for a pension or some
other government relief payment would undoubtedly be willing to pay
his lawyer a share of any money obtained from the agency. Many agencies, however, by rule limit the ,amount of a lawyer's fee, and federal
statutes and contract provisions often prohibit contingent fee agreements. 1 6
. The basic question here is: if Congress has determined that taxpayers
shall finance payments to the aged, the sick, or the veteran in certain
amounts, how much of these monies may be expended for legal services?
If Congress decides that a certain minimum amount is needed for weekly
subsistence, may the bar appropriate part of this amount? Perhaps Congress should provide for government payment of a reasonable attorney's
fee in such cases over and above the amount payable to the applicant, or
else allow the agency or court to do so. But, counsel fees are but a part
of the story. Proper presentation of a client's case before the agency may
require the expenditure of substantial sums to trace witnesses, locate evidence, or investigate clues. Security hearings are an excellent example of
this problem, the solution of which demands the attention of the bar.
166. See also Haas, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta Comp.
53 (1958). Among various statutes limiting attorney's fees or giving an administrator power to
do so are: 39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1952) (Federal Employees Compensation Act);
66 Stat. 173 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1952); 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1362
(1952) (aliens); 71 Stat. 139-41, 158 (1957), 38 U.S.C. §§ 445, 3601-05 (Supp. V, 1958)
(veteran's benefits); 52 Stat. 1099 (1938), 45 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1952) (Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); 8 CFR § 292.6(a) (1958). Cf. Gostovich v. Valore, 153 F. Supp.
826 (W.D. Pa. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 608 (1958). Section 402 of the Proposed
Practice Act provides that every participant in an agency matter shall be entitled to be
represented by an attorney in any matter (and only by an attorney if the matter involves
the practice of law, which is defined as a hearing which by statute or the Constitution must
be decided on a record subject to judicial review). But cf. Niznik v. United States, 173
F.2d 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949) (no 'constitutional right to counsel
for registrants in draft board hearings); United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169, 172 (3d Cir.
1944) (dictum) (same). See also 1 "Davis, Treatise § 8.10. As to aliens, cf. United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 156 (1923) (no right); Low'Wah Suey v. Backus,
225 U.S. 460, 470 (1912) (same); United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (hearing unfair for lack of counsel). Section 6(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act gives a right to counsel in many situations, both (1) to
any "party," and (2) to every person "compelled to appear in person" before an agency.
60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1952). Compare the approach taken in investigations by administrative agencies, which are likened to grand jury hearings or legislative
hearings, where no constitutional right to counsel exists. Cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330
(1957); Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
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Thus, the availability and amount of judicial review may be largely
dependent upon what has transpired before the agency, including such
factors as the nature of the hearing, the adequacy of the record, the fullness of the reasoning in the agency's opinion, the presence or absence of
counsel, and the extent of the separation of the agency's functions.
XVI.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF FAcT

In a discussion of judicial review of questions of fact, three key points
should be constantly kept in mind. First, a court will often label a question of law one of fact (the converse, however, is seldom true, for questions of fact are not apt to be called questions of law). This is particularly so of mixed questions of law and fact, where statutory terms are
applied to facts. Second, there are, as previously pointed out, two distinct
matters here. One is whether all questions of fact or only certain specified
questions should be judicially reviewed. It is not unusual, as we have
seen, to have judicial review available for certain types of cases involving,
for example, enemy aliens, government contracts, and pensions, on only
specified factual matters as fraud, gross mistake, malice, and citizenship. This problem as to what factual issues may be judicially reviewed is discussed in the previous sections on availability of review. It
should be noted, however, that even if judicial review is limited solely to
questions of law (constitutional issues, statutory interpretation, jurisdictional issues, due process, and fair procedure) these in turn often
involve factual determinations (was the defendant actually denied counsel, could he understand English, did the agency act with malice, etc.).
Third is the problem discussed in this section, the scope or amount of review of evidence on disputed factual issues. If a given factual question is
judicially reviewable, then the problem is whether the judge may substitute his judgment for that of the agency, or whether he is restricted to a
lesser role, such as the substantial evidence test.
A common error is the belief that one can devise a precise mathematical rule which will give objective certainty, so that all judges will
apply identical tests and reach identical results in reviewing any agency
action. This not only is impossible, but it is also a deceptively dangerous
idea. This result might appear to be achieved by an extreme rule that
there is no review at all, or that there is a trial de novo on review, or that
the court will independently reach a decision on the basis of the record of
the agency hearing. Even here judges would differ as to the results in a
trial de novo or in making an independent judgment. A rule in the middle
ground between the two extremes of all or nothing must be phrased in
broad terms which leaves much to the discretion and good sense of the
individual judge. The rule can give the conscientious judge some leads as
to what to do, but it cannot give him a precise measuring tool which can
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be automatically used to test the agency order. Attempts to do this are
unwise and fraught with peril. Rigid formulas only place a court in an
apparent strait jacket and blind it and counsel to the real nature of the

problem.
The residuum test requires the flat rejection of any agency finding of
fact based on hearsay alone. This is a good example of the dangers present
in this sort of rigidity. 167 First, it is deceptive since it is not as tight a test
as would appear, for seldom is any finding based only on hearsay. There
is almost always other non-hearsay evidence which can be deemed to
support the finding or not, depending on the attitude of the individual
judge. 168 Second, the critical issue is not hearsay, but such factors as: (1)
the availability of non-hearsay evidence on the matter and the alternatives
to using the hearsay; (2) the presence or absence of trustworthy supporting or opposing evidence on the point at issue; 169 (3) whether the
hearsay evidence is mere fifth-hand rumor and gossip or reliable testimony;' 70 (4) the extent to which cross-examination would be effective,
because of the probable deficiencies in the declarant's memory and perception; (5) the issues at stake,' 7 ' since the use of hearsay to grant a
government pension is unlike its use to revoke a license, fire an employee
for security reasons, or deport an alien; and (6) whether the hearsay is
167. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). See 2
Davis, Treatise §§ 14.10-.12; Davis, The Residuum Rule in Administrative Law, 28 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1955). The status of the rule in the federal courts is not dear. Some
decisions seem to support it. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 119 F.2d
356, 364 (7th Cir. 1941); Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir.
1940); NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1938). But cf. NLRB
v. Cantrall, 201 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 996 (1953); Montana
Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947
(1951); NLRB v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1943). The TaftHartley Act may prohibit admission or use of hearsay. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1952). Cf. NLRB v. Haddock-Engineers, 215 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 202 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1953). But cf. NLRB v. Imparato
Stevedoring Corp., 250 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1957).
168. Cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103
(1927) (hearsay plus silence and refusal to explain by subject of hearsay evidence) ; NLRB
v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1943).
169. Cf. American Rubber Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1954).
170. Cf. Martel Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1940); In re Rath
Packing Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 805, 817 (1939).
171. Cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 460 (1952); The New England
Divs. Case, 261 U.S. 184, 197-99 (1923) (use of typical evidence by ICC); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953), modified, 348 U.S. 940 (1955); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 192 F.2d 417, 419-22 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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being used where factual disputes are few, and speed and low cost are
essential, as in social security matters. 7 2
The present tests for judicial review of questions of fact used by the
courts and drawn in part from the language of the Administrative Procedure Act' 7 3 are probably as satisfactory as can be hoped for. Perhaps if
the past could be wiped out, a better phrased test could be devised. Courts
and lawyers, however, have struggled for years with the language of the
present tests and the Act. Any changes will mean a new period of great
uncertainty while the courts attempt to delineate the extent of the
changes. Moreover, changes are not needed. The present tests give both
agency and court sufficient discretion so that each can perform well the
function for which it is best suited, and still guarantee an adequate independent check on administrative power by judicial review.
For most findings of fact, the current test is whether there is substantial evidence upon the whole record to support the findings. If so, the
court may not set the findings aside.' 4 This means that the court is to
make certain there is record evidence providing a rational basis for the
finding. The judge determines whether the finding could be made from
this evidence by reference to the logic of experience, or whether the evidence is sufficient to find the legally needed fact by reasoning from the
evidence. Fundamentally, this boils down to the fact that the judge is to
reverse if he conscientiously feels the finding is not supported by the
entire record. The fact that the trial examiner disagreed with the agency
finding, when that finding is based in part at least on credibility of witnesses, is certainly a factor to be taken into account by the court here.
The trial examiner, however, is not to be considered as a master reporting
to a court, whose findings are reversible by the agency only if clearly
172. Cf. Marmon v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 218 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1955); Ellers v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943).
173. Section 10(e) provides that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence. . . . In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole
record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party . . . ." 60 Stat. 243 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952). Section 7(c) provides that "no sanction shall be imposed or
rule or order be issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions
thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c)
(1952).
174. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S.
Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1951); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292,
300 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See 4 Davis,
Treatise ch. 29; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956);
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1233
(1951); Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026
(1941); Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparative
.
Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70 (1944).
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erroneous. 7 5 On issues not involving credibility, the trial examiner's
report may be given very little weightY"
This seems to be the same test as that applied to review of a jury's
verdict (either what is required to prevent a directed verdict or to prevent setting aside a verdict). A jury may be given more leeway as a rule
by judges, for a verdict stands if there is any evidence at all in the record
to support it." r It is doubtful if this is the same test as that applied to
the appellate review of the decision of a trial judge sitting without a jury.
Here, the rule is usually phrased as allowing a reversal of the trial judge's
findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Many believe this is the same
as the substantial evidence test. 7 Others think not. Proponents of substitutes 79 for the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to replace the
"substantial evidence" test with the "clearly erroneous" one seem to be
on both sides of the fence. Often, they 8 0 argue that the two tests are
identical, so that no change would result except the elimination of the
confusion caused by asking judges to apply two differently-worded, but
175. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Pierce v. SEC. 239 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1956);
American Flint Glass Workers v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
988 (1956); Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956); NLRB
v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 228 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
952 (1956). See 2 Davis, Treatise § 10.04. As to the attitude of the Supreme Court in
reviewing decisions of the lower courts which have reviewed agency decisions, see NLRB v.
American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 410 (1952); NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S.
498, 502-03 (1951); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1951). But
see also Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Co.,
349 U.S. 358, 363 (1955); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); O'Leary
v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1951).
176. But cf. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC,, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), petition for cert. dimissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
177. Cf. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949); NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co.,
201 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198
F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
178. Cf. NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1952); Vanderbilt,
Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure-Symposium:
Introduction, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1267, 1268 (1955). But cf. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting
Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 485,
492 n.21 (1951); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948);
District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 701-02 (1944); NLRB v. Southland Mfg. Co.,
supra at 246; Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810
(1950).
179. Section 1009(f) of the A.B.A. Proposed Code provides that a reviewing court
shall set aside agency orders if it finds they are "based upon findings of fact that are
clearly erronqous on the whole record . . . ." A.B.A. Proposed Code 196.
180. See Cooper, Judicial Review, 30 N.Y.UL. Rev. 1375, 1380-81 (1955); B. Schwartz,
Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1392-93
(1955).
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essentially identical, tests. At other times, they argue that the proposed
change is not a mere semantic gesture, but designed to broaden the
amount of review. There seems little point to the proposal unless it enlarges review, as it apparently would. Exactly how much the review
would be broadened is very difficult to determine.
Under the substantial evidence test there is a presumption that the
agency is correct because of its experience in the special field. The finding
of the trial judge, however, lacks this presumption because from the
standpoint of the appellate court, he has no expertness or special experience in the particular field. Furthermore, a trial judge may be clearly
erroneous and yet not necessarily unfair in the sense of a willful attempt
to achieve a preconceived result by warping findings of fact. An agency
is not to be reversed for mere error, but only for error plus unfairness in
this sense. An agency is not an inferior tribunal or a lower court judge,
but rather an autonomous body, applying specialized knowledge and experience to regulate areas demanding flexibility and complex judgments.
Courts cannot and should not be made to guarantee the correctness of
every agency decision. Rather it is their task to review the decision to
see that it is consonant with the law.
The effort here is to insure that the agency decision is based upon law
and upon legal evidence, instead of the mere will of the finder. The great
danger is not that the agency will, like a trial judge, err in weighing testimony, since long experience in the special field may give the agency
added skill in this regard, but rather that the agency will appraise the
testimony by extra-legal standards, such as the exigencies of social policy.
All necessary facts should be found by reasoning from the evidence alone.
The criterion is whether the evidence gives rise to an appreciable probability that conduces to the conclusion reached. If there are two fairly
conflicting views or inferences, the agency may choose either, even if the
reviewing court would choose the other or thinks the other more probable. The reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence itself, to decide
upon credibility, to second-guess the agency, or to substitute one rationally sustainable inference for another. Speculation and inference are
necessary and proper, but only if based upon a reasoned view of the
effect of the evidence.
Therefore, so far as drawing inferences from the facts is concerned,
the test is reasonableness rather than rightness. The issue is whether the
agency's conclusions may be reasonably based upon the proven facts.
181. See Holtzoff, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 Va. L. Weekly Dicta
Comp. 92 (1958); Sellers, The American Bar Association's Legislative Proposals Respecting Legal Services and Procedures, 24 ICC Prac. J. 1115, 1121 (1957). Cf. Carrow, Administrative Adjudication: Should its Role be Changed?, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 279, 299
(1959).
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Many inferences, however, may become questions of law. This may
occur when either a court has once found them not merely permissive but
required if certain facts are proven; or a court has found it unreasonable
to draw them from certain proven facts.' 82 In such cases, the issue may
then become whether the agency has correctly exercised the discretionary
powers conferred on it by statute. Also, of necessity, the line is often hard
to draw and in many close cases it may be impossible to distinguish reasonableness from rightness.""s
A.

Narrow Tests

Are there situations where narrow review is justified? Actually, except
for the draft board classification cases, the usual attempt to limit review
does not consist of formulating a narrower test than substantial evidence
for questions of fact. Instead, the availability of review is restricted to
certain factual questions only, such as fraud, want of power, gross mistake, or bad faith. On any review of these specified issues of fact, however, the test used is the substantial evidence one. This is what occurs in
1
cases. Review of
the government bounty"" and government contract 85
all other factual questions is then entirely denied. However, the number
of factual issues subject to review in these cases is often increased by
statute8 6 or judicial decision 8 7 to the point where review is available on
virtually all disputed questions of fact.
In the draft cases, 8 and possibly in the immigration cases, 189 the
182. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 48-50 (1954); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 47778 (1947).
183. See, e.g., Burton-Dixie Corp. v. FTC, 240 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1957); Friend v.
Britton, 220 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955) ; Victor Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 208 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Farmers Co-op. Co. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 296 (8th
Cir. 1953); Robinson v. Bradshaw, 206 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 899
(1953). See notes 193 and 197 infra.
184. See note 44 supra. Here review, if Congress so orders, may be very restricted.
See, e.g., Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925).
185. See note 44 supra.
186. See note 46 supra.
187. See notes 52-57 supra.
188. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946), the Court limited review to
a determination of whether there was "no basis in fact" for the Board's findings of fact.
Cf. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947). Later decisions as to what is a "basis
in fact" make it difficult to distinguish this test from the substantial evidence rule, unless
perhaps it is sufficient if there be any substantial evidence at all in the record to support
the findings, without considering the effect of the opposing evidence in the whole record.
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389
(1953). See 4 Davis, Treatise § 29.07. Since review may be made by habeas corpus here,
Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), the Court may have tried to
limit the scope of review to that of habeas corpus. But, in fact, except for review of a
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Court has attempted to formulate a test which purports to give a lesser
amount of review on reviewable factual questions than would the substantial evidence test. The draft test permits reversal of a finding of fact
only if there is no basis in fact for the finding. Actually, decisions applying this test indicate that it is virtually as broad as the substantial evidence criterion. Attempts to limit the amount of review of questions of
fact in this manner seem unwise if judicial review is to serve as an effective check upon administrative power or its abuse. If a court allows any
review at all of a question of fact, it is difficult to render the review
meaningful short of a test as broad as substantial evidence on the whole
record. A possible narrower test might be one which did not take the
whole record into account in appraising the substantiality of the evidence.
Such a test seems undesirable.
military court martial the scope of review on habeas corpus is almost as broad as the
substantial evidence rule. Cf. Wiggins v. United States, 261 F.2d 113, 114-15 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 27 U.S.L. Week 3259 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1959) ; Pate v. United States, 243
F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1957); Capehart v. United States, 237 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957) ; Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Rowell
v. United States, 223 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Ransom, 223 F.2d 15 (7th
Cir. 1955) ; Weaver v. United States, 210 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Jewell v. United States,
208 F.2d 770, 771 (6th Cir. 1953); United States v. Pekarski, 207 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir.
1953); Bejelis v. United States, 206 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1953). See 3 Davis, Treatise
§ 23.08; Note, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1956); notes 143, 146 supra.
189. The scope of judicial review may be trial de novo only on the issue of citizenship in deportation cases. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). But cf.
Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113 (1924),
modified, 266 U.S. 547 (1925); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (all indicating
that a trial de novo is seldom proper on other issues). Cf. Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (trial de novo allowed). On other issues in deportation cases, except
perhaps those involving review of a suspension of deportation, the scope of review seems to
be the substantial evidence rule (see the Ng Fung Ho case, supra), but in exclusion cases
the scope of review perhaps may be less. See notes 34-37 supra. Here, too, there is an
attempt to use the scope of review for habeas corpus as the test, but in fact the scope there
is usually as broad as the substantial evidence rule. See note 188 supra. Thus, in alien
cases the Court first denied review entirely. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538
(1895). Then review of procedural fairness was allowed even in an exclusion case. Chin
Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908). Then review of questions of law by habeas
corpus was allowed. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915). Gradually the scope of review has
been extended to the evidence itself. Cf. Hekkinen v. United States, 355 U.S. 273 (1958);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Lloyd Saubaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329
(1932); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103
(1927); Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957); Mar Gong v. Brownell,
209 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954); Carmichael v. Wong Choon Ock, 119 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1941); Nagle v. Eizaguirre, 41 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1930); Gung You v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1929). Also see Kessler v. Strecker, supra; 3 Davis, Treatise § 23.08; notes 3437, 149 supra. But cf. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) ; note 149 supra.
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B. Broad Tests
Is wider review warranted? In studying some 188 decisions reviewing agency orders in the federal courts during a five year period, Professor Cooper 19 0 has reached the conclusion that in amending the Administrative Procedure Act, the clearly erroneous test should be substituted
for the present substantial evidence test. He argues, first, that the substantial evidence test is not a precise, uniform, or objective one, because
the different circuits apply it differently; and even the same circuit varies
its application to different agencies. 191 However, this may be a merit
instead of a defect, because the test should and must leave much to the
discretion of individual judges. Moreover, it is unlikely that the clearly
erroneous test would be any more precise, uniform, or objective if applied by courts to agencies. Some agencies would still be more strictly
reviewed than others, and some circuits would still be more strict on
judicial review than others. Thus, Professor Cooper points out that some
circuits, especially the fifth, are far more strict on review than others,
such as the second, in the case of agencies such as the NLRB.192 This
difference would hardly vanish under the clearly erroneous test. Possibly
the Second Circuit would expand its review then, but the Fifth Circuit,
however, instead of retaining its present standard, might expand its review even further. Moreover, Professor Cooper seems to assume that the
scope of review now applied by such courts as the Fifth Circuit is preferable to that of the Second Circuit. Others would disagree. The Fifth Circuit sometimes appears to weigh the evidence for itself, and frequently
rejects the experience and expertness of the agency in a special field,
ignoring the particular competence of the agency. 93 If an amendment to
the Administrative Procedure Act could reduce the scope of review in the
Fifth Circuit to that in the Second Circuit, perhaps it should be adopted.
Statutory language is unlikely to do this. Probably another opinion by
the Supreme Court is the only remedy.
Professor Cooper"9 also points out the difficulty of distinguishing the
substantial evidence test from the clearly erroneous one. Amendment of
the Administrative Procedure Act by insertion of the clearly erroneous
test would be followed by a long period of confusion while the courts
190. Cooper, Administrative Law: the Substantial Evidence' Rule, 44 A.B.A.J.

945

(19S8).
191.

Ia. at 948.

192. Ibid.
193. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Substantial Evidence Upon the Whole Record, 64
Harv. L. Rev. 1233, 1251-55 (1951), criticizing the decision of the Sixth Circuit in
Pittsburg S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 498 (1951). Cf.
NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339
U.S. 563 (1950); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
194. Cooper, supra note 190, at 946-47.
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determined to what extent, if at all, review had been broadened by the
amendment. Professor Cooper believes that the courts often apply the
substantial evidence test not only to findings of fact, but also to the reasonableness of inferences from these findings.1 95 The test for inferences,
he believes, is simply whether they are clearly unreasonable or palpably
unjustifiable. The real problem, perhaps, as Professor Cooper points
out,'96 is that it is often hard to separate facts from inferences drawn
from facts, or from questions of law or discretion. Some courts, whose approach he admires, often confuse the drawing of inferences from facts
with the problem of whether an agency has correctly exercised discretion
conferred upon it. 9 ' The approach of these courts, contrary to the views
of Professor Cooper,198 does not seem always proper for statutory sanction. Where it is possible to draw fairly conflicting rational inferences
from the evidence, the choice made by the agency should usually bind the
reviewing court. This follows because the choice depends on judgments
based on long experience in a special field, such as the relation of a given
fact pattern or occurrence to characteristic patterns in the special field
(e.g., was a worker fired for incompetence or for union leadership?). Inferences often reflect policy choices, on which the agency often should
have final say, so long as its determination is reasonable. 9 9 Professor
Cooper also believes the substantial evidence test was designed especially
for the NLRB and is not suitable for other agencies. 0 0 In fact, the substantial evidence test was developed long before the advent of the
NLRB 2° ' and in a remarkable manner has been adapted by courts to
almost all agencies, regardless of differing statutory language.
There may be some special needs for broader review. First, certain
agencies perform a vast volume of business, mostly routine, which is
handled mechanically. Here speed, low costs, quick payment and decision
are essential. Proceedings are seldom adversary, for the agency exists to
help the claimant. There is often a system of intra-agency appeals. In
195. Id. at 948-49, 1001.
196. Id. at 949.
197. Cf. NLRB v. West Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1957); American Brake
Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Raymond Pearson, Inc., 243
F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1957) ; NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 231 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1956).
See notes 183, 193 supra.
198. Cooper, supra note 190, at 949.
199. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17 (1954); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953). Cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
200. Cooper, supra note 190, at 1001.
201. The test dates from at least 1913. ICC v. Lousiville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 94
(1913) (statute silent as to any test at all). Cf. 38 Stat. 720 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1952) (FTC).
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the rare case of rejection of a disputed claim of any merit, judicial review by trial de novo may be preferable to any hearing, record, and reasoned decision by the agency (unless the intra-agency appeal has established a record for judicial review). There also may be cases where broad
review is needed to overcome an agency bias in favor of a group which
dominates it.
Should there be broader review of constitutional or jurisdictional fact
questions? 20 2 The first problem here is how to separate such facts from
202. The leading cases are: (1) Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S.
287 (1920) (independent judicial judgment required for due process on issue of confiscation
in public utility rate-making; the doctrine of the case is virtually obsolete in the federal
courts due to decisions as FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942)). (2) St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (following but modifying the Ben Avon rule: all findings of
fact on issue of excess of constitutional authority, which involves denial of the constitutional
right respecting persons or property, are subject to independent judicial review, but
judicial review must consider administrative findings and reasoning which are presumed correct and not to be disturbed unless plainly shown to be overborne. Cf. American Trucking
Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 320-23 (1953); Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan &

Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310
U.S. 573 (1940); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936); Safe Harbor Water Power
Corp. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179, 201 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950) ; Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 155 F.2d 694, 698 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).
(3) Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (judicial trial de novo required by due process for an issue of citizenship if a substantial showing of citizenship is made in deportation of
residents). Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). In cases of private right-liability of
one person to another, such as workmen's compensation--certain jurisdictional facts, as
occurrence of injury on navigable waters in admiralty cases and existence of employment
relation in workmen's compensation, must be tried de novo in courts as part of the
judicial function under article ][I. This rule applies to all facts which are a basis for constitutional exercise of power. There is dicta that this rule also applies to facts basic to
an exercise of statutory authority, at least if the person seeking review is potentially the
object of enforcement. But cf. NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See 4 Davis,
Treatise § 29.08-.09; Jaffe, Judicial Review, Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 953 (1957).
Today, so far as granting an enlarged scope of review is concerned, the cases above are
almost entirely confined to (1) deportation hearings involving a claim of citizenship; (2)
workmen's compensation cases in admiralty on issues of existing employment relationship
or occurrence on navigable waters. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Southern Ry., 341
U.S. 341, 348 (1951); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Davis v.
Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1942); Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280
(1935); Voehl v. Indem. Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933); L'Hote v. Crowell, 286 U.S.
528 (1932), reversing 54 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1931); Western Boat Bld. Co. v. O'Leary, 198
F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952); Gudmundson v. Cardillo, 126 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1942); South
Chicago Coal & Dry Dock Co. v. Bassett, 104 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 251,
257-58 (1940) ; note 189 supra.
Some state courts still apply the Ben Avon rule to public utility rate-making. Cf. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm., 304 S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. 1957); Opinion
of the Justices, 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952) ; Note, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 108 (1953).
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other disputed facts in the case. No one has yet come up with a logical
test. Yet, elusive though the category may be, there do seem to be some
facts in certain situations which are more essential than others, stressed
more by the relevant statute, related perhaps to areas of extremely narrow discretionary administrative powers. There are also facts about which
it is easier to be objective, to give hard and fast answers, or to view things
as black or white (such as the issue of citizenship in deportation). Moreover, when a court feels a very grave and fundamental error has been
made by the agency, it is apt to speak in terms of jurisdictional fact to
indicate that the agency act is void. The feeling may well be that a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction should not be the final judge of its own
powers and limits. The judicial function must and should include the
power to decide de novo facts relevant to constitutional limits on state
power, as in civil liberties cases.
Another problem is whether the Constitution sets a maximum limit
upon the extent of review in the federal courts, at least for courts established under article III of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has indicated that it does in order to prevent these courts from engaging in socalled non-judicial activities-legislative or administrative. This happens
if the court simply repeats what the agency is supposed to do.20 3 The
basic notion here, doubtless, is that courts should not determine purely
subordinate legislative policies about rates or licenses.
No formulas for review of factual issues issues can avoid giving wide
discretion to judges. The substantial evidence rule, in theory, tells a
judge not to weigh evidence, determine credibility of witnesses, or choose
from among various reasonable inferences or between conflicting testimony. In fact, however, there is little doubt that judges can and do
perform these supposedly forbidden things even when purportedly applying the substantial evidence rule. The line between what is and what
is not allowed by the rule cannot always be drawn clearly and firmly.
XVII.

JUDICIAL REvrEw OF QUESTIONS OF "LAW"

A much disputed matter is judicial review of questions of law decided
by an agency. There is considerable support for the view that all quesThe right to introduce new evidence on review in these situations is not clear. Cf.
American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 320-23 (1953) ; Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 362-69 (1936).
203. Cf. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); Sanford v. Kepner, 344 U.S. 13
(1952); Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79 (1945); Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Co.,
289 U.S. 266 (1933); Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930);
Postur Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927); Keller v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886). See 4 Davis,
Treatise § 29.10.
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tions of law should be decided independently by the judges. Proposals" 4
to this effect have been made as substitutes for the Administrative Procedure Act
to clarify its language2 0 5 which has yet to accomplish this
208
result.
The present state of the problem is that while some questions of law
are decided independently by judges, others, which are often labeled
either questions of fact or questions of discretion, are reviewed only to
determine either their reasonableness or their adherence to the limits of
the agency's powers. The difficult problem is to determine which questions
of law are fully reviewable and which are not, and the reasons therefor.
The troublesome cases involve concrete application of legal concepts.
Often Congress has used broad statutory terms, such as "employee,"
which must be applied to a particular fact situation. There is language in
several Supreme Court opinions 0 7 which seems to say that any reasonable interpretation of the statutory term must be accepted by a reviewing
204. Section 1009(f) of the A.B.A. Code provides: "In all cases under review the court
shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory and constitutional provisions involved and shall apply such interpretation to the facts duly found or established."
A.B.A. Proposed Code 196. It also provides for the setting aside of an agency order which
is an "abuse or dearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." A.B.A. Proposed Code 196.
Section 10(e) of the present Act merely refers to "an abuse of discretion." 60 Stat. 243
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952).
205. Section 10(e) provides that "so far as necessary to decision and where presented
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any
agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found
to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without
observance of procedure required by law. . . . " 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)
(1952).
206. Cf. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264 (1956); Howell Chevrolet Co.
v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504
(1951).
207. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264 (1956) (CIO Regional
Director not a union "officer"); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Co., 340 U.S. 504, 508
(1951) (whether death was in course of employment); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947) (meaning of "fair and equitable" and "detrimental to the public interest or the
interest of investors or consumers"); NLRB v. Hearst Publications,. Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944) (whether newsboys are employees under the Wagner Labor Act); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402 (1941) (meaning of statutory term exempting one both a producer and consumer of coal). See also Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939) ;
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 185 (1938); Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1934); ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541,
547 (1912).
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court. The Supreme Court itself, however, has never consistently followed
such a view.2°8
The initial problem is to separate questions of law from questions of
fact. Unfortunately, whether the court is determining law or fact may be
unclear, since applying legal concepts involves both law and facts. It is
not surprising, therefore, to find much confusion here. Moreover, courts
have tended to label questions "law" or "fact" not because of a logical
analysis of the issues but rather because of practical considerations." 9
Nowhere is this truer than in judicial review of agency decisions. The
court's choice of a "fact" or "law" label for a question may be motivated
by its determination as to whether the appropriate scope of review is
either the substantial evidence test-the reasonableness or rational basis
approach-or the independent judgment, rightness, or substitution of
judgment test. If the former, then the "fact" label is used; if the latter,
the "law" label. If the court decides to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency, it can always do so by labeling the question one of "law."
If it does not wish to do so, it can either label the issue as one of fact or
discretion, or else as one of law, but, despite this, apply the test of reasonableness.
There are many questions of law, strictly speaking, which clearly de208. See, e.g., Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (Court substituted views
as to who are "employees"); NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) ("good
faith" in bargaining with the union); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322
(1951) (Court in upholding lower court disagreed with the view of the NLRB as to who
were labor union officials required to file non-communist oaths) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (whether foremen were employees; Court upheld the Board
in deciding issue itself); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441
(1947) (Court independently upheld Board's interpretation of statutory phrase); Social
Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) (Court reversed agency ruling that back
pay awarded by NLRB was not wages for social security); Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S. 446 (1946) (who is an employee); Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946) (agency decides what is a labor dispute
and was it in progress; Court decides if dispute was at place of employment).
209. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) (where the Court assessed the
comparative qualifications of the Tax Court and the courts in deciding whether to label
an issue one of fact, so that the court's judgment should not be substituted for that of
the agency). Cf. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958); Alleghany Corp. v.
Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957); O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S.
504, 508 (1951); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 590 (1945); Swift
& Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216, 225 (1942) ; Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305
U.S. 177 (1938); Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 409-10 (1932); Manufacturer's Ry. v.
United States, 246 U.S. 457, 481 (1918). In all these cases the Court treated the issue as one
of fact and refused to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Yet, in every case the
issue could have been labeled one of law, for the meaning of a statutory term was involved
to some extent as to whether certain admitted facts fell within the scope of statutory
language. The same result could also be reached even if the issue were labeled law, but the
Court still applied the test of reasonableness, as it sometimes seems to do.
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mand the expertness of the agency. This is particularly true when the
problem is to apply a so-called statutory standard-such as fair return
or public interest-to a set of facts. A court can label this an issue of
"fact" and so avoid substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. Or it can label it one of "law," but still apply a test of reasonableness. Whatever the label chosen, the court should consider certain
basic problems, the first of which is whether the issue was one for administrative discretion.
Courts should always decide by an independent judgment whether the
agency has stayed within the limits set on its discretionary authority to
interpret the statute. The agency's interpretation may be reasonable
and highly relevant to the purpose of the statute, but still not acceptable
if outside the relevant limits the court believes the statute authorized the
agency to apply. The court's task is to decide whether the agency considered relevant or irrelevant factors in applying a statutory standard.
However, once the court determines the standards of relevancy, the
agency alone applies these standards to the facts. Courts interfere then
only if the findings of the agency are unreasonable, arbitrary, or harsh
under these standards. °
As a general proposition, there should be a presumption that the legislature always means to give an agency some discretionary power to make
choices within certain limits, this, after all, being one of the chief reasons
for entrusting the agency with its job. The decisive issue is whether this
particular question of law was left to the discretion of the agency, which
only a court can decide. In view of the statutory purpose, as the court
sees it, is the agency's interpretation of the statute's meaning within the
range of choices given the agency by the legislature? If the court decides
that the question has been left to agency discretion, the only issue left
for the court is whether the rule is a reasonable one. In effect, the court
then refuses to interpret the statute or to pronounce the rule of law, but
leaves it up to the reasonable discretion of the agency. Even in these
cases, however, where the agency pronounces the rule itself or applies the
rule to the facts, the court, on judicial review, has two functions: (1) to
pass independently upon the reasonableness of the rule or its application;
and (2) to decide independently if the pronouncement of the rule or its
application falls within or without the discretionary powers of the agency.
On the other hand, when the court decides the agency lacks discretionary
power to announce or apply the rule, then the court itself may undertake
to do so.
The problem of questions of law and of statutory interpretation is
closely related to the exercise of the agency's rule-making functions. A
210. Cf. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941).
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distinction is usually made between legislative rules"' which fill in "gaps"
in a statute and which the statute expressly authorizes the agency to
make, and rules2 2 which merely "interpret" a statute and which are based
solely upon the implied powers of the administrator. The criteria for this
distinction are often confusing. Legislative rules usually are those which
the administrator is expressly empowered by statute to make, but they
also may be based only upon an implied grant of power. Interpretative
rules are ordinarily issued in reliance upon implied powers, but their
issuance may be expressly authorized by statute. Strictly speaking, many
legislative rules obviously do "interpret" a statute. On the other hand, socalled interpretative rules often do not interpret. The truth is that almost
any agency power to make rules or to adjudicate cases has the concomitant power to make law, to fill in some statutory gaps and to interpret some statutory language.
Perhaps a significant distinction would be three-fold. First, there are
legislative rulings without which a statute would impose duties on no
one, as contrasted with interpretative rulings which are not essential in
this manner for the operation of the statute. Interpretative rulings may
either be formally adopted as binding by the agency or like interpretative
bulletins of the Wage and Hour Administrator, enforcement rulings which
announce general agency policy in the enforcement of a statute in order,
primarily, to guide those charged with the enforcement of the law.
In any event, the ultimate distinction is not between rules which are
"interpretative" and those which are "legislative," in the usual meanings
of these words. Nor is the distinction between those rules based upon
implied powers and those based on express powers. The decisive factor is
211. United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956); American Trucking
Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.,
322 U.S. 607 (1944); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); Federal Security
Agency v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator,
312 U.S. 126, 154-55 (1941); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236-37
(1936) ; Houston v. Saint Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919). Cf. United
States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 575 (1958). See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 252 (1940); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations
Problem, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398 (1941); Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 1311 (1941); Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations under
the Income, Estate and Gift Taxes, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 556 (1940).
212. FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954); United States v. Zazove,
334 U.S. 602 (1948); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 290
(1946); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (legislative rule interprets statute). Sections 4(a) and
(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act exempt "interpretative rules" from requirements
of notice and publication. 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1952). There is no such
exemption in the A.B.A. Proposed Code.
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the amount of power or discretion expressly or impliedly conferred on the
administrator by Congress.
The question is whether Congress intended the administrator to have
any power to make law, and if so, how much. Congress may have conferred narrow or broad law-making powers on the agency. The court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the administrator when
Congress has given the administrator the primary law-making power on
the issue. Thus, as in other questions of statutory construction, the problem is whether Congress meant for the courts or for the agency to interpret the language or to decide this matter. It is for the court independently to determine what Congress meant. If the court decides that the
agency has the primary power, then it may label the rule "legislative."
This means that the rule is valid if the agency has followed the correct
procedure, stayed within statutory and constitutional authority, acted
reasonably, and relied upon substantial evidence. The court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in passing upon the validity of
the "legislative" rule. On the other hand, if the court decides that it has
this primary power of rule-making on the issue, then it may label the rule
"interpretative." This means that the court may, if it wishes, pass upon
the wisdom of the rule and substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
The rule may be valid only if the court agrees with the agency. Actually,
however, this distinction is often misleading because even in the case of
"interpretative" rules, the court often will give great weight to the views
of the administrator and merely inquire to see if the statute permits the
agency to make the rule. In any event, the scope and nature of judicial
review should be governed by the same criterion for rules as for other
questions of law. True, there may be more discretion conferred upon the
agency by the statute; but even so, it is up to the court to decide if the
limits of that discretion have been exceeded and the discretionary power
reasonably exercised:
The next problem which must be faced is what factors enter into a
court's determination as to whether it should independently determine
the correct rule of law or application, thus denying policy-making or discretionary power to the agency, or whether it should leave this decision
up to the discretionary power of the agency, within limits. Mere ambiguity in a statute is not enough to prove that the right to exercise discretion has been given the administrator. A court may be convinced that
it is unwise to take an independent view of the law, but if that court believes that the administrative interpretation exceeds the agency's discretion, it can, and should, intervene.
When should a court hold that while several views are possible and
reasonable, only one is correct? There are several elements to consider
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here. 213

First, and perhaps most important, is the extent to which interpretation of the statute, and the framing and application of the rule, require the expert experience of the agency in its special field. 214 The relevance and weight of this expertness must be evaluated by the court.
This aspect involves a comparison of the qualifications of agencies and
courts. Unfortunately, the criterion of comparative qualifications is often
not decisive because both court and agency may be equally competent on
the particular problems involved. On certain matters, however, courts
seem especially well qualified to pass judgment, such as those involving
interpretation of the common law; analysis of legislative history (particularly if political conflicts are at stake rather than legislative inquiry
into the technical problems of the agency's specialized work); common
law type problems of ethics or fairness; problems extending into fields
outside the agency's special area; problems presenting, or even substantially affected by, constitutional questions; and judge-made law growing
out of statutory interpretation. 1 5
To say that courts are specialists in statutory interpretation (either as
to the meaning of words or legislative history) contains some truth, but
ignores the fact that the subject-matter may often be technical or nonlegal, or involve an area in which the legislature intended that the agency's
policy should be developed through use of its own discretion. The particular element involved in construction of the statute may be decisive.
If the question concerns the general purpose of the statute, this calls for
judgment as to statutory language, its legislative history, and the social
and economic conditions responsible for its enactment. Here courts would
usually seem as well, if not better, qualified than agencies to make determinations. However, as the purpose becomes more specific, there may
be more need for an agency's special knowledge. If the problem pre213. See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239 (1955); 4
Davis, Treatise ch. 30; Note, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 271 (1957).
214. Cf. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958); Frank Bros.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944) ; Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942) ;
NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942); Railroad Comm. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 573, 581-84 (1940); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 235 U.S. 314
(1914); Director v. Princess Elkhorn Coal Co., 226 F.2d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB
v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1943).
215. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953) (national policy
of competition); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (racial discrimination
on railroads); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944) (legislative history);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (principles of equity and common law);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941) (common law fairness in unfair
labor practice). One may question the judicial abdication in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947), where the question concerned the further extension of the common law
principle of fiduciary obligation. Cf. SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1951) (court
decided the proper fiduciary standard).
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sented is which statutory interpretation will best carry out this statutory
purpose, the agency has expertness here and may be intended by the legislature to decide this very issue. Frequently there are several interpretations consistent with the statutory purpose, all equally reasonable, from
which a choice-presumably by the expert agency-must be made.
Whether the4i7tatutory words will actually bear the meaning given by
the agency, or whether the agency's views violate any clear policies of our
society-are matters which the courts should determine.
A second factor is the clarity with which the rule can be enunciated.
A court may desire to assume jurisdiction over the matter only if it can
delineate a rule which can serve as a future guide to the parties and the
administrator. If a clear-cut rule, stable in form and context, cannot be
drawn, it may be desirable to leave the matter to the agency's discretion.
A third factor is the nature of the administrative proceeding in question. The more thorough and impartial the administrative proceeding, the
less apt is the court to substitute its judgment for that of the administrator. This requires inquiry into such ma.tters as did an agency mem-_
ber or a subordinate issue the ruling; was it made by an enforcing or an
adjudicating official; was the rule formulated by an ex parte hearing or
after a public hearing-not necessarily an adversary one-in which opposing viewpoints of counsel were adequately presented and considered
in the agency decision.2 16
A fourth factor is the intent of Congress concerning allocation of functions between the court and the agency, as revealed by the existence of
any clear legislative preference that the administrator, and not the courts,
should have the primary power of passing upon this matter of discretion
or judgment. 17 This criterion is particularly useful in dealing with rulemaking powers of administrators, for it is often the real distinction between legislative rules 18 (those the legislature meant the agency to promulgate as law) and interpretative ones 19 (those issued by the agency
without such legislative delegation of power). Unfortunately, it is
often impossible to tell to what extent Congress intended to delegate law
making power to an agency. The courts have particularly emphasized that
legislative delegation of power to fashion appropriate remedies is usual.220
216. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Co., 328 U.S. 275, 290 (1946); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
217. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,

411-12 (1941).
218. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309 (1953); NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S.
232 (1953) ; Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
219. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
220. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953) ; FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
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Courts seem inclined to interfere very littlb with agency discretion in im221
posing sanctions and penalties to obtain compliance with a statute,
222
unless the agency has clearly exceeded its statutory powers.
A fifth factor is the relative importance of the legal problem to the
statutory scheme. This involves an inquiry as to whether such a problem
is fundamental2 23 (a general concept) or comparatively mirror 224 (such as
application of a concept to a unique fact). For example, a court may substitute its own judgment for the agency's in formulating criteria, but
allow the agency wide discretion in using the broad criteria. The difference is between applying and generalizing, between making broad
policy and administering details, and between deciding broad questions
or narrow ones. Thus, a court may enumerate an important proposition,
such as the absence of a national policy of competition or the inapplicability of common law rules for defining employees under a statute, and
then leave to the agency the task of choosing in a specific case between
monopoly and competition,225 or defining in a specific case, "em'226

ployees.

Two other important elements to be taken into account are whether
there has been a consistent, prolonged adherence to the same view by
the agency and parties most affected; 22

7

and whether the administrative

interpretation was made contemporaneously with the enactment of the
statute by those responsible for carrying out the statutory program who
221.

FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948); American Light & Power Co. v.

SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704-05 (1944);

Northwestern Elec. Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119, 124 (1944); Federal Security Adm'r
v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227-29 (1943); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941); Magnolia Liquor Co. v. Black, 252 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1958); Walker v.
CAB, 251 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1958).
222. NLRB v. District 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453 (1958); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,
327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946); NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941); FTC v.
Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 218 (1933); Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1951).
223. Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg.
Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
224. Cf. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). There are cases giving agencies much discretion on broad questions. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581
(1945).
225. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
226. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Cf. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (Board may determine whether facts show lack of good faith in
bargaining; the Court decided that refusal to produce records to prove inability to raise
wages may be used to show bad faith).
227. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946); Helvering v. Winmill,
305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938). But cf. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) ; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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were familiar with the legislative intent.1 8 An administrative interpretation of a statute is at least some evidence that the statutory language
may denote this meaning, and that this meaning, ordinarily, is a natural
one. If this ruling also is widely accepted and consistently followed, considerations of stable transactions may lead to its judicial acceptance. Experience may show this is the meaning the words should bear. At the
least, a uniform interpretation by an agency charged officially with responsibility for a statute must 'be given some weight by a court. It may
be given conclusive weight if the interpretation is consistent with the
purpose properly attributed to the statute in the court's judgment, and if
it is arrived at with proper regard for the factors which should, in the
court's opinion, be considered in spelling out that purpose.
Finally, there are certain other factors often considered, such as
whether the statute was re-enacted after the issuance of the administrative interpretation by legislators with knowledge thereof;2 29 the
psychological advantage of having the prestige of a court pronouncing
the rule itself, instead of the agency; and fundamental responsibility of
the judiciary to impart unity and coherence to our legal system and to
see that an agency remains consonant with our legal order and its constitutional principles.
In the last analysis, any formula. leaVes much discretion to a judge.
If he adopts a test allowing substitution of his judgment, he may still
lend much weight to the administrative views. If he follows the test of
reasonableness, he must also determine whether the agency has exceeded
what he deems are the limits of its discretionary power. In fact, in many
cases, the two tests seem to interblend so that it is impossible to ascertain
which one the court actually applied. 3 0
An unqualified rule that all questions of law must be decided independently by the courts is improper and unwise. Certain questions of law
are better left to the agency to decide, if it acts reasonably. To the prac228. See FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944); White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 (1942);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940)., But cf. Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
229. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 380 (1957); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340
U.S. 361, 366 (1951); Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1949); Crane
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United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1957); Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428,
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tical wisdom of judges, therefore, must be left the determination of which
questions of law are for administrators, which for courts, to decide.
CONCLUSION

Judicial review is a keystone and far too essential a part of the administrative process to be frozen into a rigid mold. To function at its best,
much must be left to the discretion of both administrators and judges. If
we do not trust judicial discretion, then judicial review cannot be regarded
as an effective method of using the administrative process in a democratic
society with a minimum of harm to individual rights and liberties. If the
scope of review is unduly broadened, however, we will so overwhelm the
courts as to make it impossible for them to be effective in performing
their essential duty of insuring that agencies abide by the law. Government will not be able to secure competent administrators if more and
more power is given to courts and examiners, less and less to administrators.
The time is not yet ripe to adopt legislation which would prevent further experimentation. We have learned much about the administrative
process in the last few decades. There is every prospect that such knowledge will increase rapidly in the future, for the growth of the administrative process seems inevitable as we try to cope with the new problems
presently confronting society. Now is an inopportune moment to ignore
the great need for continued experimentation and knowledge. We desperately need every resource available to insure that state control and
regulation will be exercised fairly, and with due regard for individual
rights and liberties, since there is no escape from the allocation of discretionary powers to government officials.
To transfer administrative functions, even those of an adjudicative
nature, to the courts on the theory that the problems facing the agencies
have now been solved is to close our eyes to present realities. Perhaps if
given another chance, we might well have used tools other than administrative agencies for certain matters, such as the authority granted to the
post office and customs in fraud and censorship cases, and to the Immigration Service in alien and naturalization affairs. These tasks involve
important issues affecting individual liberties, where the need for courtroom hearings and procedures to ascertain facts from conflicting oral
testimony is imperative. They might have been better handled in the
courts, but interested agencies, however, have gradually reformed their
procedures and evolved measures which seem, on the whole, reasonably
satisfactory.23 ' To transfer their functions to the courts now seems unnecessary and might cause prolonged confusion. To a large extent, after
231.
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all, it is Congress and the electorate who are responsible for the kind of
treatment given aliens. Nor is it wise to transfer the functions of the
NLRB or the FTC to the judiciary, even if these agencies do prosecute,
as well as regulate, transcend all industries, and rely more upon adjudication than rule-making to establish and enforce their policies..2 32 The problems confronting these agencies are far from solved, because in our
dynamic society new ones constantly arise. Yesterday's precedents provide little guidance for the solution of today's problems.
Questions about the availability and extent or scope of review are far
from solved. Further study is necessary to determine how to remove
obstacles to effective judicial review raised by rigid rules about standing,
timing, and methods. Emphasis should be given to the development of
agency procedures which facilitate and insure effective judicial review of
agency actions. This involves insistence on such matters as adequate
hearings (not necessarily formal trials), reasoned decisions, prohibiti6ns
against ex parte secret influences or open reliance upon secret evidence,
and the availability of experienced counsel to all litigants, among others.
Perhaps the most fundamental problems are: (1) the extent to which the
administrative process may and should depart from judicial procedure
without incurring too great a loss in public confidence, and (2) determinations as to which matters are, and which are not, suited for the administrative process.
232. But cf. Cole, Administrative Agencies and judicial Powers, 44 A.BAJ. 953, 1004-06
(1958).

